

### **Joint Maritime Information Center**











JMIC Weekly Dashboard 31 March to 06 April 24

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### **About Us**

Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) is an entity operating under the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). The JMIC currently has participation from multiple military stakeholders, Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) and Information Fusion Center (IFC) to fuse open-source unclassified information into an open, truthful messaging service.

The JMIC has been established to support the Shipping Industry with challenges faced when operating in the Red Sea region. The JMIC is aligned to the principals that all vessels should be entitled to Freedom of Navigation and seafarers supporting the movement of global trade are unhindered. The information shared by the JMIC is intended to offer information, advice, and guidance only, and help inform any Threat and Risk Assessment process.

### **Objectives:**


- 1. To provide ground truth (threat assessment) to enable risk assessment by shipping industry to support operational planning and decision making.
- 2. To provide clear and concise updates and guidance to the shipping industry "single source of truth".

### Areas of Coverage:

Houthis attacks on merchant vessel in the Red Sea, Bab Al Mandeb (BAM) and Gulf of Aden (GOA)



### **Executive Summary**



During the last two weeks there has been one recorded merchant vessel targeted for attack by the Houthis. Despite the reduced kinetic activity towards merchant shipping, the threat remains and kinetic activity remains constant in the area. JMIC recommends companies continue to thoroughly risk assess passages via the Southern Red Sea/Gulf of Aden and fully maintain their current mitigation measures.

Executive Summary (as of 06 Apr 24)		
Total number of Incidents (since 19 Nov 23)	51	

Total number of Suspicious Activities Reported# (since 19 Nov 23)	4
Number of Incidents + Suspicious Activities Report last week (31 Mar to 06 Apr 24)	1 + 1

#Possibly more suspicious activities than JMIC has reported

Note: Incidents exclude coalition engagements

### Legend

- Attack (Serious Incident)
- Attack (Minor Incident)
- Attempted Attack
- Hijack
- Unmanned Vehicle Sighting
- Comms Challenge
- Others




## **Incident: Communications Challenge**

01 Apr – Communications Challenge/ Bahama-Flagged Passenger Vessel/ No Injury/ Underway/ 150NM NW Of Al Hudaydah, Yemen

There was a reported communications challenge on a Bahama-flagged Passenger Vessel, CRYSTAL SYMPHONY (IMO: 9066667), while the vessel was transiting the Red Sea at approximately 150nm NW of Al Hudaydah, Yemen on 01 Apr 24 at 19:56 (UTC). Reference UKMTO Incident Warning 059.

The JMIC has confirmed CRYSTAL SYMPHONY was targeted by a communications challenge. The vessel reported that after transiting the Bab al Mandeb Strait, transiting with AIS turned off, was challenged on VHF by an organization claiming to be the Yemeni Navy demanding that the vessel turn on the AIS. The vessel had transited the Threat Area with AIS off following JMIC guidance. Not long after, a crew member reported a loud bang and discovered a cracked cabin window on the port side. Vessel crew investigated and determined the likely cause of the broken glass was not an act of an external factor. The vessel and all crew on board reported safe (no injuries), and the vessel was proceeding to next port of call.



(IMO:9066667)



### **Incident: Attempted Attack**

06 Apr – Attempted Missile Attack/ Marshall Islands-Flagged Container Vessel/ No Injury/ Underway/ 600NM SW Of Al Hudaydah, Yemen

There were three separate missile attacks reported on a Marshall Islands-flagged container vessel, HOPE ISLAND (IMO: 9263320), while the vessel was transiting the Red Sea, BAM, and GOA at approximately 60nm SW of AI Hudaydah, Yemen between 06 Apr 24 at 14:53 (UTC) and 07 Apr 24 at 05:03 (UTC). Reference UKMTO Incident Warning 061 and 062.


The JMIC has confirmed HOPE ISLAND was targeted by missiles. The vessel departed its previous port with AIS on, but when nearing the threat area was transiting with AIS turned off. Prior to the missile launches there was UAV activity in the vicinity of the vessel on 06 Apr 24 at 1135 UTC. There were three missile attacks reported in the subsequent 12-hour period. The vessel had transited the Threat Area with AIS off following JMIC guidance. No reported damage to the vessel and all crew on board reported safe (no injuries), and the vessel proceeded to next port of call.







