

## RECORD OF DISCUSSION

### MARITIME INFORMATION EXCHANGE VESSEL OPERATORS' MEETING (MIEVOM) HELD ON 25<sup>th</sup> April 2019 AT THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL SEAFARERS' CENTRE (DISC).

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| <b>Attendees</b> | See Enclosure 2  |
| <b>1</b>         | <p><b>Introduction</b></p> <p>At 0900 Lt Cdr Chris Long RN welcomed all attendees to the 28<sup>th</sup> MIEVOM. He introduced the guest speakers, members of UKMTO team and Stephen Roberts from the British Embassy (Welsh Government) who provided support at registration. He thanked all the guest speakers for volunteering to conduct their presentations.</p>  |
| <b>2</b>         | <p><b>Shared Awareness and De-confliction Meeting (SHADE) feedback – Lt Cdr Chris Long, OiC UKMTO Dubai</b></p> <p>The 44<sup>th</sup> SHADE meeting was held in Bahrain 16-17 April 2019. SHADE is an unclassified forum to bring together nations, International organisations and members of the shipping industry who share a common interest in combating piracy and other regional maritime security threats. The meeting co-chaired by the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the European Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) is convened to discuss and de-conflict the regional military response to these threats.</p> <p>Day 1 consisted of round table discussions that included Air, Convoy and Counter Piracy Working Groups. Lt Cdr Long gave the following feedback from his attendance at the last two groups.</p> <p><b>Convoy Working Group (CWG)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Chaired by the new appointed Spanish COS Capt Diaz Puente from EU NAVFOR (Op ATALANTA).</li> <li>• The CWG discussed the issue of lack of de-confliction of convoys in the IRTC which can result in multiple convoys taking place on the same day. Delegates were urged to use the Mercury de-confliction tool that allowed the Maritime Security Centre Horn Of Africa (MSCHOA) to plot national convoys and the whereabouts of naval assets.</li> <li>• Delegates were asked to provide their intentions to carry out convoys or deploy assets to the region to MSCHOA 3 months in advance.</li> <li>• The chair stated there was less naval assets in the region now conducting convoy escort duties and that between Nov 18 and Mar 19 there was only a 1-2% take up of national convoys and a 9-11% take up for group transits. 50% of convoys had been cancelled in March and individual nations were asked to provide feedback on why this was so?</li> <li>• It was stated that due to the average take up of only 1 ship per convoy, India in particular had moved away from convoy escorting to a more flexible approach of patrolling throughout the whole Indian Ocean area of operations.</li> <li>• A question raised from the previous SHADE regarding extending convoys into the SRS was covered, it was stated by the shipping Industry representative that</li> </ul> |

Industry did not see the need to extend the scope of convoys into the SRS at this time.

- The CMF representative rounded up the CWG saying that the reduction in convoys was not seen as a negative but a reflection of the success in suppressing piracy and that less convoys reduced the need for the use of the de-confliction tool.

### **Counter Piracy Working Group (CPWG)**

- The CPWG spoke at length about the reaction to the new HRA boundaries and how this may affect ships transits, the use of Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) and adherence to BMP5 measures.
- It was stated CMF, MSCHOA and UKMTO would monitor shipping trends post implementation of the new HRA boundaries on 1 May 2019, to see if there was a significant deviation from previous routes and practices.
- A representative from India gave a presentation that voiced their concerns about, in their view, the lack of effective legislation and regulation of floating armouries used by PMSC. However, the representative did acknowledge that 'No MV had been successfully hijacked with an Armed Security Team embarked'.
- It was stated that military definitions (attack; suspicious approach; sighting, etc) for maritime security threats and incidents agreed by EU NAVFOR and CMF, could differ from UKMTO and IMB's initial reporting of incidents. Under the agreed formats for the IMO Global Reporting of Piracy Incidents, any differences would need to be bridged to create a common lexicon for classifying incidents reported to the shipping industry, this would enable a cohesive assessment of the piracy threat. Industry was asked to report back on any further developments in the work under way to provide these common definitions.

