



## Joint Maritime Information Center




### JMIC INFONOTE 26APR\_04 – MULTIPLE MISSILE ATTACKS INVOLVING PANAMA-FLAGGED TANKER VESSEL, ANDROMEDA STAR, 14NM SW OF AL MUKHA, YEMEN.

#### INCIDENT REPORT

1. There were reports of several missile attacks on a Panama-flagged Tanker Vessel, ANDROMEDA STAR (IMO: 9402471), while the vessel was transiting southbound in the Red Sea approximately 14nm SW of Al Mukha, Yemen on 26 Apr 24 at 1500 (UTC) and 1720 (UTC). Reference UKMTO Incident Warning 066. (See **Picture 1** for incident location).

Picture 1: Incident Location





2. The JMIC has confirmed that ANDROMEDA STAR was targeted by a total of three missiles in two attacks. The first missile missed and caused no damage to vessel. The second and third missile impacted the merchant vessel and resulted in minor damages. ANDROMEDA STAR was transiting with AIS on, but turned it off following the first attack. Coalition warships in vicinity of the merchant vessel responded and provided assistance. MT ANDROMEDA STAR and all crew on board are safe (no injury reported), and the vessel was last reported proceeding to next port of call.

3. JMIC assesses that ANDROMEDA STAR was likely targeted due to outdated information, showing ownership having UK affiliation. Ownership was transferred in NOV 23 to current owner, a Seychelles based company. *[Note: Houthi spokesperson stated previously in Jan 24 that its attacks were in response to the US-UK military actions in the region.]*

## JMIC GUIDANCE

4. Freedom of navigation and the free flow of maritime commerce continue as a top priority while the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden from 16N to 047E remain a threat area based on the Houthis ability to attack vessels with various capabilities.

- a. The current threat assessment identifies vessels with an Israeli, United States or United Kingdom association at highest risk

5. **Vessels** intending to transit the threat area are recommended to:

- a. Exercise caution
- b. Conduct a risk assessment prior to entering the area
- c. Review security measures/incorporate appropriate vessel hardening measures into their security plans
- d. Ensure AIS is transmitting, consistent with provisions of the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
  - i. Except when believed that continuing to operate AIS might compromise safety and security of the vessel



## Joint Maritime Information Center



- ii. If AIS is turned off, alter course and speed to minimize tracking by DR
    - iii. Do not loiter
  - e. If contacted on VHF by “Yemeni Navy”:
    - i. Ignore the VHF call and continue passage if safe to do so
    - ii. Describe incident in movement reporting to UKMTO and NAVCENT NCAGS.
  - f. Share instances of suspicious activity with UKMTO
    - i. UAV sightings
    - ii. Communications challenges
- 6. **Shipping Companies** are recommended to:
  - a. Conduct threat & risk assessment of all their vessels and especially those that may have previous US, UK or Israel ownership or associations
  - b. If an association is made, shipping companies are recommended to provide the information to UKMTO prior to transiting the threat area
  - c. Ensure their managed vessels receive and follow the guidance for vessels
  - d. Review digital footprint

### **Additional Resources on Incident:**

UKMTO Reporting Visit: <https://www.ukmto.org>

Email: [watchkeepers@ukmto.org](mailto:watchkeepers@ukmto.org)

Emergency Tel: +44 (0)2392 222060

### **Additional Resources on Industry Guidance:**

BMP 5 – Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea:

<https://www.ics-shipping.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/bmp5-hi-res-min.pdf>

ATP – 02.1 NCAGS Guide to Owners, Operators, Masters and Officers:

[https://shipping.nato.int/systems/file\\_download.ashx?pg=692&ver=2](https://shipping.nato.int/systems/file_download.ashx?pg=692&ver=2)