



EU NAVFOR SOMALIA

MARITIME INFORMATION EXCHANGE VESSEL OPERATORS' MEETING

TUESDAY 28 NOV 2017

***CDR Matt Boulind Royal Navy
EU NAVFOR Liaison Officer to CMF
(NSA Bahrain)***



EU NAVFOR Somalia

- Introduction: LNO Bahrain
- EU NAVFOR: ongoing mission
- EU NAVFOR: Strategic Review
- Operational Update:
 - Recent Activity
 - Where are we now
 - Next steps
- Tactical Instruments: moving forward





EU NAVFOR: Mission



- Protects vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) and other vulnerable shipping
- Deters and disrupts piracy and armed robbery at sea
- Monitors fishing activities off the coast of Somalia
- Supports other EU missions and international organisations working to strengthen maritime security and capacity in the region.



EU NAVFOR: Strategic Review



- Current mandate: extends to Dec 18
- Strategic Review: reports ~30 Nov to the PSC
- A single proposal: 'Agile & Responsive'
- Likely extension of the timeframe to ~ Dec 20
- Intentions ref mandate/force flow TBC



EU NAVFOR: Strategic Review

- OHQ focus remains delivery of the current OPLAN
- Further military input:
 - will emphasise the need for permanent presence
 - ‘intelligence-led’ operations and ‘Influence Operations’
 - must be underpinned Hard Power
- Op ATALANTA has become a core and valued component of the regional maritime security architecture.
- Ownership and Location - yet to be determined.





EU NAVFOR Somalia


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
Operational Update


- Successful period of activity:
 - Counter Piracy Coordinator Jun-Nov 17
 - FHQ in FASAN
 - Focused Operation AEOLUS: Oct 17
- Geo-political situation in Somalia
- Geo-political situation in Yemen and wider region






Registration Sep 16-17





SOCOTRA GAP MONTHLY COMPARE		
	TOTAL SHIPS	NO PAST
Aug-16	86	80.23%
Sep-16	83	81.93%
Oct-16	81	85.19%
Nov-16	103	85.44%
Dec-16	79	82.28%
Jan-17	57	77.19%
Feb-17	44	75.00%
Mar-17	51	76.47%
Apr-17	35	65.71%
May-17	28	75.00%
Jun-17	78	85.90%
Jul-17	113	77.88%
Aug-17	106	74.53%
Sep-17	88	77.27%
TOTAL	1032	79.55%





Maritime Security Transit Corridor





East Hanish Island Monitoring



20th September 2017-9th November 2017

Objective: Monitor traffic and analyse behaviour of vessels transiting East of Hanish Islands avoiding central TSS in SRS.


COA: Surveillance area set up within EMSA to capture SAT/local-AIS and LRIT positional data IOT collect specific information for further analysis.

Focus:


- LPOC/NPOC (Within area)
- PAST
- Vessel type
- Speed (Cost reduction)
- Distance (Time reduction)

Surveillance area:

- 13 15.42N 043 14.37E
- 13 42.38N 043 18.56E
- 14 20.29N 043 03.18E
- 14 40.51N 042 59.36E
- 14 31.48N 042 26.17E
- 13 47.35N 042 40.53E
- 13 34.49N 042 46.38E



Local area depiction of surveillance area.



Traffic density.

FORECAST

Asymmetry (AS / IS)

Attacks **LIKELY** to occur

Houthi Rebels will **LIKELY** continue to target campaign related targets

REALISTIC POSSIBILITY that Jihadist Groups may attempt sporadic high profile attacks against shipping

Some threats to shipping from collateral damage or miscalculation

Terrorists will select targets and conduct attacks based on their objectives

Southern Red Sea and Western Gulf of Aden higher areas of risk

Piracy

Attempts **LIKELY** to continue

Criminal networks **LIKELY** investing resources and attention in other enterprises

Interest in piracy will **LIKELY** remain and opportunities will be sought and acted upon

Local traffic will remain vulnerable but not profitable

Security measures will **HIGHLY LIKELY** remain effective

Local security forces and reduced tolerance for piracy will limit options for pirate networks



Operational Update: next steps

- EU NAVFOR: clear end state – Piracy focused
- FIN / FIX / FINISH across the Maritime Security domain
- Major challenge: Force Flow
- Opportunities:
 - Mercury Deconfliction tool
 - Enhanced coherence and cooperation with CMF
 - EU NAVFOR's strength in depth



VIEW WEEK

< 50 51 52 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 >

Patrol details for week 50 (w.b. 11 Dec 2017)

The map displays several patrol areas in the Horn of Africa region. Each area is marked with a flag icon (EU or a ship) and a number (e.g., '2'). 'Add' buttons are placed over various areas. A modal dialog is open for 'Area 13', which is circled in red. The dialog contains the following fields and options:

- Area 13
- Ship Aircraft
- Patrol:
- Present in Weeks
- Select week(s)
- Helicopter availability
- Buttons: Cancel, Save



AL FAROUQ skiff 22-23 Sept 17



220746Z SEP 17: JAPAN NAVY 41 sighted suspicious skiff in position 1237N 04728E. Assessed to have possible arms and 3 POB. **(1)**


Imagery from JAPAN NAVY 41: JPN P-3 passed updates and imagery upon initial detection of contact. **(2)**

221459Z SEP 17: JAPAN NAVY 41 conducts handover of contact with JAPAN NAVY 42.