### **EU NAVFOR introduction**

- Day 2 of SHADE began with opening remarks and introductions from the new EU NAVFOR operations commander for their counter piracy operation 'Op ATALANTA' RA Antonio Martorell Lacave and his CMF counterpart US RA Malloy. He stated that the attack on MV KSL Sydney in Oct 2018 demonstrated that there is still a latent but viable threat from piracy off the coast of Somalia. EU NAVFOR were still fully committed to support World Food Programme regional initiatives and to work alongside CMF in their operations.
- RA Malloy said that CMF were keen to promote information sharing and reiterated the strong relationship and close cooperation that exists between CMF and EU NAVFOR despite the recent change in command. He added that they were keen to share operational threat assessments with all interested parties. CMF is committed to keeping piracy suppressed, the driving down of illegal activities, narcotics, weapons, charcoal smuggling and other maritime threats in the region.

The main discussion points from this presentation were as follows:-

- Capt Diaz Puente SP Navy COS Op ATALANTA, stated the handover of command of Op ATALANTA and relocation of the operational headquarters from Northwood UK to Rota in Spain was complete and confirmed the EU mandate for OP ATALANTA had been extended until Dec 2020. The transfer of MSCHOA HQ from Northwood to Brest in France was also complete.
- He pledged his support to the shipping industry and stated that he was seeking to explore new ways of strengthening this cooperation.
- The threat to shipping in the region had diversified in recent years and that with less forces deployed to the region, the need for greater cooperation between all players was paramount, their mantra of 'doing more together' emphasises this point.

- He intended to reach out and continue close cooperation with local people in the region, as recently carried out in the Galmudug region of Somalia. They had created a Cooperation Concept for Op ATALANTA known by the acronym CCOA.
- He talked about the recent proliferation of Information Sharing Centres (IMC) opening in Oman, India and Madagascar and how there was a need to ensure all information was coordinated and shared with all interested parties.
- The new contact numbers and e-mail addresses for Rota and Brest were available on the EU NAVFOR/MSCHOA website and soft copy BMP5, stickers were to be issued to amend hard copy BMP5.

#### **Commander Maritime Forces (CMF) - Cdr Maxwell USN**

- Cdr Maxwell USN stated that a milestone had been reached by CMF as this was the 10<sup>th</sup> year of operations conducted by CTF 151, the CMF multinational counter piracy force.
- CMF and EU NAVFOR has had significant success in intercepting narcotics smuggling vessels, so far this year they had taken 3.5 Tonnes of Hashish and Heroin with an estimated value of \$43million which would seriously dent the revenue stream of terrorist organizations.
- CMF had noted a rise in the participation by regional coastguard organisations which enriched the capability of CMF.
- Piracy statistics remain low.
- The introduction of Industry Releasable Threat Assessments and Bulletins was a tangible sign of the way CMF was seeking to inform, guide and advise Industry through regional situational awareness. IRTA/B are available to download from the MSCHOA website, however registration is required.
  - Industry Releasable Threat Assessments (IRTA) released quarterly.
  - Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin (IRTB) released to update or inform of specific incidents.

#### **EU NAVFOR Regional Threat Assessment – Lt Col Villegas**

- An overview of recent activity and developments in the operational area was given that included the emergence of new foreign military facilities in Oman, Somaliland and Djibouti.
- The growing sophistication and effectiveness of regional maritime capability was mentioned, citing the Puntland Maritime Police Force as an example.
- Kenya and Somalia had restored diplomatic relations post their disagreement over TTW limits.
- 31 long liner fishing licenses had been issued by Somalia to China, it was hoped this would provide the Somali government with vital revenue and help to reduce incidents due to illegal fishing.
- Somalia has also recently awarded mineral exploration rights to companies to operate in Somali TTW/EEZ.
- The asymmetric threat in Somalia from piracy and terrorism (Al Shabab) was still relevant with conflict spill-over into the maritime domain in the Southern Red Sea (SRS) still possible.
- A Pirate Action Group (PAG) is thought to be operating in the Galmudug region NE of Mogadishu and although those involved previously in piracy had diversified their activities into weapons and people smuggling, they still retain the intent and have the capability to conduct piracy.
- Ships not complying with BMP5 protection measures still remain vulnerable. Piracy is suppressed not eradicated.
- In the SRS targeting of non-Saudi Led Coalition ships by Houthi rebels remained unlikely but the possibility of being misidentified was a cause for concern. The threat from terrorism is credible but again unlikely.

