




# JMIC INFONOTE 15JUL\_04 – ATTEMPTED ATTACKS INVOLVING A PANAMA-FLAGGED TANKER VESSEL, BENTLEY I, 70 NM SW OF AL-HUDAYDAH, YEMEN.

## INCIDENT REPORT

1. There were several reported attacks on a Panama-Flagged Tanker Vessel, BENTLEY I (IMO: 9253129), while transiting the Southern Red Sea, the initial attack occurred approximately 70NM SW of Al-Hudaydah, Yemen on 15 JUL 24 at 0537. Subsequent attacks occurred at 1343 and 1515 while transiting further south (all timings in UTC). Reference UKMTO Incident Warning 099. (See **Picture 1** for initial incident location).

Picture 1: Initial Incident Location





2. The JMIC has confirmed that BENTLEY I was attacked in the following sequence;

- a. (0537 UTC) Approached by three skiffs, two of which were manned and one seemingly unmanned. There was an exchange of small-arms fire and the unmanned skiff attempted twice to ram amidships, with no detonation or damage.
- b. (0607 UTC) One missile, missing the vessel and impacting water 30 meters short of the port side
- c. (1343 UTC) Two missiles, missing the vessel, both impacting water approximately 10-15 meters off her starboard side.
- d. Two skiffs opening small-arms fire on her. This attack was fended off by on board security team.
- e. (1515 UTC) One missile, missing the vessel and impacting water approximately 80-100 meters off port side.

Coalition warships in the area responded and assisted in her onward journey.

The vessel was underway with AIS off. BENTLEY I was not hit, reporting no damage, all crew onboard safe and proceeding to next port of call.

3. JMIC assesses that BENTLEY I was targeted due to Israeli registered ownership.

## JMIC GUIDANCE

4. Freedom of navigation and the free flow of maritime commerce continue as a top priority while the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden from 16N to 047E remain a threat area based on the Houthis ability to attack vessels with various capabilities. The current threat assessment identifies:

- a. Vessels with an Israeli, United States or United Kingdom association at highest risk
- b. Any vessel within a Group or Company fleet structure whereby the company has been identified making port calls to Israel

5. Vessels intending to transit the threat area are recommended to exercise caution by applying the following:



## Joint Maritime Information Center



- a. Conduct a threat and risk assessment prior to entering the area
- b. Review security measures/incorporate appropriate vessel hardening measures into their security plans
- c. Turning off any form of non-essential emissions (e.g. intra-ship UHF/VHF transmissions) and AIS policy in the vicinity of, or before transiting or entering the threat area is to be very carefully considered as part of voyage risk mitigation process, as broadcasting on AIS is assessed to aid Houthi targeting
  - i. While transmitting AIS may be consistent with SOLAS, it may compromise safety & security of the vessel
  - ii. If AIS is turned off, consider altering course and speed to minimize tracking by Dead Reckoning
- d. Do not loiter when transiting this threat area and proceed with caution
- e. If contacted by any unrecognized organisation:
  - i. Report back to your company security officer and validate the source before responding
- f. If contacted on VHF by “Yemeni Navy”:
  - i. Ignore the VHF call and continue passage if safe to do so
  - ii. Describe incident in follow up reports to UKMTO
- g. Share instances of suspicious activity with UKMTO (with recordings or imagery where possible)
  - i. UAV sightings
  - ii. Communications challenges
- h. In case of any unexploded ordnance and debris on deck:
  - i. Maintain a safe distance (as far away as practically possible) and cordon off the area
  - ii. Do not touch or try to dismantle any debris
  - iii. Be aware that any radio emissions may trigger the device
  - iv. Request assistance through UKMTO, ask for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team (EOD)

6. **Maritime Industry** is recommended to:

- a. Conduct threat & risk assessment of all associated vessels and especially those that may have previous US, UK or Israel ownership or associations [*to include recent port calls by vessels within the company and/or group structure*]



- b. If an association is made, shipping companies are recommended to provide the information to UKMTO prior to transiting the threat area
- c. Ensure their managed vessels receive and follow the guidance for vessels
- d. Review digital footprint
- e. The JMIC is aware of increased email communication between unrecognized reporting entities and owners/operators
  - i. If contacted by any organization not officially recognized, report back to your company security officer and validate the source before responding
  - ii. Any response should be carefully considered
  - iii. Statements by Houthi forces to encourage merchant shipping to engage with the Houthi's Humanitarian Operations Coordination Centre (HOCC), or Yemeni Navy, should be disregarded and industry best practice and guidance should be followed in close communication with your company's CSO
- f. Open-source claims that vessels are targeted may not be factual
  - i. JMIC recommends verifying source for legitimacy

**Additional Resources on Incident:**

UKMTO Reporting Visit: <https://www.ukmto.org>

Email: [watchkeepers@ukmto.org](mailto:watchkeepers@ukmto.org)

Emergency Tel: +44 (0)2392 222060

**Additional Resources on Industry Guidance:**

BMP 5 – Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea:

<https://www.ics-shipping.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/bmp5-hi-res-min.pdf>

ATP – 02.1 NCAGS Guide to Owners, Operators, Masters and Officers:

7. [https://shipping.nato.int/systems/file\\_download.ashx?pg=692&ver=2](https://shipping.nato.int/systems/file_download.ashx?pg=692&ver=2)