

## RECORD OF DISCUSSION

### MARITIME INFORMATION EXCHANGE VESSEL OPERATORS' MEETING (MIEVOM) HELD ON 28<sup>th</sup> NOVEMBER 2019 AT THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL SEAFARERS' CENTRE (DISC).

<b>Attendees</b>	See Enclosure 2
<b>1</b>	<p><b>Introduction</b></p> <p>At 0900 Lt Cdr Chris Long RN welcomed all attendees to the 29<sup>th</sup> MIEVOM, highlighting the attendance of Capt Khaled Al Kandari Kuwaiti Naval Force, Commander of CTF 151 Counter Piracy Ops. He introduced the guest speakers, members of UKMTO team and invited all attendees to give a brief introduction of who they were and the organisation they represented.</p>
<b>2</b>	<p><b>Shared Awareness and De-confliction Meeting (SHADE) feedback – Lt Cdr Chris Long, OiC UKMTO Dubai</b></p> <p>The 45<sup>th</sup> SHADE meeting was held in Bahrain 19-20 November 2019. SHADE is an unclassified forum to bring together nations, International organisations and members of the shipping industry who share a common interest in combating piracy and other regional maritime security threats. The meeting, co-chaired by the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the European Naval Force (EU NAVFOR), is convened to discuss and de-conflict the regional military response to these threats.</p> <p>Day 1 consisted of round table discussions that included Air, Convoy and Counter Piracy Working Groups. Lt Cdr Long gave the following feedback from his attendance at two of these groups.</p> <p><b>Counter Piracy Working Group</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capt Maxwell, Combined Maritime Force (CMF) Chief of Staff gave an update on piracy stating that piracy remained suppressed but not eradicated, he emphasised however that there was no room for complacency as the threat from Somali pirate groups remained a viable one.</li> <li>• He confirmed there had been one act of Somali piracy in 2019 on 2 fishing trawlers in April and that EU NAVFOR currently had 2 warships patrolling the Somali area and one aircraft operating from Djibouti.</li> <li>• It was suggested that although SHADE was primarily related to piracy in the Indian Ocean the presence of a representative from a West African focussed organization such as the MDAT GoG may be useful at the next SHADE.</li> <li>• The monitoring of shipping trends post the reduction of the HRA, use of Private Armed Security Teams (PAST) and adherence to BMP5 was discussed and is covered below under 'Impact in the reduction of the HRA - EUNAVFOR'.</li> <li>• He stressed the importance that Industry remains focused on the use of BMP 5 measures and the use of AST, stating it remained a fact that no vessel had been hijacked that had an AST embarked.</li> </ul>

## Maritime Information Fusion Centres (IFC) Working Group

- Recently the Region had witnessed a proliferation of National Maritime Information Fusion Centres opening up notably in Madagascar, Oman and India. This WG had been convened to try to rationalise information sharing between the IFCs and to work out how best to share information with each other and co-ordinate effort.
- Industry recognised that there was now a number of contact points however, UKMTO still remained the primary contact for Industry to gain access to/pass information to military organisations.
- Information sharing arrangements were discussed and it was agreed to open up the MSCHOA administered 'MERCURY' reporting system to other reporting centres in the region.
- It was concluded that this initial WG would remain an action item for future SHADE.

## Day 2 of SHADE

- Vice Admiral James Malloy the Commander of the US 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet and Commander of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in Bahrain opened day 2 and welcomed the representative from the Kenyan Navy to their first SHADE along with other friends old and new.
- He stressed the need to work together to guarantee freedom of navigation in the region and that the current success in doing so was a truly International effort.
- CMF was keen to promote information sharing and he reiterated the strong relationship and close cooperation that exists between CMF/EUNAFOR and other organizations such as UKMTO.
- He said that they were keen to share their operational threat assessments with all interested parties through the release of Industry Releasable Threat Assessments (IRTA). Access to IRTAs can be obtained via the MSCHOA website (authorised log-in required).
- CMF is committed to keeping piracy suppressed, and removing the root causes of piracy in Somalia such as illegal fishing, poverty and the lack of viable alternative employment. They were also committed to driving down illegal activities such as narcotics, weapons and charcoal smuggling along with other maritime threats in the region.

