

UKMTO

VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA OVERVIEW



PRODUCED
14 Aug 2026

REPORT
No. 2

Transit statistics, GNSS interference and regional incident activity
across the maritime VRA.

90

WARNINGS YTD

13

ADVISORIES YTD

75

IRAN-US CONFLICT
RELATED
INCIDENTS YTD

4

RED SEA ATTACKS
ON SHIPPING YTD

37

PIRACY RELATED
INCIDENTS YTD

TRANSIT VESSEL TYPE BREAKDOWN

STRAIT OF HORMUZ TRANSIT OVERVIEW / AIS + DARK DERIVED INFORMATION

Week ending: 14 Aug 26
Reporting Range 28 Feb 26 – 13 Aug 26

OUTBOUND FULL TRANSITS LAST 7 DAYS

75


INBOUND FULL TRANSITS LAST 7 DAYS

76


TOTAL INCIDENTS DURING SOH TRANSIT SINCE 28 FEB 26

29


TRANSIT VESSEL TYPE (% FULL TRANSITS since 28 Feb 26)





TRANSIT DIRECTION FLOW (% FULL TRANSITS since 28 Feb 26)



STRAIT OF HORMUZ TRANSITS - LAST 90 DAYS



STRAIT OF HORMUZ TRANSITS - LAST 180 DAYS



TOP FLAG OF REGISTRATION SINCE 28 FEB 26

Country	Count
Panama	251
Liberia	163
Marshall Islands	122
Comoros	85
Iran	59
Unknown	57
St Kitts & Nevis	44
Malta	43
Hong Kong, China	40
Singapore	39

TOP COUNTRY OF ECONOMIC BENEFIT SINCE 28 FEB 26

Country	Count
United Arab Emirates	256
China	200
Greece	159
Unknown	119
India	83
Japan	80
South Korea	74
Marshall Islands	62
Iran	56
Hong Kong	52

UKMTO STRAIT OF HORMUZ TRANSITS DETAIL AIS + DARK DERIVED INFORMATION(LAST 7 DAYS)

OUTBOUND



7 Day vs PRE-CONFLICT AVERAGE



Route (7 Days) (AIS Only)	Vessel Types (7 Days) (AIS Only)
19 Northern PGSA route	13 Tanker Products2 Cellular container
8 Southern Oman TTW route	6 Dry Bulk Cargo1 Liquid Cargo
2 Traffic Separation Scheme	4 General Cargo1 Offshore
	2 Ro-Ro

Flags of Registry (7 Days) (AIS Only)		
Liberia: 9	Iran: 1	China: 1
Panama: 5	Bahamas: 1	Marshall Islands: 1
Barbados: 2	Unknown: 1	China: 1
Comoros: 2	Palau: 1	San Marino: 1
St Kitts & Nevis: 2	Cook Islands False: 1	

Economic Benefit (7 Days) (AIS Only)		
UAE: 9	Unknown: 3	Singapore: 1
South Korea: 4	India: 2	Bahamas: 1
Marshall Island: 3	Iran: 1	Turkey: 1
Greece: 3	China: 1	

INBOUND



7 Day vs PRE-CONFLICT AVERAGE




Route (7 Days) (AIS Only)	Vessel Types (7 Days) (AIS Only)
26 Northern	12 Tanker Products2 Cellular Container
5 Southern	9 Dry Bulk Cargo1 Liquid Cargo
0 Traffic Separation Scheme	4 General Cargo1 Unknown
	2 Specialist 1

Flags of Registry (7 Days) (AIS Only)			
Panama: 7	Gambia: 1	UAE: 1	China: 1
Comoros: 3	Sint Maarten False: 1	Senegal False: 1	
Liberia: 3	Malta: 1	Madagascar False: 1	
Unknown: 2	Antigua & Barbuda: 1	Palau: 1	
Marshall Islands: 2	Angola False: 1	Iran: 1	
Cameroon: 1	Tanzania (Zanzibar): 1	St Kitts & Nevis: 1	


Economic Benefit (7 Days) (AIS Only)		
UAE: 6	India: 2	Turkey: 1
Unknown: 5	Panama: 2	Cyprus: 1
China: 3	Hong Kong: 1	Anguilla False: 1
Greece: 3	South Korea: 1	Madagascar False: 1
Marshall Islands: 3	St Kitts & Nevis: 1	

UKMTO STRAIT OF HORMUZ TRANSITS SUMMARY AIS DERIVED ONLY

Strait of Hormuz Transits – Last 7 Days



Strait of Hormuz Transits – Last 30 Days vs Last Year



AIS-derived vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz (1 Mar to 31 Jul 2026). Heatmap density is based on over 100,000 AIS position reports aggregated into 1 km grid cells. Darker colours indicate higher traffic density. EMCOM silent transits are not captured.