- The increase in regional IFC and the drive to unify terminology of incidents was acknowledged.

### **United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) – Somalia update**

- A representative from UNODC delivered a brief on the current capacity building and sustainability efforts in Somalia. By trying to stabilise and provide viable, legal income alternatives they could try and prevent illegal trading which helps to fund terrorism.
- He reported that the charcoal trade continued to provide a large source of revenue for Al Shabab. In order to have an impact in reducing this trade there needed to be a concerted effort made by all states involved either in the sourcing of their charcoal imports or by stopping the transportation of it.
- He stated that engagement with Dhow owners and flag states was required and action taken against those Dhow operators carrying illegal cargoes.
- The illegal trade in sugar, thought to provide \$13 million of funding for Al Shabab, was also highlighted. Most of the sugar arrived in Kismayo Somalia from Brazil and was then smuggled across the border into Kenya where it was sold on the black market.

### **Industry Perspective - John Stawpert, International Chamber of Shipping**

- John Stawpert gave a comprehensive brief on the rationale behind the recent decision to reduce the size of the High Risk Area (for piracy). He stated that it was primarily due to the continued reduction in piracy incidents, pressure from regional states (Oman) and a request from the IMO Maritime Safety Committee.
- The decision was made after consultation with regional states, military and industry representatives, discussion at OCIMF workshops and data analysis of incidents taken over the last 5 years.
- Although the area was deemed to be a threat area the decision was made to retain the 'Risk' element in the title 'HRA' to avoid confusion within Industry and to retain a brand name.
- The new HRA was based on the perceived capability of an unsupported PAG to conduct piracy out to 400nm from the coast with an additional safety of 100nm. It is also an important reference point for seafarers to know when to deploy AST and initiate BMP5 measures.
- The new HRA does not impede on any states TTW other than Somalia.
- Industry, MSCHOA and UKMTO would work together to monitor trends in vessel self-protection measures as a result of the changes in the boundaries.
- IRTA's and IRTB's were seen as a very important product for CSOs and shipping companies. Their continuation was viewed by Industry as critical, it gives Industry an independent military assessment of all the maritime security threats in the region which enabled credible vessel risk assessments to be conducted. There was a call for the IRTA's to address more of the "so what?" questions that arise from the assessments. CMF and EU NAVFOR both agreed to address this in order to help improve the product.
- John mentioned the Gulf of Guinea and that there continued to be concern due to the increase in instances of boarding and kidnappings, he stated there was growing international focus on resolving that issue.
- Discussing piracy in other regions he went onto say in SE Asia the situation was under control due to littoral state cooperation.
- In the Gulf region there was concern over the likely reaction by Iran to recent U.S. policy changes towards Iran.

**Post Meeting:** The new HRA came into force on 1 May 2019, details are available on the Admiralty Maritime Data Solutions webpage <http://bit.ly/2H1k00y>. Copies of the new Q6099 can be obtained from Admiralty Chart Agents.