## EU NAVFOR introduction

- Capt Diaz Puente Spanish Navy gave an update on the EU NAVFOR mission on counter piracy Op 'Atalanta'.
- He reported he had two frigates under his command, one Spanish and one Italian, which were supported by German and Spanish Maritime Patrol Aircraft.
- EUNAVFOR is commanded from Rota in Spain and he confirmed that the EU mandate for OP Atalanta had been extended until Dec 2020.
- He spoke about their focussed operations conducted off Somalia which centred on the 5 main pillars of **Deterrence, Engagement** with local communities, **Understanding** the situation ashore, **Developing** relationships with local forces and authorities and **Supporting** other organizations such as the WFP and UNODC.
- He also talked about the terrorist threat in the region in the form of Al Shabaab in Somalia, Al Qaeda in the Saudi peninsular and Somalia and the Islamic State.

## Commander Maritime Forces (CMF) - Cdr Maxwell USN

- Cdr Maxwell USN reported on the significant success in intercepting vessels smuggling narcotics. So far this year they had taken 30,000 kilos of Hashish worth an estimated value of \$46million which would seriously dent the revenue stream of terrorist organizations.

- He reiterated that although incidences of piracy were low, Industry should not lower its guard (literally). He said CMF/EUNAVFOR Industry Releasable Threat Assessments and Bulletins were a tangible sign of the way CMF was seeking to inform, guide and advise Industry.

### **CMF Regional Threat Assessment - Cdr Iliffe RN**

Cdr Iliffe RN gave a comprehensive presentation covering 5 main topics:-

- Illegal fishing off the Somali coast - the scale and methods employed by illegal fishing boats was having a devastating impact on sea life and was not sustainable. The concern was that if this continues then Somali fisherman will seek to retaliate returning to the situation that initially led to the rise of piracy in that area.
- Piracy - is 'suppressed but not eradicated' however, factors such as illegal fishing, poor governance and poverty could be the drivers for its return. He stated there had only been one incident of attempted piracy in 2019. The continued use of 'Grey Hulls' was likely as this was acknowledged to be a significant deterrent factor to piracy off the Somali coast.
- Terrorism - the threat was a real one although not specifically to the maritime sector. Illegal activities that create revenue streams for terrorism were particularly prevalent in the region and CMF were actively involved in trying stop such activity.
- Smuggling of people, weapons, charcoal, sugar and narcotics - although not a direct threat to commercial shipping it provided funding for possible terrorist attacks.
- Regional conflicts and disputes such as those in Yemen, recent tensions in the Arabian Gulf and the dispute between Somali and Kenya over TTW boundaries has had economic consequences. He said the use of limpet mines on vessels anchored off Fujairah in April, the attacks on 2 oil tankers in the GOO, the hijacking of Stena Impero and more recently the attack on the Iranian flagged tanker Sabiti have had a destabilising affect and led to a rise in oil prices.

### **Somalia Update - Mr John Steed United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNDOC)**

- John Steed gave an update on Somalia and explained how the central government in Mogadishu had little if any power outside Mogadishu. The different states of Somalia (Puntland, Somaliland, Galmudug etc.) acted independently and had cabinets, ministers etc. of their own. The integrity of these states in Somalia were challenged by Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda and other warlords.
- Maritime security was looked after by local forces, the most coherent force being the Puntland Maritime Police Forces who were policing the Puntland coastal areas. Other security forces including AMISON operated mainly in support of specific ports along the coast.
- He confirmed that currently only 3 seafarers are left as hostages in Somalia, all from the Iranian fishing vessel Siraj, which was pirated in 2015. They were in a very poor state, two had been wounded a while ago during an attempt by a rival criminal group to secure control over the hostages. Mr Steed mentioned that the current ransom demand was \$320,000 USD and he welcomed donations.
- Pirate Action Groups (PAGs) still remain active but are less protected and their networks are weaker. He speculated that the rise in Oil and Gas exploration off Somalia could present a new opportunity for the PAGs but also for the Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs). He said there was some intelligence that pointed to a new PAG centred on Hobyo being responsible for the attack on 2 fishing vessels in April.
- Mr Steed also described how charcoal smuggling funded terrorism to the tune of \$10 million a year (\$2 tax per bag). Other crimes like cigarette and hash smuggling were prevalent with a recent increase in instances of a particularly nasty new

business in organ trafficking where adults and children were kidnapped and their organs removed and sold and the bodies dumped at sea.