Strait of Hormuz Maritime Flow Summary

UKMTO Comment: Despite a brief recovery in late June, vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains significantly reduced, AIS transit information suggests operators increasingly favouring the Northern route following projectile attacks, ongoing security concerns, and heightened enforcement activity.

Key Insights

- Traffic remains well below normal levels, with AIS-detected transits approximately 90% below pre-conflict baselines and declining since the 24–26 Jun peak.
- Southern Omani route remains the highest-risk corridor, accounting for 16 of 18 projectile strike incidents reported by UKMTO since 6 Jul.
- Behavioural change evident amongst shipping, with multiple vessels aborting planned transits or rerouting North following attacks, indicating risk avoidance rather than route substitution alone.
- Tanker traffic continues to dominate movements through the Strait, although overall volumes remain suppressed.
- Engine rooms were the primary damage location (12 incidents), highlighting the potential for attacks to directly impact vessel mobility and operational continuity. US enforcement actions against Iranian-linked shipping continue in the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Gulf, adding a further layer of operational uncertainty.
- GNSS interference reports remain below Mar 26 peak levels, suggesting physical threats currently present a greater concern than electronic disruption.
- JMIC threat assessment remains elevated, with SEVERE risk assessed for the Strait of Hormuz and SUBSTANTIAL across the Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, and Bab el Mandeb.
- IMO traffic separation arrangements remain suspended, with no indication of an imminent return to normal routing procedures.
- 20 UKMTO-reported projectile strike incidents since 6 Jul 2026, resulting in bridge, engine-room, and structural damage across vessels operating in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

MARITIME INCIDENTS – Strait of Hormuz, Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman

Week ending: 14 Aug 26
Reporting Range 28 Feb 26 – 13 Aug 26

56

REPORTS OF DAMAGE TO VESSELS YTD

13

NEAR MISS REPORTS YTD

23

INJURY / FATALITIES YTD

3



CONFIRMED TOTAL LOSSES YTD

76

TOTAL EVENTS REPORTED YTD

166

DAYS SINCE CONFLICT START (28 FEB 26)



LATEST INCIDENTS REPORTED DURING CONFLICT						
Date	Name	IMO	Type	Position	Event	Product
11/8/26	VELA NOVA	9136228	CONTAINER	23°51'N 061°49'E	ADVISORY	109-26
08/8/26	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	26°12'N 056°35'E	ATTACK	108-26
05/8/26	WITHELD	WITHELD	TANKER	26°15'N 056°33'E	ADVISORY	107-26
03/8/26	WITHELD	WITHELD	BULKER	26°25'N 056°32'E	ATTACK	104-26
02/8/26	WITHELD	WITHELD	TANKER	26°24'N 056°31'E	ADVISORY	103-26
31/7/26	WITHELD	WITHELD	TANKER	26°21'N 056°35'E	ATTACK	102-26
31/7/26	WITHELD	WITHELD	TANKER	26°04'N 056°34'E	ATTACK	101-26
25/7/26	LAVINE	8818219	TANKER	25°30'N 056°50'E	ADVISORY	096-26
20/7/26	WITHELD	WITHELD	TANKER	26°01'N 056°33'E	ATTACK	094-26
19/7/26	WITHELD	WITHELD	TANKER	25°42'N 056°36'E	ATTACK	093-26
19/7/26	WITHELD	WITHELD	TANKER	25°33'N 056°16'E	ATTACK	092-26
16/7/26	WITHELD	WITHELD	TANKER	19°38'N 059°31'E	ADVISORY	091-26
16/7/26	WITHELD	WITHELD	TANKER	26°11'N 056°35'E	ATTACK	088-26
15/7/26	WITHELD	WITHELD	TANKER	28°55'N 049°37'E	ADVISORY	089-26
14/7/26	AL BAHYAH	9937799	TANKER	25°48'N 056°36'E	ATTACK	087-26

UKMTO COMMENT INCIDENT TREND – DYNAMIC, VOLATILE, ADAPTIVE

Mar 26 – Conflict onset; Iran closes SoH and targets commercial shipping with drones and small boats. US strikes Iranian naval assets. Trend: missile/UAV/USV attacks and SoH disruption.

Apr 26 – Temporary ceasefire and SoH reopening followed by renewed closure after failed diplomacy. Trend: coercive maritime activity, including vessel harassment, warning shots and VHF threats.

May 26 – US convoy operations and Iranian attacks on merchant shipping drive a return to kinetic maritime activity. PGSA established to regulate and toll transits.