## **Overview of Incidents and Suspicious Activities**





## Houthi Capability Update – Capability Ranges

Using Hudaydah as an estimation of launch point, this map shows the range extent of missiles and rockets. These are the maximum estimated ranges of the weapon systems, based on ideal conditions. Although exact targeting methods are unknown, it is almost certain that the accuracy of the missiles will reduce the further away they are fired.






## **Trending by Categories**

Summary of Incidents and Suspicious Activities Reported (as of 06 Apr 24)			
Total number of Incidents (since 19 Nov 23)		51	
Total number of Suspicious Activities Reported (since 19 Nov	<sup>7</sup> 23)	4	
Number of Incidents + Suspicious Activities Report last week	(31 Mar - 06 Apr)	1 + 1	
Note: Incidents exclude missiles/drones that were shot down by coalition warships.			
Summary of Incidents (since 19 Nov 23)	Summary	of Suspicious Activities Reported (since 19 Nov 23)	
25	20		
$\begin{array}{c} 20 \\ 15 \\ 10 \\ 5 \\ 3 \\ 0 \end{array}$	15 10 5 2 0	2	
Attack Attack Attempted Attack Hijack (Serious Incident) (Minor Incident)	Unmanned Veh	icle Sighting Comms Challenge	

\*Refer to last slide for the explanatory notes for the respective categories



# **Trending of Incidents Involving Merchant Vessels**



#### **Observations and Assessments**

Based on trending, the number of Houthis attacks on merchant vessels last week was below average, and the threat remains focused on vessels with a US, UK, and Israeli associations. **Refer to the JMIC Guidance to Industry slide.** 



# **Incidents Involving Merchant Vessels by Type**

1/N

27

26

25

24

23

22

21

20

19

18

17

16

15

14

13

12

11

10

9

8

6

5

3

2

Name

ZOGRAFIA

GIBRALTAR EAGLE

**KHALISSA** 

GREEN BAY

CMA CGM TAGE

MAERSK HANGZHOU

MSC BEIRA IV

MSC UNITED III

MSC SILVANA

BLAAMANEN

SAI BABA

MSC CLARA

SWAN ATLANTIC

**MSC PALATIUM 3** 

MSC ALANYA

AL JASRAH

MAERSK GILBRATAR

ARDMORE ENCOUNTER

**STRINDA** 

CENTAURIUS LEADER

PANTA REI 1

AOM SOPHIE II

UNITY EXPLORER

NUMBER 9

**CENTRAL PARK** 


CENTRAL PARK

GALAXY LEADER

DECEMBER ↑

NOVEMBER ↑

JANUARY ↑



#### **Observations and Assessments**

2 vessels were targeted this week. Distribution of attacks among vessel types does not appear to follow a pattern.

- 1 vessel was a Passenger Vessel.
- 1 vessel was a Container Vessel.



## Incidents Involving Merchant Vessels by Assessed Association

I/N

27

26

25

24

23

22

21

20

19

18

17

16

15

14

13

12

11

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

Name

ZOGRAFIA

GIBRALTAR EAGLE

**KHALISSA** 

GREEN BAY

CMA CGM TAGE

MAERSK HANGZHOU

MSC BEIRA IV

MSC UNITED III

MSC SILVANA

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**STRINDA** 

CENTAURIUS LEADER

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AOM SOPHIE II

UNITY EXPLORER

NUMBER 9

CENTRAL PARK


CENTRAL PARK

GALAXY LEADER

DECEMBER ↑

NOVEMBER  $\uparrow$ 

JANUARY ↑



#### **Observations and Assessments**

Based on trending, the Houthis continue to target all commercial vessels with any US, UK and/or Israeli associations (~67% of all incidents).

-Majority of the vessels targeted overall had Israeli associations (~38% of all incidents)

-Incidents in previous week involved vessels that had outdated associations or US associations.

