

# RiskIntelligence


Legend:  
1. Government  
2. Former Government  
3. AQAP (al-Qaeda)  
4. Houthi Militants  
5. Tribal Allies

Government, Popular Resistance Committees & tribal allies  
Southern Movement, Southern Resistance Committees  
\*Supported by Arab Coalition: Air-cover with light presence of ground forces

Former Government, Houthis militants & tribal allies

AQAP (al-Qaeda) & tribal allies

**Military Situation Map of Yemen - 20 November 2017**



## RiskIntelligence

### Maritime threats related to the conflict in Yemen

**PortRisk Manager  
Former Royal Navy SNCO**

**Represented UK at ONI Counter Terrorism and Illicit  
Activities Conference 2011**

**2 x Tours at UKMCC as Counter Piracy Manager**

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# Maritime threats related to the Yemen conflict

1. Background
2. Types of threats
3. Threats from Houthis/Saleh side
4. Threats from AQAP/(IS)
5. Threats to commercial shipping



# WBIED/Drone attacks



Houthi/Saleh Capability: Existing and increasing

# Missile capability

## Possible Candidate Missiles – C802/NOOR




- ◆ Chinese C802 ASCM
  - Noor is an Iranian copy
- ◆ Max Range: 120 km
- ◆ Speed: Mach 0.80-0.90
- ◆ Warhead: 165 kg




Primarily C802: Reduced, but not removed

# Collateral damage: The case of the HANIT and the general cargo vessel MOONLIGHT 14 July 2006


## Israeli – Hezbollah Conflict of 2006



## Missile Engagement



# Israeli – Hezbollah Conflict of 2006



Sa'ar 4.5 PTG




INS *Hanit*, Sa'ar 5 FFL

The Israeli Navy conducted blockade operations off Tyre and Beirut during the 2006 Hezbollah war. INS *Hanit* was providing air defense and command & control support for at least one Sa'ar 4.5 PTG as it shelled targets in Beirut with its 76mm cannon.



# Missile Engagement



- On 14 July 2006, two or three anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) were fired by Hezbollah and IRGC personnel at INS *Hanit*. According to Israeli sources, coastal surveillance radars provided firing data to the mobile missile battery.
- One missile hit INS *Hanit* in the stern, causing a fire and killing four of the crew. The second missile missed the Israeli frigate, but locked on and hit a small Cambodian registered merchant ship, MV *Moonlight*, which sank. The reporting on the range of the merchant vessel from the coast varies between 35 to 70 kilometers.
- The attack took place well after sunset at approximately 2030 local time. INS *Hanit* was patrolling off Beirut, about 16 kilometers from the coast. The exact position of the Israeli combatant and Cambodian merchant have not been provided. Thus, the illustration to the left is a representational view of the attack.


# Mines

Original Yemen inventory MYAM, MKB og M-08 mines of Soviet origin - capability intact plus new Yemen-constructed (local) mines



UXOINFO.com

Source: Iraq Ordnance Id Guide (unclassified)




UXOINFO.com

Source: Iraq Ordnance Id Guide (unclassified)

U.S.S.R. NAVAL MINE, CONTACT MYAM, (IRAQI AL MARA)  
(IRANIAN SADAF-01)

**Q-35-2-11**

Ordnance used with:



### 3. Threats from Houthis/Saleh side



1. Coalition naval vessels
2. Civilian vessels operating in support of operations
3. Saudi (UAE) merchant vessels
4. Merchant vessels with Saudi e.g. Aramco cargo
5. Saudi terminals

## 4. Threats from AQAP/(IS) - primarily AQAP:

Drone or possibly WBIED attacks against vessels in area from Mukalla to BAM - primarily oil and gas tankers



Syriana (2005)

The following incidents have been assessed to be more likely/highly likely terrorist attacks:

GALICIA SPIRIT 25 October 2016



MUSKIE 31 May 2017



Similar: MO to M.STAR 28 July 2010



# GALICIA SPIRIT 25 October 2016



**RiskIntelligence**

**Oil Tanker GALICIA SPIRIT** **25 October 2016**

**Region:** West of Africa Gulf of Guinea  
**Ship:** GALICIA SPIRIT

**Reported above:** 13:02:00 (UTC) 25 Oct 2016  
**Observed above:** 13:02:00 (UTC) 25 Oct 2016

The vessel GALICIA SPIRIT was observed on the coast of the Gulf of Guinea at 13:02:00 (UTC) on 25 October 2016.


The incident was reported at 13:02:00 (UTC) on 25 October 2016.

According to the report, a small craft approached the tanker and a fire was allegedly seen. No damage was reported, and the crew and vessel were reported safe. However, further information is required to determine the exact nature of the incident or whether the tanker sustained any damage to its hull, cargo, or other equipment.

Additional information provided by the report indicates that the vessel had been observed with a small craft nearby at 13:02:00 (UTC) on 25 October 2016. The vessel was observed with a small craft nearby at 13:02:00 (UTC) on 25 October 2016. The vessel was observed with a small craft nearby at 13:02:00 (UTC) on 25 October 2016.

**Notes:** On 25 October 2016, a small craft was observed approaching the tanker GALICIA SPIRIT. The vessel was observed with a small craft nearby at 13:02:00 (UTC) on 25 October 2016. The vessel was observed with a small craft nearby at 13:02:00 (UTC) on 25 October 2016. The vessel was observed with a small craft nearby at 13:02:00 (UTC) on 25 October 2016.

# Similar MO to M.STAR 28 July 2010







## 5. Summary: Threats to international shipping

- Houthis/Saleh ->
  - Direct/targeted attacks against vessels directly supporting the coalition operations
  - Indirect attacks (collateral damage from being at wrong POS at wrong time) connected to attacks against coalition naval vessels '
  - Direct attacks against Saudi (UAE) vessels
  - Direct attacks against vessels carrying Saudi cargo
  - Direct/indirect attacks against vessels at Saudi terminals
  - Possibly but less likely threat from mines (used defensively against coalition until now)
- Game changers that may lead to attacks against merchant vsls in int. trade:
  - If the Houthis are cornered by occupation of Hudaydah or otherwise closure of supply lines
  - If there is a split in the alliance between Houthis and the Saleh side
- AQAP
  - Primarily tankers and most likely especially LPG/LNG tankers

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