

UKMTO

VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA

OVERVIEW



PRODUCED
25 Sep 2026

REPORT
No. 8

Transit statistics, GNSS interference and regional incident activity across the maritime VRA.

117 WARNINGS YTD	17 ADVISORIES YTD	106 IRAN-US CONFLICT RELATED INCIDENTS YTD	6 RED SEA ATTACKS ON SHIPPING YTD	41 PIRACY RELATED INCIDENTS YTD
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TRANSIT VESSEL TYPE BREAKDOWN

STRAIT OF HORMUZ TRANSIT OVERVIEW

TOTAL OUTBOUND TRANSITS LAST 7 DAYS

129

Total of AIS derived and US stated facilitated transits

TOTAL INBOUND TRANSITS LAST 7 DAYS

129

Total of AIS derived and US stated facilitated transits




49


INCIDENTS REPORTED DURING
STRAIT OF HORMUZ TRANSIT
SINCE 28 FEB 26

Incidents reported to UKMTO since start of conflict


TRANSIT VESSEL TYPE (% FULL TRANSITS since 28 Feb 26)




TANKER TYPE (% FULL TRANSITS since 28 Feb 26)




STRAIT OF HORMUZ TRANSITS - LAST 90 DAYS



STRAIT OF HORMUZ TRANSITS - LAST 270 DAYS



CHOKEPOINT FLOW MAP WITH INCIDENTS LAST 7 DAYS



TOP FLAG OF REGISTRATION SINCE 28 FEB 26

Country	Count
Panama	287
Liberia	195
Marshall Islands	144
Comoros	115
Iran	76
Unknown	76
St Kitts & Nevis	54
Hong Kong, China	51
Malta	51
Barbados	49

TOP COUNTRY OF ECONOMIC BENEFIT SINCE 28 FEB 26

Country	Count
United Arab Emirates	329
China	231
Greece	203
Unknown	165
India	96
Japan	83
South Korea	82
Marshall Islands	75
Iran	75
Turkey	69

Disclaimer: All figures are derived from AIS data and enriched through S&P vessel entity correlation, with the exception of the **US Facilitated Transit** on the combined charts and total outbound/inbound figures, which is sourced separately.

UKMTO STRAIT OF HORMUZ TRANSITS DETAILS (LAST 7 DAYS)

AIS DERIVED OUTBOUND

7-Day Total

22

↔

30-Day Total

129

↑

Since 28 Feb

1020

AIS tracked Vessels

Route (7-Day, AIS Only)

18 Northern
4 Southern
0 Traffic Separation Scheme

Vessel Types (7-Day, AIS only)

8 Tanker Products
4 Dry Bulk Cargo
4 General Cargo
3 Cellular Container
2 Specialist-1
1 Unknown

Flags of Registry (7-Day, AIS only)

Panama: 5
Marshall Islands: 3
Comoros: 3
Unknown: 2
Nicaragua False: 2

Gambia: 1
Barbados: 1
St Kitts & Nevis: 1
Hong Kong, China: 1
Equatorial Guinea False: 1

Bahamas: 1
Tanzania (Zanzibar): 1

Red text denotes suspected false or misreported flags of registry.

US STATED FACILITATED TRANSITS OUTBOUND

7-Day Total

107

30-Day Total

371

Since 13 Jul

669

TOTAL AIS + FACILITATED 7-Day vs PRE-CONFLICT AVERAGE



AIS DERIVED INBOUND

7-Day Total

22

↓

30-Day Total

129

↑

Since 28 Feb

780

AIS tracked Vessels

Route (7-Day, AIS only)

14 Northern
8 Southern
0 Traffic Separation Scheme

Vessel Types (7-Day, AIS only)

10 Tanker Products
4 Dry Bulk Cargo
4 General Cargo
2 Unknown
1 Yacht
1 Specialist-1

Flags of Registry (7-Day, AIS only)

Liberia: 4
Bahamas: 2
Comoros: 2
Nicaragua False: 2
Barbados: 2

Malta: 1
Bolivia: 1
United Kingdom: 1
St Kitts & Nevis: 1
India: 1

Sint Maarten False: 1
Vanuatu: 1
Gambia: 1
Sri Lanka: 1
San Marino: 1

Red text denotes suspected false or misreported flags of registry.