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|   | <p><b>World Food Programme (WFP) - Tom Metcalf</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• On behalf of the WFP Tom Metcalf thanked the military for providing a safe maritime environment that allowed his organization to provide food to 91 million people in 91 countries World-wide but in particular to the Yemen.</li> <li>• Tom went on to state that in Yemen 12 million people were dependent on deliveries of food aid. Supplies of food and equipment were growing due to the increase of famine conditions across the country with future shipments estimated to increase 160,000 metric tonnes per month.</li> <li>• The WFP was spending \$1.6 billion on efforts in Yemen and Tom once again thanked the military and commercial effort to help keep food aid entering the country.</li> </ul> <p><b>Indian Navy Perspective</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A representative of the Indian Navy stated that the Indian government had recently re-affirmed their mandate for the Indian Ocean which states that 'in the event of piracy, India can interfere in Somali TTW'</li> <li>• It was confirmed that the Indian Navy had moved to free patrolling of the Indian Ocean operating area, spending 10 days in the GOA, 14 days off the East coast of Somalia and patrolling the SRS as required.</li> <li>• Currently 2 warships were deployed giving them flexibility of operations which now covered escorting WFP ships, conducting SAR missions and conducting exercises including ship boarding tactics.</li> </ul> <p><b>Indian Fusion Centre (IFC) Indian Ocean Region</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A representative from the IFC India provided an introductory presentation to their centre which commenced operations at the end of 2018.</li> <li>• It was highlighted that the centre was a maritime domain awareness centre to share information and not a naval incident response centre although it was under the direct control of the Indian Navy.</li> <li>• They will be providing monthly security updates and can be contacted by e-mail at ifc-ior.gurugram@navy.gov.in</li> </ul> <p><b>Oman Information Sharing Centre Muscat</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A representative from the Information Sharing Centre in Muscat provided a brief on the activities of the centre and explained how they wished to be connected to the architecture of regional information sharing centres both civilian and military.</li> <li>• It was concluded that there was an increasing number of Information Sharing Centres operating in the Indian Ocean region which highlighted a clear need to avoid any unnecessary duplication of effort, poor coordination and mixed messaging. CMF announced that the subject of IFCs would be addressed at the next SHADE in November with a new Working Group set up and tasked to look at this risk and ensure deconfliction.</li> </ul> |
| 3 | <p><b>Heidmar UK - Captain David Lockwood</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capt Lockwood introduced himself and gave thanks to UKMTO for what they do in looking after the merchant vessels transiting through the region.</li> <li>• He gave a comprehensive overview of his company, Heidmar UK, which included details of his global team and areas of operations.</li> </ul>   |

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|   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• He explained the marine risk and assurance process giving details of how they prepare for the varying levels of Port State Controls (PSC) and potential problems that could arise.</li> <li>• Charts and graphs were used to highlight changes in demand of oil trade and tanker fleet vessels in particular to meet the changes to legislation being brought in such as the sulphur regulations. Present production was exceeding demand in order to try and anticipate oil demands pre the regulation changes.</li> <li>• Dynamic risk assessments were always carried out regardless of transit area with a global team effort to ensure all individual chartering teams were fully aware of the current situation and potential risks.</li> <li>• Private Security Companies had to pass company due diligence and were employed where owners/charterers determined they were required for specific voyages.</li> <li>• All vessels were continuously monitored and the risk assessment checked, making adjustments as required. Risk assessments were made available to owner/charterer, ASTs and the master in order that he could brief his crew therefore ensuring that all involved were aware of the risk and the mitigation Heidmar was taking against them.</li> <li>• Risk assessments were based on information from a variety of sources such as the IMB, ICC, UKMTO, MSCHOA, USNOI, P&amp;I clubs and organisation such as Dryad Global. David gave an example of how his team would risk assess a voyage to determine if they would amend the route or avoid the area completely.</li> <li>• David highlighted an 18% increase in transits through the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) with only a 5% increase in use of ASTs.</li> <li>• With no intelligence to suggest there were active PAGs between Galle and Fujairah the Yemen conflict continued to present the highest risk to vessels transiting the Bab al Mandeb and SRS. As attacks there have been restricted to Saudi Coalition vessels, the risk of being directly targeted by Houthi rebels was deemed low.</li> <li>• A graph of the region was used to highlight areas and routes across the region where his vessels complied with BMP5 hardening and carried ASTs.</li> <li>• Discussing the threat to vessels in the Gulf of Guinea (GOG) David highlighted the demand for oil in that region was high because it is low in sulphur and that the demand would increase with the new regulations coming into force in 2020. The incidents of Kidnap &amp; Ransom (K&amp;R) were continuing and despite the average kidnap lasting a maximum of 10 days it was recognised that this was a harrowing experience for the mariners.</li> <li>• Slides of the GOG area highlighted areas of concern and areas to avoid. Risk assessments included the use of escort vessels where possible and took into consideration that vessels may have to slow down to rendezvous with an escort.</li> <li>• Moving onto Libya it was stated that ship operations were deemed safe, with all ports operating except the ports of Sirti and Derna. Heightened crew awareness, 24/7 deck watches, close monitoring of VHF and maintaining engines at immediate notice were recommended with advice from Dryad against travel outside of the port limits for any crew.</li> </ul> |
| 4 | <p><b>The Yemen Conflict &amp; the Implications for Maritime Security - CPO Anne McGarva, UKMTO Ops Room Manager</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• On behalf of Cdr James Edwards RN, the Maritime Security Adviser for Yemen, CPO McGarva gave a brief background to the current Yemen conflict from 2011 to present day. She went on to say that;</li> <li>• A truce and ceasefire had been agreed in December 2018, known as the Stockholm Agreement, maritime interest centred on the city and port of Hodeidah and included agreements for the ports of Al Saleef and Ra Isa.</li> </ul>   |