Jun 26 – Mixed diplomatic progress and continued enforcement activity. Trend: interdictions and attacks on vessels transiting the SoH despite easing blockade conditions.

Jul 26 – Ceasefire collapse leads to large-scale US-Iran escalation. Trend: increased missile, drone, USV and small-boat threats to commercial shipping across the region.

MARITIME INCIDENTS – Red Sea, Gulf of Aden

Week ending: 14 Aug 26
Reporting Range 28 Feb 26 – 13 Aug 26

4

Confirmed Events within Defined Area

7

Year to date suspicious activity reported

21% Decrease

Bab El-Mandeb Transits prior to 22 Jul 26

6

INJURY / FATALITIES YTD

UKMTO COMMENT:


- Northernmost incident at 17°N in line with previous 2023-2024 northernmost attacks, in the same period 056°E and 10°N were the eastern and southernmost positions of incidents.
- Current threat to shipping appears to be in line with published blockade to Saudi linked shipping.
- Since the Houthi announced a maritime blockade on Saudi shipping 6 fatalities have been reported to UKMTO
- JMIC threat level for the Southern Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden is SUBSTANTIAL

LATEST ATTACKS – projectile strikes, near misses & aggressive approaches with weapons discharged


Date	Name	IMO	Type	Position	Event	Product
11/08/26	TIHAMAH	1031329	GENERAL CARGO	13°04'N 043°13'E	ATTACK	UKMTO-110
05/08/26	DAISY	9516545	TANKER	11°43'N 046°22'E	ATTACK	UKMTO-106
04/08/26	MSV FAIZE NOORE	-	CARGO DHOW	13°12'N 043°08'E	ATTACK	UKMTO-105
22/07/26	ENCELIA	9240172	TANKER	17°00'N 041°05'E	ATTACK	UKMTO-095

LATEST SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY – unaccountable actions indicating potential threats, such as unusual equipment or behaviour

Date	Name	IMO	Type	Position	Event	Product
27/07/26	WITHELD	WITHELD	TANKER	17°02'N 041°21'E	SIGHTING	UKMTO-098
14/05/26	ALPINE EAGLE	9366275	TANKER	16°26'N 040°48'E	UAS SIGHTING	No Product
22/03/26	AMALYA	9907366	YACHT	14°29'N 042°12'E	UAS SIGHTING	No Product
10/03/26	ANNIET	-	YACHT	13°49'N 042°21'E	UAS SIGHTING	No Product
12/04/26	JANNER II	-	YACHT	13°54'N 042°48'E	SUSPICIOUS APPROACH	UKMTO-034




Weekly Average Northbound Southbound BeM transits 2026 vs 2025



MARITIME PIRACY RELATED INCIDENTS – Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Somali Coast

(NO CHANGE)

Week ending: 14 Aug 26
Reporting Range 28 Feb 26 – 13 Aug 26



37

PIRACY RELATED INCIDENTS YTD

7

BOARDING & HIJACKS YTD

4

ATTACKS YTD

26

SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY YTD

LATEST HIJACKS & BOARDINGS – attackers who take control of or board a vessel against the crews will without legal justification

Date	Vessel Name	IMO No.	Vessel Sub-Type	Incident Location	Event Type	UKMTO Product	Status
17/07/26	ASANA	9035838	TANKER	13°36'N, 48°37'E	HIJACK	090-26	Ongoing
01/07/26	GOLDEN ARSENAL	9493212	DRY BULK CARGO	12°52'N, 48°1'E	BOARDING	077-26	Released
02/05/26	EUREKA	1022823	TANKER	13°49'N, 48°28'E	HIJACK	Null	Ongoing
26/04/26	SWARD	9174244	GENERAL CARGO	7°13'N, 49°32'E	HIJACK	046-26	Ongoing
21/04/26	HONOUR 25	1099735	TANKER	8°25'N, 50°21'E	HIJACK	045-26	Ongoing
06/02/26	YEMENI FV	UNKNOWN	FISHING VESSEL	9°54'N, 54°4'E	HIJACK	Null	Unknown
01/01/26	LIAO DONG YU 578	8590350	FISHING VESSEL	9°9'N, 50°43'E	HIJACK	Null	Released

LATEST ATTACKS – aggressive approach with weapons discharged

Date	Name	IMO	Type	Position	Event	Product
17/06/26	FAREEDA 5	1065863	TANKER	13°13'N, 46°46'E	ATTACK	071-26
15/06/26	AMARA	9742211	TANKER	12°24'N, 46°46'E	ATTACK	070-26
15/06/26	GRETA STAR	9230787	CONTAINER	13°10'N, 46°27'E	ATTACK	069-26
10/06/26	MARIA F	9240811	BULK CARGO	12°42'N, 47°22'E	ATTACK	065-26