-The last 7 out of 8 incidents have involved vessel with outdated associations.



## **JMIC Guidance to Industry**

#### Vessels:

- a. Conduct a risk assessment prior to entering the area
- b. Review security measures/incorporate appropriate vessel hardening measures into their security plans
- c. AIS:
- i. AIS policy within the threat area is to be very carefully considered as part of voyage risk mitigation process, as broadcasting on AIS is assessed to aid Houthi targeting
- i. While transmitting AIS may be consistent with SOLAS, it may compromise safety & security of the vessel
- ii. If AIS is turned off, consider altering course and speed to minimize tracking by Dead Reckoning
- d. Do not loiter when transiting this Threat area and proceed with caution.
- e. If contacted on VHF by "Yemeni Navy":
- i. Ignore the VHF call and continue passage if safe to do so
- ii. Describe incident in follow up reports to UKMTO.
- f. Share instances of suspicious activity with UKMTO (with recordings or imagery where possible)
- i. Unmanned vehicle sightings
- ii. Communications challenges

### **Shipping Companies**:

i.

- a. Conduct a risk assessment of all their vessels and especially those that may have **previous US**, **UK**, **or Israel ownership or associations** 
  - Note that most recent attacks have been against vessels that have changed ownership in last 2 months
- b. If an association is made, shipping companies are recommended to provide the information to UKMTO prior to transiting the threat area
- c. Ensure their managed vessels receive and follow the guidance for vessels
- d. Review digital footprint

### Additional Resources on Incident:

UKMTO Reporting Visit: <u>https://www.ukmto.org</u> Email: <u>watchkeepers@ukmto.org</u> Emergency Tel: +44 (0)2392 222060

### Additional Resources on Industry Guidance:

BMP 5 – Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea: https://www.ics-shipping.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/bmp5-hi-res-min.pdf

ATP – 02.1 NCAGS Guide to Owners, Operators, Masters and Officers: https://shipping.nato.int/systems/file\_download.ashx?pg=692&ver=2



## **General Categories**

General Categories	Explanatory Notes
	This refers to the act of successfully attacking a vessel with the use of force that results in serious damage(s) to the vessel.
Attack (Serious Incident)	<ul> <li>Any use of force including but not limited to launching of weapons (i.e. missiles, drones), and/or ramming into the vessel.</li> <li>Serious incident refers to any damage that impacts the vessel's ability to continue functioning, which requires immediate assistance. It includes a vessel deemed a total loss, and significant threat to lives.</li> </ul>
Attack	This refers to the act of successfully attacking a vessel with the use of force that results in minor damage(s) to the vessel.
(Minor Incident)	<ul> <li>Any use of force including but not limited to launching of weapons (i.e. missiles, drones), and/or ramming into the vessel.</li> <li>Minor incident refers to any damage that does not impact the vessel's ability to continue functioning, which does not require any assistance.</li> </ul>
	This refers to the act of attacking a vessel with the use of force that results in no damage to the vessel.
Attempted Attack	<ul> <li>Any use of force including but not limited to launching of weapons (i.e. missiles, drones), and/or ramming into the vessel.</li> <li>No damage may include but not limited to missile ditching, and/or coalition warships shooting down missiles and/or drones.</li> </ul>
Hijack	This refers to any illegal act of violence whereby the perpetrators have boarded and taken control/detained a vessel, and/or its crew against their will.
Unmanned Vehicle Sighting	This refers to any act of Unmanned Vehicle(s) approaching in close proximity to the vessel that is enough to warrant suspicion. To include aerial, surface, and subsurface.
	This refers to any inappropriate use of VHF channels from one vessel/radio station to another vessel that is not aligned to International Maritime Organisation (IMO) A 23/Res.954.
Comms Challenge	<ul> <li>Inappropriate use of VHF channels may include but not limited to illegal diversion of vessels, and/or instructing vessel(s) to manoeuvre that may endanger the safety of the vessel(s).</li> </ul>
Others	This refers to any incidents that do not fit into any of the above categories.