- Despite ongoing daily incidents and reports of the ceasefire being broken by both sides, the truce had largely held, although with the talks at stalemate the ceasefire remained under threat of collapse.
- An agreed handover of the port and withdrawal of armed forces from the city of Hodeidah that had been planned to commence in mid-January had failed to materialise, repeated efforts to kick-start the process at the political level had also failed and there had been no tangible progress on the ground.
- With the ports of Al Saleef, Ras Isa and Hodeidah still under Houthi control, access to the remaining Yemen ports varied from restricted to completely closed due to deteriorating security situations and or a naval blockade. The Stockholm agreement included an expanded role for UN monitors and for the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM). UNVIM provided a structure and process for commercial shipping to gain access to Yemen Red Sea ports.
- Working with the Evacuation and Humanitarian Operations Cell (EHOC) in Riyadh, all vessels are inspected in Djibouti by a qualified team which includes sniffer dogs. Once a vessel had been checked and approved, the vessels are called forward into Hodeidah and from that point the port takes control. WFP vessels are the only vessels exempt from the process.
- CPO McGarva referred to current CMF guidance for vessels transiting through the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden, highlighting the recommended use of the Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC) into the western side of the Bab al Mandeb TSS, remaining west of the Hanish Islands. She went onto state that UKMTO had been monitoring vessels using the eastern side of the TSS, contacting masters where possible to highlight the CMF guidance.
- Highlighting the maritime threats to shipping in the Red Sea, CPO McGarva mentioned incidents involving missile attacks, water-borne improvised explosive devices (WBIED) and sea mines. She stated that although merchant shipping may not be deliberately targeted, there was a risk of misidentification or receiving collateral damage.
- Maritime insecurity and criminality through Red Sea ports was driving the SLC desire to take control. However, despite the Houthis targeting marine infrastructure and vessels linked to the Saudi Led Coalition they are aware that targeting merchant vessels would significantly harm their cause internationally resulting in potential economic sanctions and an escalation of military hostilities.
- The current humanitarian situation was that 24 million people required humanitarian assistance in the Yemen, with 20 million requiring food assistance. Hodeidah and Al Saleef were critical access points for the north and west of Yemen where the significant proportion of the population at risk from famine live.
- Cholera was on the rise with 240,000 people at risk of death due to the lack of clean water. This is the first time Yemen had faced this level of severity with 165,576 suspected cases reported between 1 January 2019 and 14 April 2019. 21 of 23 governorates and 286 of the 333 districted in the country have been affected.
- To summarise, CPO McGarva stated that building and maintaining commercial shipping confidence for the safety of their vessels and crews in Yemen ports remained key to feeding the country. A balance between the requirement for necessary maritime security measures against the need for reliable commercial and humanitarian access was required. Although a credible risk to commercial shipping existed, the risk of a maritime incident in the SRS was thought to be unlikely while the ceasefire negotiations were ongoing.

### **Combined Maritime Force (CMF) and CTF 151 Counter Piracy Update – Captain Husain Alajmi, Kuwait Naval Force and Commander CTF 151**

- Captain Alajmi gave an overview of his role as Commander CTF 151, he explained that command of the Task Force was normally a 4 month period and highlighted the countries that had been in command from January 2009 through to present. He went onto to discuss the other task forces and their respective roles;-

CTF 150 (Counter Terrorism and Illegal Activities) - Pakistan Navy.