- All these activities were a source of instability that provided a source of income to terrorists and criminal networks.

#### **Industry Update – Jakob Larsen, BIMCO**

- Jakob Larsen the maritime security representative from BIMCO gave a presentation on the commercial shipping Industry's observations on regional affairs, initially explaining how BIMCO provided products, training and regulatory advice for its members which included all sectors of the Industry.
- He emphasised the continued use of BMP measures and AST was paramount to maintain the currently low levels of piracy incidents.
- He stated that Industry viewed UKMTO as the bridge between Industry and the military. He contrasted the situation in the Indian Ocean region where UKMTO was the single recognised point of contact, with that of the Asian region where BIMCO's members note there is confusion about who they should contact if they need assistance.
- He thanked CMF/EUNAVFOR and other military organisations for their efforts to guarantee a safe maritime environment for shipping but stressed the need for information sharing between all concerned parties.

#### **Impact in the reduction of the HRA - EUNAVFOR**

- EUNAVFOR talked about their analysis of shipping trends since the reduction in the HRA in May which showed that the use of AST was largely unchanged with around 30% of the ships registered with MSCHOA indicating they use AST.
- Traffic patterns had moved slightly and routing of vessels closer to the new HRA border had been observed. A slide shown highlighted a snapshot of vessels routing through the Indian Ocean 6 months before and after the HRA was reduced. It was noted that a larger portion of traffic now followed the border of the new HRA, some coastal traffic had moved further out and some of the ocean traffic had moved closer to shore.
- As a consequence it was mentioned there was now a risk pirates could exercise their capability to attack vessels beyond 500 miles as they had done in the past, and that they would have a higher probability of locating targets as ships were now transiting in a more concentrated area.
- EUNAVFOR explained that they were following developments around the HRA closely, and would share their analysis with industry.
- Oman questioned the rationale behind the HRA, and it was explained that the HRA was in reality based on an analysis of the threat and not the risk. The extent of the HRA was based on an assessment of the range of Somali pirates to operate in unsupported skiffs. It was also explained that with the exception of Somalia, TTW were not part of the HRA.

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#### **Maritime Security:- Market Update - Harry Pearce, Ambrey**

- Harry Pearce introduced himself and repeated earlier statements that piracy is suppressed not eradicated. He also stated that the key requirement for continued success is the sharing of information and that stakeholders should be trusted to hold this information.
- During his presentation he showed slides of the global and regional displacement of incidents and events and gave an overview of their detail. He also covered developments ashore in Somalia highlighting the problems of the ongoing drought and the flooding that affected various areas and stated this year had seen the lowest crop yield since the 1990s.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• He highlighted that globally piracy reporting had increased however, so had the numbers of false reports. He said overall incidences of piracy were reported as down 6% year on year.</li> <li>• Ambrey see Mogadishu as an area of high risk as Al Shabaab continue to exploit the weak federal state. The Islamic State are linked to Al Shabaab and are known to be increasing their reach of taxation into Kenya and the Yemen.</li> <li>• Attacks in the Red Sea are believed to be intelligence led and as with the attacks in the Strait of Hormuz/Gulf of Oman, they are designed to fall short of escalating the tension between countries.</li> <li>• Nigeria dominated the West African region and although incidents of maritime crime had increased, especially around Lagos, piracy had reduced with most attacks being carried out unsuccessfully by the same PAG (2 skiffs).</li> <li>• Kidnap for Ransom (KfR) events increased in Nigeria but there was a discernable fall in the average numbers of crew kidnapped. Crews were being held for considerable periods before ransoms were paid. Cameroon also saw a sharp rise in KfR with higher ratios of incident/crew than Nigeria with the target being Chinese fishing vessels.</li> <li>• In Nigeria tankers had been the dominant target however as a share of assets targeted this had decreased. It was reported that the criminals now preferred Suezmax tankers, often in ballast, to handysize tankers.</li> <li>• In closing Harry stated that responses require to be dynamic and anchored in science with route assessment proportionate to the perceived threat and security available. He added that risk assessments and responses to incidents should be a continual process of refinement and communicated in a timely fashion to all concerned onboard and ashore to ensure Ambrey were best placed to serve.</li> </ul>
4	<p><b>The Yemen Conflict &amp; the Maritime Environment - Cdr Lee J Williams RN, Maritime Security Adviser (Yemen)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cdr Lee Williams RN, gave a quick introduction of himself, his role as Maritime Security Adviser and details of the past and current situation of the Yemen.</li> <li>• He confirmed the port of Ras Isa was closed for operations, Emirati Forces had left Aden, the planned prisoner exchange had been delayed due to the taking of Ragibh 3 and that the Government of Yemen (GoY) was not allowing container vessels into Hodeidah at present in order to concentrate on access for World Food Programme (WFP) vessels.</li> <li>• He discussed the current maritime threats to shipping in the Southern Red Sea and stated that neutral shipping had not being targeted e.g. non-KSA coalition flagged. He said it was still unclear what exactly happened to the Iranian flagged tanker MV SABITI.</li> <li>• He explained the Yemen Coastguard in the North are controlled by the Houthi and in the South by the GoY. Assistance is sporadic and dependent on who controls the area however he pointed out that although their boats and uniforms are similar their capability differed and warned that vessels should be made aware not to assume they would provide assistance.</li> <li>• 90% of the humanitarian aid for Yemen is currently received through the port of Hodeidah and he confirmed that to date no merchant vessels had been attacked while alongside.</li> <li>• Cdr Williams suggested that the key to feeding and fuelling the Yemen was reliant on continuing efforts to build and maintain commercial shipping confidence and to balance the humanitarian and commercial access with robust maritime security. He added there was a continued risk to commercial shipping, especially from misidentification. However, the international community, United Nations, military coalitions and shipping companies were all working hard together to create a safer environment in Yemen waters.</li> </ul>