LATEST SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY – unaccountable actions indicating potential threats, such as unusual equipment or behaviour

Date	Name	IMO	Type	Position	Event	Product
13/07/26	WITHELD	WITHELD	TANKER	11°55'N, 44°51'E	Small craft approach	084-26
01/07/26	WITHELD	WITHELD	TANKER	12°36'N, 48°13'E	Small craft approach	078-26
14/06/26	WITHELD	WITHELD	CARGO	9°49'N, 51°24'E	Small craft approach	Null
28/05/26	WITHELD	WITHELD	TANKER	13°51'N, 51°22'E	Irregular behaviour	Null
23/05/26	WITHELD	WITHELD	TANKER	13°35'N, 50°37'E	Small craft approach	060-26

UKMTO COMMENT:

- Recent Piracy incidents meeting BMP criteria have migrated from the Somali coastline towards the Gulf of Aden
- Historical hijackings and boardings demonstrate a proven capability for operations up to 400 NM offshore
- Recent reporting also highlights opportunistic attacks closer to shore, indicating adaptive and flexible tactics
- As of 31 Jul 26 four vessels are currently under pirate control.
- JMIC threat level for the Gulf of Aden is SUBSTANTIAL and Somali Coast/ Somali Basin is MODERATE

UKMTO VRA: VESSEL REPORTED GNSS INTERFERENCE

VESSEL REPORTING AND ANOMALOUS POSITIONS IN THE VRA

55 608 26,596

30-DAY REPORTS YTD REPORTS 7-DAY ANOMALOUS AIS

PERSISTENT HOTSPOTS Red Sea Arabian Gulf Gulf of Oman


UKMTO Comment:
Reporting of GNSS interference to UKMTO during 2026 remains concentrated within the Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Gulf. Year-to-date reporting patterns indicate persistent clusters of interference activity within these geographic areas, with the highest concentrations observed within the southern Arabian Gulf and along the Red Sea transit corridor.

Recent reports received during the last 30 days indicate that GNSS interference continues to affect vessels operating within these established areas, suggesting that the geographic distribution of disruption activity has remained broadly consistent throughout the reporting period.


Areas with the highest concentrations of GNSS interference reports closely align with locations where UKMTO observes vessels displaying anomalous AIS positions and speeds inconsistent with normal commercial operations. This correlation suggests that both independently derived datasets are identifying the same underlying GNSS disruption activity and provides increased confidence in the assessed geographic extent of interference.

The heatmap represents year-to-date GNSS interference reports voluntarily submitted to UKMTO and should not be considered a complete representation of all GNSS interference activity. Heatmap intensity reflects the relative concentration of reports received during the current calendar year, whilst orange diamonds identify reports received within the preceding 30 days. UKMTO reporting is based on single-source information voluntarily submitted by vessels and not all vessels experiencing GNSS interference will necessarily report incidents. Equally, not all vessels operating within affected areas will experience interference.

Increased reporting compliance enhances UKMTO's situational awareness and supports more comprehensive information sharing with the wider maritime community. UKMTO recommends that all suspected GNSS interference incidents within the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) are reported to UKMTO. Masters and operators should continue to follow company procedures and relevant industry guidance. The information provided is intended to raise awareness of potential navigation risks and areas of elevated GNSS disruption activity to support informed decision-making.



ANOMALOUS AIS POSITIONS OVER TIME



WARNINGS

UKMTO warnings notify the maritime industry of attacks, boardings, hijackings, and other maritime security incidents occurring within the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA). They provide timely alerts to Masters and Company Security Officers (CSOs) to support risk awareness and decision-making.

ADVISORIES

UKMTO advisories are security-related reports received within, or relevant to, the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) that do not meet the BMP criteria for issuing a warning. They are published to maintain situational awareness and provide industry with information on maritime security developments within the region.

IRAN-US CONFLICT RELATED INCIDENTS

Events reported to, or shared with, UKMTO concerning maritime security-related incidents potentially linked to the Iran-US conflict within the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and wider Arabian Sea.

RED SEA ATTACKS ON SHIPPING

Events reported to, or shared with, UKMTO relating to maritime security incidents within the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, and adjacent areas. These incidents are reported separately from BMP-defined piracy activity, with a focus on kinetic events targeting commercial shipping in the region.