CTF 151 (Counter Piracy) - Kuwait Navy.

CTF 152 (Arabian Gulf Security and Co-operation) - Kuwait Coastguard.

- Showing slides of the region, Capt Alajmi highlighted the narcotics routes and the piracy HRA in relation to the CMF area of operation.
- The Gulf of Aden IRTC and MSTC was discussed, with guidance of transiting on the western TSS through the Bab el Mandeb highlighted.
- Incident statistics compared the number of pirate hijacks/attacks, suspicious acts and other maritime security events over the past 8 years and highlighted the absence of attacks between 2012 and 2017.
- CTF 151's purpose is to support CMFs mission to protect global maritime commerce and secure the freedom of navigation with focus to deter and disrupt piracy both at sea and ashore. Capt Alajmi explained that CTF 151 are the only Task Force operating in the region that has the legal authority to arrest and detain suspected pirates.
- Stating the aims and priorities of CTF 151 he emphasised the importance of co-ordination between independent deployers and other organisations, military and non-military, engaged in counter-piracy.
- Capt Alajmi talked about reasons for a potential piracy threat; reduction in use of ASTs due to cost, navigation outside the IRTC, not using the group transits, navigating near the coasts of Somalia or Yemen, passing through the Socotra Gap and the increased number of illegal unlicensed fishing vessels. He stated piracy has never gone away, it is just under the surface.
- The following observations were highlighted,
  - The need for a co-ordinated and robust military presence.
  - Co-operation between all counter piracy stakeholders such as CMF, EU NAVFOR, Independent deployers, the merchant community and regional authorities.
  - Effective BMP measures and embarked AST remain a key factor.
  - The piracy model has been disrupted but not destroyed.
  - Conditions in Somalia drive the future demand for the counter piracy mission.
  - The increased presence and response to piracy for the past 10 years had seen a vast reduction in piracy in the Gulf of Aden.
  - A vigilant and persistent presence was the key to maintaining the counter piracy mission.
- In closing Capt Alajmi stated that the success of CTF 151 over the past 10 years was not the result of a singular country or individual but was through the collaboration of nations working collectively with a common vision of countering piracy in the region.

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| <p>6</p> | <p><b>Lessons learned from an armed attack in the HRA – Broking and Operations Director, Asket Ltd.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Simon introduced himself and gave an overview of his company which offers a free service to the shipping industry by providing support and open source material for all, including price comparisons for HRA and West Africa transits and compliance checks on ASTs.</li> <li>• Drawing on personal experience, Simon mentioned his concerns that the shipping and security industry did not really learn from incidents or events because they did not conduct or share lessons learnt.</li> <li>• Describing a pirate attack scenario, he emphasised that pirates were determined and unpredictable and that due to the speed that an incident develops mistakes can be made in the heat of the moment.</li> <li>• He continued to highlight problems that can occur with ASTs. Language barriers and/ or personality clashes within the team or with the master and crew members could cause communication issues on the bridge leading to the master not being fully aware of the dynamic response of the AST.</li> <li>• The requirement for unplanned drills to be carried out, with or without an embarked AST, was essential to train the crew how to react in real time.</li> <li>• Simon went onto give details of a personal voyage he undertook between the Arabian Gulf and USA, when the vessel was attacked. He described the preparation conducted before beginning transit, the reported the initial sighting of a single skiff approx. 3-4 nm from the vessel during transit and the immediate action of the AST, Master and crew.</li> <li>• He described the continued evasive actions taken by the vessel and AST and stated that the skiff continued to approach at speed. At 250m from the vessel the skiff with 6 POB began to drift however, after a few seconds the pirates opened fire which was returned by AST. Initially the AST fired over the heads of the pirates and at the engines of the skiff, when they began to fire inside the skiff it ended the attack. The pirates were successfully intercepted by CTF 151, 12 pirates arrested and the 2 boats used in the attack destroyed.</li> <li>• On conclusion of the attack it was discovered that the crew had not actually gone to the citadel but had mustered inside the accommodation because they thought it was a drill, and that the warning system only operated inside the vessel which meant anyone working outside would not have been aware of the situation.</li> <li>• Using the experience of that attack Simon emphasised the importance of conducting ‘lessons learnt’ from events highlighting the use of bridge cards to show exactly what to do. He stressed that command and control processes need to be tested alongwith with all communication links. Training and practice were key.</li> <li>• In closing, Simon emphasised the need to share information and incidents so that everyone can learn from others experiences and be better prepared.</li> <li>• The briefing notes and more free resources can be found here:<br/> <a href="https://www.asket.co.uk/asket-maritime-resources">https://www.asket.co.uk/asket-maritime-resources</a></li> </ul> |
| <p>7</p> | <p><b>Question &amp; Answers</b></p> <p>Questions and statements raised throughout the morning along with the respective responses can be found below.</p> <p><b>Q.</b> Lt Cdr Long asked Simon (Asket) if they used 3 or 4 man teams?<br/> <b>A.</b> Simon stated that 3 man teams work however, a 4 man team allowed for a better all round awareness in an incident and working/ watch-keeping routine.</p> <p><b>Q.</b> Capt Alajmi (CTF 151) asked Simon (Asket) about training requirements?</p>   |