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**Combined Maritime Force (CMF) Update - Cdr Marty van Duin RN, CMF StratPol, Senior National Representative (UK)**

- Cdr Marty van Duin RN gave an overview of his role with CMF, explained the CMF Mission Statement and the Commander's vision which emphasised the importance of the Indian Ocean.
- With the use of slides he gave details of the 33 CMF member nations and showed the breakdown of the group and task forces. He explained that each nation provides what they can, when they can and maintain tactical control of their assets.
- Current task forces, their respective roles and lead countries are;-
  - CTF 150 (Counter Terrorism and Illegal Activities) - UK.
  - CTF 151 (Counter Piracy) - Kuwait.
  - CTF 152 (Arabian Gulf Security and Co-operation) - Jordan.
- He stated that many nations had a vested commercial interest in maritime security but only European nations could join EUNAVFOR. European nations could provide assets to both CMF and EUNAVFOR however, a nation's mandate/rules of engagement controlled what their asset could be used for such as only counter piracy operations.
- He listed and gave details of the current threats to regional maritime security within the CMF area of operations:-
  - Illegal fishing – The Somali Government are unable to monitor and enforce compliance with regulations and deliberate long term industrialised overfishing would deplete fish stocks that would increase poverty, the main driver for piracy.
  - Piracy - International efforts by CMF, EUNAVFOR and Independent Deployers had been successful in the suppression of piracy however it is not eradicated and there was concern that if the warship deterrent was removed, piracy would return.
  - Terrorism - the threat was from the main groups of Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda and Islamic State.
  - Smuggling - weapons, charcoal, narcotics and people. Interdiction operations continue to be successful
  - Regional conflicts/disputes - the Yemen conflict, tensions between Iran and the U.S.in the Gulf, the Somalia/Kenya EEZ dispute, recent attacks in Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea were all areas for concern.
- The HRA was discussed and Cdr van Duin explained that the recent reduction in the size of the HRA had been driven by Industry who own the HRA it and was based on the maximum distance of 400miles that it was believed an independent pirate skiff could operate with an additional 100nm added as a safety margin.
- In summary he stated that CMF delivers continuous interoperability, building mutual trust and understanding that enable focused coalitions. This international relationship enabled the use of the most appropriate asset to intercept and/or deter illegal/suspect activity within the remit of the respective member nation's legal mandate.