Information flow: MSCHOA passed information on events to date to U.N. Somalia/Eritrea Monitoring Group and Minister for transport (Puntland).

230346Z SEP 17: Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) report interception of large skiff North of Puntland. **(3)**

Imagery following seizure: PMPF assess arms shipment to have originated in Yemen; arrests made and arms seized. **(4)**



New Somalia
10:58Z Lat: 14



Imagery



Possible RPGs



Imagery



Shipment included
AK47s, pistols, PKM
light machine guns and
associated ammunition




Ever Dynamic & Galerna III (17 Nov



MV EVER DYNAMIC (IMO: 9142198)
 Registered with MSCHOA
 Reporting to UKMTO
 BMP4 Self Protection Measures:


- Razor wire
- Well briefed extra bridge lookouts
- Crew briefed on how to respond
- Citadel

1. 17 Nov 2017 (PM) . MV EVER DYNAMIC reported to UKMTO and MSCHOA that she was attacked by suspected pirates in a position approximately 300nm SE of Mogadishu. The skiff with 5 persons onboard were armed with AK-47 and RPG's. Initially the suspected pirates tried to board the MV using ladders from the side and stern, however due to the height of freeboard and the presence of razor wire the attempt was unsuccessful. In an attempt to make the MV stop the suspected pirates attacked with 2 x RPG rounds (1 at the bridge, 1 at the stern , both missed) . The MV was able to increase speed to 20kts and escape. The Master of the MV reported this information to UKMTO as soon as it was safe to do so. This information was sent to the Military CP responders via the MERCURY chat system.




FV Galerna III (IMO: 9663166)
 Operating out of the Seychelles and reporting via FV Vessel Monitoring System (VMS). Private Armed Security team embarked. The Master was aware of potential piracy threats and how to pass information to the Military.

2. 18 Nov 2017 (AM). FV Galerna III reported to an EU NAVFOR MPA (who was now hunting for the PAG after the attack on the 17th) that she was approached by a suspicious skiff to within 300m, the FV's PAST fired warning shots and the skiff retreated. The description of the incident provided by the FV Mater to the FHQ confirmed that there was a high probability this was the same skiff involved in the attack the previous day. The information gathered by the MPA was passed to the FHQ and also to other CP responders via the MERCURY chat system.





The Hunt (171200z-181500z)



3. MSCHOA – Confirmation of an active PAG in the area is of a grave concern to the Mariner. MSCHOA broadcast a Navigation Warning and alerted all MV's operating in the vicinity that a potential threat from a Pirate Action Group (PAG) was present. Contact information provided via MSCHOA registration details enabled the FHQ to gather information directly from the Master of the MV and FV in order to find and identify the PAG.

4. Deployed EU Warship with organic Helo and boarding team capability was conducting Counter Piracy Operations in the southern Somali Basin. Following the reported attack on the MV, the in-theatre and afloat FHQ Commander tasked the EU Warship to find the PAG. Co-ordination for the search was managed by the FHQ with full support and subject matter expert advice from the OHQ.

5. Deployed EU MPRA based out of Djibouti was tasked by the FHQ to conduct a search of the area in order to provide the Warship with a recognised maritime picture prior to arrival in the area. During the search the MPA also conducted VHF reassurance calls with MV's and FV's, it was during such a call that the FV Galerna III reported that she was approached by a suspicious skiff. The MPA reported this information which included an updated PAG position to the FHQ.



The Find/Fix/Finish (190300z Nov 17 - ongoing)

6. The Boarding. EU Warship Helo located the position of the PAG at 181200z Nov 17 (approx. 24hours after the reported attack). Covert pictures taken by the Helo were shared by the FHQ with the Master of the MV and FV, both confirmed that it was the same skiff that conducted the attack.

Based on this shared information and evidence of confirmation provided by the Master, the FHQ Commander ordered the Boarding Team to conduct a boarding at first light, in order to disrupt the activity of the suspected PAG.

6 suspected pirates have been apprehended onboard the EU Warship pending further investigation.

7. Legal Finish. A legal process has now begun for the suspected pirates to be transferred to the appropriate authority for prosecution. EU NAVFOR assets can seize vessels of suspected pirates as well as the property on board.

The suspects can be prosecuted by an EU Member State, by Regional States, or by any other Third States with which the EU has agreements, and which wishes to exercise its jurisdiction over the suspected pirates. The EU currently has such an agreement in place with the Seychelles.

The OHQ Legal team are supporting the FHQ in the collection of evidence and witness statements. In addition they are currently preparing the activation of current transfer agreements.



350nm





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Any Questions?