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|   | <p><b>A.</b> Simon stated that each ship should carry out drills and training adding that the relevant ISPS codes were the basis for the requirement and were dependant on the vessel and crew.</p> <p>This was confirmed by Anup Khan (Bahri shipping) and Meena Matthews (GAC). It was pointed out that in the unlikely attack of a WBIED the crew would need to be able to move quickly to a safe place above the water line which could be in the cross alley way for a container ship. Steve Hardy (NYK) highlighted that for small ships and tankers crews would have to go to the citadel and the meeting agreed that it was important for each ship to have its own plan that they regularly rehearsed.</p> <p><b>Q.</b> Sandeep Manglik (GEM) raised his concerns that vessels with ASTs onboard were not allowed in Aden.</p> <p><b>A.</b> Dimitris Maniatis (Diapolus) stated that he has ASTs onboard vessel that have gone into Aden and Capt David Lockwood (Heidmar) suggested there may be issues with obtaining weapon licences. Lt Cdr Aaron Krekorian (USNCAGS) confirmed that the port was stable and he was unaware of any issues.</p> <p><b>Q.</b> Steve Hardy (NYK) asked that if the military knew where and when illegal shipments of charcoal took place what was being done to prevent it?</p> <p><b>A.</b> Lt Cdr Long stated he was not aware of when charcoal shipments took place, he said that regional states should check where their shipments of charcoal are sourced to ensure it is from legitimate, non-embargoed sources. However, while the demand was there it would take time to shut down and cease the movement of illegal shipments. The drive was for more co-operation between all parties involved in the prevention of this illegal activity.</p> <p><b>Q.</b> The final questions was a plea from Capt Alamji (CTF 151) for co-operation from masters and vessels in their forthcoming focused operation from 29 Apr-5 May. The operation was to analysis fishing trends in the Gulf of Aden. There was an additional plea on behalf of CMF for masters of vessels that would be willing to have their vessels take part in boarding operations.</p> |
| 8 | <p><b>UKMTO Update - Lt Cdr Chris Long, Officer in Charge</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• From a UKMTO perspective, the ongoing threat to shipping from piracy, conflict spill over and terrorism remains our focus. The threat is constantly evolving and we wait to see what reaction there will be from Iran to the recent decision by the U.S. government to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization.</li> <li>• It is likely ships will see more IRGC activity particularly in the SOH. Over the last weekend there was a reported hijacking of a Yemeni Dhow by armed men who appear to have used it as a mother ship to carry out 3 attacks on fishing trawlers approx 250nm SE of Mogadishu. Although unclear yet who carried out the attacks it is unlikely commercial transport ships were the intended targets. A Spanish warship has since intercepted the Dhow and we are awaiting further updates from them. Both of these recent developments serve to highlight the unstable nature of the maritime threat to commercial shipping in the Region and UKMTO will always endeavour to keep Industry informed of the changing threat.</li> <li>• Outreach and engagement with Industry is a major part of our role here in the UAE, since the last MIEVOM UKMTO have visited 282 ships and have had over 30 people from all sectors of the maritime community visit our office, we recently travelled to Qatar to present a maritime threat update to the local shipping community and the MNLO and I will continue to visit companies to strengthen our ties with the local shipping community. Anyone wishing to have us brief their organisations or workforce in house on maritime security matters or indeed visit our offices in the British Embassy please let me know.</li> </ul>   |