<p><b>6</b></p>	<p><b>US Naval Co-operation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) - Capt Charles D McDermott USN.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capt McDermott introduced himself and explained the role of the Commander US Naval Forces Central Command/Commander US Fifth Fleet and his NCAGS unit which are all based within the Naval Headquarters in Bahrain.</li> <li>• US NCAGS are contacting all American flagged vessels entering the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) and requesting they contact their office along with UKMTO's to report their ETAs at the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) and Bab el Mandeb (BeM).</li> <li>• He stated that with the implementation of the International Maritime Security construct (IMSC) there was no requirement for new or additional reporting forms however vessels should make a slight amendment to their 'initial' reports.</li> <li>• He requested that when forwarding 'initial' reports, Masters add their ETA at the choke point and where applicable add a new line 14 to report any delays or deviations from planned route.</li> <li>• Lt Cdr Long acknowledged that the additional request for ships to provide ETAs at the SoH and BeM must be agreed with Industry and was voluntary and not as yet a requirement.</li> </ul>
<p><b>7</b></p>	<p><b>Enabling your business through effective Security and Risk Management – Crispin Webster, Director (MENA) SPS Global.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Crispin introduced himself and explained the purpose of his company was to provide a platform where Security and Risk Management became integral part of business decision making.</li> <li>• Business Risk Information Sharing Community (BRISC) provides the opportunity for entrepreneurs and corporations to share ideas, ask questions or highlight security threats that do not just concern the maritime.</li> <li>• He identified the global threats and discussed events that could not be controlled such as changes to regulations or mandated legislation within nations that could affect how businesses operate without management being fully aware. An example was companies not having current information on cross border controls that could impact on the movement of personnel.</li> <li>• Cyber-attacks threaten all electronic systems onboard and ashore, especially with the introduction of fully autonomous ships. There is substantial evidence to suggest significant infiltration of vessel navigations systems with criminal intent. Unregulated access to the internet increased the opportunity for hacking and installation of viruses and there is evidence that use of social media can impact on the welfare and mental health of crews.</li> <li>• He explained the requirement for mitigation measures and integrated risk management systems, giving examples of each and breaking down how organisations could benefit from having robust systems in place.</li> <li>• In summary he stated that managing risk was a continual 24hr process that had to be specific to the type of risk - financial, operational, technology, cyber etc. Senior management had to prioritise and focus on major risks, taking control to implement mitigation measures. Business continuity plans should be clear and include details of how the recovery element fits into the overall plan.</li> </ul>
<p><b>8</b></p>	<p><b>International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) Update – Lt Sam Yee RN, MTO Liaison Officer</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lt Yee RN introduced himself and explained the background to the formation of the IMSC which was officially commissioned on the 7 Nov 19 in Bahrain. It currently</li> </ul>

	<p>comprised of 7 member nations - Albania, Australia, Bahrain, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, UAE, UK and USA.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• He stated annually 17,000 vessels transit the Bab el Mandeb strait and one sixth of global oil production plus one third of the world's LNG transit the Strait of Hormuz therefore any disruption of seaborne trade in the Middle East region would impact the world economy.</li> <li>• Due to various incidents in 2019 including attacks on vessels in Fujairah, off Bander Jask and in the Southern Red Sea plus the attempted and subsequent seizure of vessels in the Arabian Gulf, the U.S. invited the International community to join a construct to maintain freedom of navigation within international law, to deter malign intent or state interference, to provide reassurance to the shipping industry and to de-escalated regional tensions.</li> <li>• With the reality that several nations could be a stakeholder in the same vessel the problem was identified as international therefore it required an international response. The USA and the UK initially formed the IMSC in Aug 19, 4 other countries joined in Sep 19 and Albania in Nov 19. With the exception of staff, Albania has no assets to provide but by joining showed recognition of the international nature of the risk to global trade. Australia is providing maritime air patrols until her warship deploys in Jan 20.</li> <li>• Lt Yee said that due to the number of individual mandates of the nations that currently comprise CMF, it was not legally possible to use CMF assets as a solution however the IMSC continues dialogue with nations that have expressed an interest in joining.</li> <li>• He explained that the accompanied transits that had been in place for Red Ensign Group (REG) vessels since Jul 19 had ceased when the IMSC officially stood up. The current intention was for larger warships, known as Sentinels, to be strategically placed throughout the region to provide reassurance and an over-watch for merchant vessels. Smaller fast patrol boats know as Sentries would be working alongside the Sentinels to act as a deterrent.</li> <li>• Repeating the request from US NCAGS for additional reporting of SoH ETAs to UKMTO he also stated the importance of AIS remaining switched on at all times. All vessels are currently tracked and accurate reporting (72hrs in advance) is essential in order to provide a timely over-watch of SoH transits.</li> <li>• In summarising Lt Yee showed examples of the types of information flow that is being generated by the respective current nations of the IMSC before being collated to produce a real time picture of the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el Mandeb shipping transits. He stated the IMSC has the capability to upscale or drawdown the operation to meet current and future demand.</li> </ul>
8	<p><b>Question &amp; Answers</b></p> <p>Questions and statements raised throughout the morning along with the respective responses can be found below.</p> <p><b>Q.</b> Russell Pegg (OCIMF) asked Cdr Williams (MSA to Yemen) for an update on MT SAFER?</p> <p><b>A.</b> Cdr Williams explained that MT SAFER was acting as an offshore oil transfer vessel off Ras Isa port in the Red Sea when the Yemen conflict began, both the GoY and Houthi rebels have prevented access to her since then. The vessel therefore has had no maintenance since 2015 and is estimated to hold \$60 million worth of crude oil. The UN had tried on several occasions to gain access to carry out inspections without success. Concern has increased recently over the safety of the vessel and the potential for an environmental disaster, the international community are currently in the process of deciding whether to purchase the oil, ship or both.</p>