PIRACY RELATED INCIDENTS

Events reported to UKMTO within the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA), predominantly covering the Somali Basin, Gulf of Aden, and wider Indian Ocean. This category focuses on incidents that meet BMP piracy reporting criteria, including hijackings, attacks, illegal boardings, and suspicious activity.

TRANSIT OVERVIEW

Derived from AIS data, supplemented with vessel characteristics and ownership data from S&P. Tracks are operator-verified to mitigate GNSS interference and AIS manipulation. Full transits are those that are IMO numbered vessels that complete a full movement from the Arabian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman through any of the current transit routes within a defined 24 hour period. Those that do not complete within the 24 hour period are reviewed for the following day, or stored as local/partial movements.

GNSS Reporting

This heatmap displays year-to-date GNSS interference reports voluntarily submitted to UKMTO by vessels operating within the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA). Geographic concentrations of reported interference broadly align with areas where anomalous AIS positions are observed, providing increased confidence that both datasets are reflecting the same underlying GNSS disruption patterns. AIS anomaly analysis is derived from commercial vessels over 1,000GT displaying geographically implausible positions or speeds greater than 30 knots within a 20km hexbin. The data presented should not be considered a complete representation of all GNSS interference activity, as reporting remains voluntary and is dependent upon vessel participation, AIS availability, data integrity, and reporting compliance.

INCIDENT INFORMATION

Events are correlated with AIS positioning and s&p entity data; some incident reporting remains single-source and cannot always be verified beyond the initial report information is verified against other sources where possible. Incident Attack density uses 100NM natural breaks; piracy density uses 250NM natural breaks, larger radius is to account for mobility of pirate action groups (PAG).

EVENT DEFINITIONS

The following event definitions are aligned with BMP Maritime Security (BMP MS) terminology and classifications wherever possible:

- Hijack:** Attackers take control of a ship against the crew's will for purposes such as robbery, cargo theft, or kidnapping.
- Kidnap:** Unauthorised forcible removal of one or more persons from a vessel.
- Attack:** Aggressive approach or hostile action against a vessel, including the discharge of weapons or missiles, or the impact of loitering munitions on or near the vessel.
- Illegal Boarding:** Boarding of a vessel without lawful authority and with intent to steal, cause harm, or commit another criminal act, without taking control of the vessel.
- Attempted Boarding:** A close approach to a vessel with visible boarding paraphernalia or indicators of intent to board, where the boarding is unsuccessful or prevented by defensive measures.
- Suspicious Activity:** Unaccountable actions, behaviours, or circumstances that may indicate a potential threat to a vessel. Indicators can include unusual equipment, unusual vessel behaviour, abnormal crew numbers, high-speed approaches, multiple skiffs, unusual vessel types for the location, or other activity inconsistent with normal maritime operations.

UKMTO event definitions are intended to be consistent with BMP MS guidance wherever possible.

This is not an exhaustive list. Other incidents, events, activities, vessels, or behaviours may reasonably be assessed as suspicious based on the professional judgement of a vessel's Master, crew, reporting authority, or relevant maritime security organisation, taking into account local operating conditions and information shared within the maritime community.

INFORMATION SOURCES, VALIDATION & USE

All information contained within this report is UNCLASSIFIED and derived from a combination of commercial Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, geospatial analysis, vessel and industry reporting, open-source information, and information shared by partner organisations including the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC), Maritime Security Centre Indian Ocean (MSCIO), Information Fusion Center – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), US Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS), MICA Center and other regional maritime security stakeholders.

Where practicable, information is assessed using a multi-source analytical process. Reporting is cross-referenced against available AIS, geospatial, industry and partner information to improve confidence, reduce duplication, and provide the most accurate representation of the maritime operating environment available at the time of publication. Some partner and vessel reporting may remain single-source and independently unverifiable.

This product is provided to support maritime security awareness, voyage planning, operational understanding, and risk-informed decision-making by Masters, operators and Company Security Officers operating within the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA). It should be considered alongside company procedures, Flag State guidance, industry best practice (BMP MS), and individual vessel risk assessments.

UKMTO provides information and situational awareness to support informed decision-making. The inclusion of information within this report does not constitute navigational advice, routing recommendations, operational direction, legal attribution of responsibility, or formal determination of liability.

Information reflects reporting available to UKMTO at the time of publication and may be subject to amendment as additional information becomes available. Whilst every effort is made to ensure accuracy and timeliness, UKMTO cannot guarantee the completeness, accuracy, or continued validity of third-party reporting.

This report may be shared for legitimate maritime safety and security purposes, provided the content remains unaltered and appropriate UKMTO attribution is retained.

UKMTO remains a neutral and impartial information provider, supporting vessels of all flags and ownership operating within the VRA.