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|                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Finally UKMTO exists to facilitate a two way information flow between Industry and the Military and we will continue to deliver that function as long as the need exists.</li> </ul>  |
| <p><b>9</b></p>  | <p><b>Closing Remarks</b></p> <p>Lt Cdr Long closed the meeting, he thanked everyone for their attendance, Deepak and staff of the Seaman's Centre for their support and hospitality in hosting the MIEVOM. Attendees were requested to complete the feedback proforma included in their welcome pack, with particular regard to suggestions for future presenters and/or presentations. Anyone wishing to present or has suggestions for the next or future MIEVOMs should send their details to <a href="mailto:dubai-oic@ukmto.org">dubai-oic@ukmto.org</a>. The meeting was concluded at 1320.</p> |
| <p><b>10</b></p> | <p><b>Date of next meetings:</b></p> <p>SHADE. Bahrain 19 - 20 November 2019<br/> MIEVOM. Dubai 28 November 2019</p>   |

## LIST OF ATTENDEES

### MARITIME INFORMATION EXCHANGE VESSEL OPERATORS' MEETING (MIEVOM) HELD ON 25<sup>th</sup> APRIL 2019 AT THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL SEAFARERS' CENTRE

#### Speakers

##### Organisation

UKMTO, OIC  
UKMTO, ORM  
Kuwait Naval Force & CTF 151  
Asket Ltd  
Heidmar UK Ltd

##### Name

Lt Cdr Chris Long RN  
CPO Anne McGarva RNR  
Capt Husain Alajmi Kuwait Naval Force  
The Operations Director  
Capt David Lockwood

#### Attendees

Assist Logistics  
Bahri Ship Management  
Chenega International Consulting LLC  
CTF 151  
Defence Attache British Embassy Abu Dhabi  
Diaplous  
Emarat Maritime  
Emia Alindien  
Emia Alindien  
Emia Alindien  
Gulf Energy Maritime (GEM)  
International Registries (Middle East) DMCEST  
International Registries (Middle East) DMCEST  
Maersk West & Central Asia, Feeder Manager  
NOV Ltd  
NYK Line, Area Marine Representative Middle East  
Odfjell Middle East DMCC  
Oman Ship Management  
Oman Ship Management  
RNLO Gulf, NP1023  
Shell International Trading Middle East  
Shell Trading & Supply Co  
Shell  
Special Contingency Risks  
Special Contingency Risks  
UKHO Law of the Sea  
UKMTO, Briefing Assistant  
UKMTO, MNLO  
US NCAGS  
Welsh Government

Alex Munro  
Anup Khan  
Harry Harper  
Cdr Muhamad Al Hasinan  
Capt Jim Lowther  
Dimitris Maniartis  
Capt P K Sawhney  
Major Bertrand Lespes  
CPO Olivier Ruiz  
PO Aurelie Fresneau  
Sandeep Manglik  
Capt Amarjit Kauchhur  
Anil Jain  
Rienk Kwast  
Peter Hayes  
Capt Steve Hardy  
Julius Freund  
Faisal Al Abri  
Feryat Dalioglu  
Cdr Mark Stuttard RN  
Capt Sam Sithambaram  
Cedric Kegels  
Khim Chong  
Dean Allen  
Panteha Peters  
Fiona Bloor  
LH Roy Cadman RNR  
Chris Scothern  
Lt Cdr Aaron Krekorian USN  
Stephen Roberts

#### Apologies received

EMEA MacQuarrie Group  
ENOC  
Svitzer Middle East

Alan Long  
Capt Raj Shetty  
Capt Scott Ward