**Q.** Ian Wilkinson (Risk Intelligence) asked how Qatar fits in to CTF 152, does the current issues cause problems for other GCC countries.

**A.** Cdr van Duin (CMF) explained that because CMF is not a state facing organisation there is not an issue with CMF working with any country in the region, he highlighted that Qatari ships often work alongside Saudi ships without a problem.

**Q.** Peter Hawkin (Maersk Tankers) asked for clarification on assistance from warships without a counter-piracy mandate if they were the nearest available asset to a request for help?

**A.** Cdr van Duin (CMF) stated in an emergency situation under 'UNCLOS' it would be proactive for any asset to respond however for routine or training purposes if the asset belongs to a nation that has not signed up to provide counter-piracy operations then it would not respond.

**Q.** Capt Rahul Chittiboina (Chevron) asked if an incident took place, what time frame of assistance could be expected from an IMSC asset.

**A.** Lt Yee (IMSC) replied that providing the IMSC has knowledge of merchant vessels movements there should be Sentinels or Sentries nearby to monitor and quickly provide assistance. He also stated that in addition to IMSC ships there was aircraft carrying out patrols. He clarified that merchant vessels should report into UKMTO by email or telephone (+44 2392 222 060) and contact warships by VHF as required.

**Q.** Anup Khan (Bahri) asked if a vessel was attacked by an Iranian Revolutionary Guard vessel would they receive assistance from any nearby warship.

**A.** The response was jointly answered by Cdr van Duin (CMF), Capt McDermott (USNCAGS) and Lt Yee (IMSC). If the assistance required came under the provision of SOLAS then the nearby warship had a duty to assist however if the issue involved harassment or a boarding by suspected Iranians and the merchant was not state registered with one of the IMSC member nations then it may not assist. If the warship was a member of CMF then it would depend on that nation's Rules of Engagement and the type of incident that could be unfolding. This question did invoke a short discussion that concluded the more countries that join the IMSC and provide additional assets the better deterrent the IMSC would become.

**Q.** Peter Hawkin (Maersk tankers) asked if there was guidance on the types of questions vessels were being asked and how masters should respond giving requests to change course or allow boarding teams to board their vessel.

**A.** Lt Yee (IMSC) replied that such guidance was currently being investigated however he asked that masters report all unwanted or suspicious hails to UKMTO, especially those by Iranian Forces. Lt Cdr Long (UKMTO) gave feedback from masters of vessels briefed by his team, the standard questions asked were 'last and next port of call', 'cargo' and 'nationality of crew' with 18% of ships briefed by UKMTO reporting they had been contacted by Iranian forces during their SoH transit. The majority of these ships were tankers. He advised that masters did not give out the nationalities of crew members if asked.

**Q.** John Thompson (Ambrey) asked for guidance on use of citadels should a vessel be boarded by a 'state-actor'.

**A.** Russell Pegg (OCIMF) stated that although the threat is different to a pirate attack the choice to muster crew in the citadel would be down to the master of the vessel. Capt Dave Bancroft (Chevron) reported that his company have produced guidance and procedures for his vessels. Chris Scothern (UKMTO) said that alternative procedures should be planned between CSOs and masters which need to be specific as the incident would dictate the relevant timescale.

**Q.** Ian Wilkinson (Risk Management) asked how the IMSC operated in the Arabian Gulf alongside CTF 152.

	<p>A. Cdr van Duin (CMF) referred to his earlier comment on whether a member country is state facing or not. If the flag state of the merchant vessel was a member of the IMSC then they would respond however if not then it would be an asset of CTF 152.</p>
<p><b>9</b></p>	<p><b>UKMTO Update - Lt Cdr Chris Long, Officer in Charge</b></p> <p>Lt Cdr Long gave an update from a UKMTO perspective:-</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The ongoing threat to shipping from piracy, conflict spill over and terrorism remained UKMTO's focus. Although the threat was constantly evolving, recent events in the SoH had shifted attention somewhat, it was hoped the creation of the IMSC would reduce tensions and provide Industry with assurance and also act as a deterrence against malign state activity in the Gulf region.</li> <li>• The recent boarding and detention of a Saudi tug towing 2 x South Korean units in the Southern Red Sea illustrated the vulnerability of commercial shipping that stray too close to Houthi territories off the coast of Yemen. Lt Cdr Long stated that it was still best practice for shipping to remain as far away as possible from the Yemen coast while transiting the BeM. To mitigate against this risk it was still advised that ships stay to the West of the Hannish Islands and report their transits of the VRA to UKMTO.</li> <li>• He said the primary role of the UKMTO office in Dubai was to conduct outreach and engagement with Industry across the region, the operational reporting centre for shipping was provided by the 24/7 watch-keeper element of UKMTO which is based within the Maritime Trade Information Centre (MTIC) located in the UK on Portsdown Hill.</li> <li>• He highlighted that when Masters or CSOs call or email UKMTO, they are initially processed by watch-keeping staff in the UK with all relevant incidents and/or information reported to the Dubai Duty Officer as required.</li> <li>• In the last 12mths UKMTO Dubai personnel have:- <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Visited 687 ships in the UAE ports of Jebel Ali, Abu Dhabi, Ras Al Khaimah and Port Rashid Cruise Terminal.</li> <li>○ Visited 35 offices of local shipping companies to meet with CSOs and visiting regional staff.</li> <li>○ Represented UKMTO at 11 major conferences across the region including Bahrain and Qatar.</li> <li>○ Hosted 82 visits to the UKMTO Dubai office by people from all sectors of the maritime community.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• He highlighted that along with Chris Scothern, UKMTO MNLO, they would continue to visit companies to strengthen ties with the local shipping community. Anyone that would like to arrange a presentation on maritime security matters to their organisation/workforce or arrange a visit to the UKMTO office within the British Embassy should contact Lt Cdr Long on <a href="mailto:dubai-oic@ukmto.org">dubai-oic@ukmto.org</a> or telephone +971 4309 4468.</li> <li>• UKMTO exists to facilitate a two way information flow between Industry and the Military and would continue to deliver that function as long as the need exists.</li> </ul>
<p><b>10</b></p>	<p><b>Note of Appreciation - Capt Geoff Pearson MNI, Global Head of Fleet Security, BW LPG</b></p> <p>On behalf of his company Capt Pearson wished to record his profound thanks to UKMTO, MSO Bahrain, IMSC, HMS Montrose, HMS Duncan, HMS Kent and HMS Defender for their co-ordinated efforts and operational transits in recent months.</p> <p>He said that since the introduction of accompanied transits through the Strait of Hormuz for REG vessels, 24 of these transits included BW vessels and commented on the immense</p>

	pleasure and comfort the crews of these vessels felt to see 'Grey Hulls' escorting them during their transits, he also stated the knowledge that their movements were being monitored was invaluable.
10	<p><b>Closing Remarks</b></p> <p>In closing the meeting Lt Cdr Long thanked everyone for their attendance. He also gave thanks to Deepak and the staff of the Seaman's Centre for their support and hospitality in hosting the MIEVOM. Attendees were requested to complete the feedback proforma included in their welcome pack, with particular regard to suggestions for future presenters and/or presentations.</p> <p>Anyone wishing to present or has suggestions for the next or future MIEVOMs should send their details to <a href="mailto:dubai-oic@ukmto.org">dubai-oic@ukmto.org</a>. The meeting was concluded at 1300.</p>
11	<p><b>Date of next meetings:</b></p> <p>SHADE - Bahrain 21-22 April 2020. MIEVOM - Dubai 30 April 2020.</p>

Enclosure 2 to  
W/13/2019/Nov  
Dated 10 Dec 2019

## LIST OF ATTENDEES

### MARITIME INFORMATION EXCHANGE VESSEL OPERATORS' MEETING (MIEVOM) HELD ON 28<sup>th</sup> NOVEMBER 2019 AT THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL SEAFARERS' CENTRE

#### Speakers

<u>Organisation</u>	<u>Name</u>
UKMTO, OiC	Lt Cdr Chris Long RN
Cdr Marty van Duin RN	CMF StratPol, Senior National Representative (UK)
Cdr L J Williams RN	Maritime Security Advisor (Yemen)
Lt Sam Yee RN	MTO Liaison Officer, International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC)
Harry Pearce	Intelligence Manager, Ambrey
Crispin Webster	Director (MENA), SPS Global

#### Attendees

Alindien MARSEC	Cdr Ulysse Walker French Naval Force
Alindien MARSEC	PO Emmanuel Gallego French Naval Force
Ambrey	John Thompson
Bahri Ship Management	Anup Khan
BW Group	Capt Geoff Pearson
Chevron	Capt Dave Bancroft MNM
Chevron	Capt Rahul Chittiboina
Chevron	Capt Pietro Torrente
COSCO Shipping Ports	Alexis Herrero
CTF 151	Capt Khaled Al Kandari Kuwait Naval Force
CTF 151	Cdr Osamah W Akbar Kuwait Naval Force
CTF 151	Lt Cdr Naser Al Barood Kuwait Naval Force

Diaplous	Dimitris Maniartis
Gulf Agency Company (Abu Dhabi) LLC	Anshad Hamza
Gulf Agency Company (Abu Dhabi) LLC	Marc Nordblad
Gulf Agency Company (Abu Dhabi) LLC	Meena Matthews
Gulf Energy Maritime (GEM)	Capt Robert Buckham
Heidmar UK Ltd	Capt David Lockwood
International Registries (Middle East) DMCEST	Capt Amarjit Kauchhur
Kanoo Shipping	Steve Blackney
London Offshore Consultants	Capt Simon Harries
Maersk Tankers	Peter B Hawkin
Maersk West & Central Asia, Feeder Manager	Rienk Kwast
MSC Cruises	Anthony Walsh
NYK Line, Area Marine Rep, Middle East	Capt Steve Hardy
Oil Companies International Maritime Forum (OCIMF)	Russell Pegg
Protection Vessels International (PVI) Ltd	Andrew Rose
Risk Intelligence	Dr Dirk Siebels
Risk Intelligence	Ian Wilkinson
RNLO Gulf, NP1023	Cdr Mark Stuttard RN
Salama Fikira	Crispin Kennedy
Securewest International	Andrew Gibbens
Securewest International	David Wilson-le-Moine
Shell International Trading Middle East	Christopher Gamble
UKHO	Tim Lewis
UKHO	Samuel Wincester
UKMTO, ORM	CPO Anne McGarva RNR
UKMTO, Briefing Assistant	LH Roy Cadman RNR
UKMTO, MNLO	Chris Scothern
United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime (UNODC)	Adrien Parrin
United Nations Verification & Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM)	Pascal Goodman
US NCAGS	Capt Charles McDermott USN
X-press Feeders	Bert Moran

**Apologies received**

APL	Jack Scogin
Emirate Global Aluminium	Philip Speechly
London Offshore Consultants	Chris Partridge
Risk Intelligence	Troels Hessellund
RMIFC	Lt Said Lavani
Simatech Shipping	Capt Hamid Bagheri
Stena	Sandy Watt
United Arab Shipping Company	Capt Ayad Walleed Khalid