US STATED FACILITATED TRANSITS INBOUND

7-Day Total

107

30-Day Total

369

Since 13 Jul

674


TOTAL AIS + FACILITATED 7-Day vs PRE-CONFLICT AVERAGE



Disclaimer: Transit figures have been derived from a combination of AIS-observed vessel movements and US stated facilitated transit reporting. The analysis assumes limited overlap between these datasets; however, UKMTO cannot independently verify facilitated transit figures or quantify any duplication. In addition, vessels transiting without AIS may not be captured by either source. Consequently, the figures should be regarded as indicative rather than definitive and represent the best estimate available from current reporting.

UKMTO STRAIT OF HORMUZ TRANSITS SUMMARY AIS DERIVED ONLY

Strait of Hormuz Transits – Last 7 Days




Strait of Hormuz Maritime Flow Summary

UKMTO Comment: Vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains significantly below pre-conflict levels despite a brief recovery in late June. Vessels transiting with AIS on predominately route via Iranian TTWs. Over the past seven days, US-stated facilitated transits on the southern route have averaged 30 vessels per day, compared with an average of 6 AIS-derived transits per day. This equates to an approximate 5:1 ratio. The continued disparity suggests that a significant proportion of traffic remains reliant on facilitated passage.

Key Insights



1. Traffic remains approximately 75% below pre-conflict levels however there has been a steady flow of movement since the 24-26 Jun peak. Tankers remain the predominant vessel type transiting the Strait.
2. The southern Omani route remains the most reported corridor, accounting for 26 of 43 projectile strike incidents reported by UKMTO since 6 Jul 26.
3. Engine rooms were the most frequently reported damage location, featuring in 25 of 43 projectile strike incidents since 6 Jul 26, highlighting the continued vulnerability of vessel propulsion and manoeuvrability systems.
4. US enforcement activity against Iranian-linked shipping has increased over the past seven days, with CENTCOM announcing multiple vessel disablement actions in the Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.
5. US CENTCOM report Strait of Hormuz sea lanes are clear of mines
6. JMIC threat assessments remains unchanged, with SEVERE risk assessed for the Strait of Hormuz; SUBSTANTIAL across the Gulf of Aden and Bab el Mandeb; and MODERATE across the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Gulf.

Strait of Hormuz Transits – Last 30 Days vs Last Year



MARITIME INCIDENTS – Strait of Hormuz, Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman

Week ending: 25 Sep 26
Reporting Range 28 Feb 26 – 23 Sep 26



LATEST INCIDENTS REPORTED DURING CONFLICT

Date	Name	IMO	Type	Position	Event	Product
23/09/2026	WITHHELD	WITHHELD	BULK CARRIER	26°24'N 056°25'E	ATTACK	142-26
21/09/2026	WITHHELD	WITHHELD	TANKER	26°24'N 056°32'E	ATTACK	140-26
20/09/2026	WITHHELD	WITHHELD	TANKER	26°24'N 056°30'E	ATTACK	141-26
18/09/2026	WITHHELD	WITHHELD	TANKER	26°23'N 056°30'E	ATTACK	138-26
17/09/2026	TREND	9477177	TANKER	26°25'N 056°24'E	ATTACK	137-26
16/09/2026	WITHHELD	WITHHELD	TANKER	26°22'N 056°28'E	ATTACK	139-26
14/09/2026	WITHHELD	WITHHELD	GENERAL CARGO	26°29'N, 056°36'E	ATTACK	135-26
12/09/2026	WITHHELD	WITHHELD	TANKER	26°23'N, 056°32E	ATTACK	134-26
10/09/2026	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	26°15'N, 056°11'E	ATTACK	133-26
09/09/2026	NEW ANDROS	9294252	TANKER	29°35'N 048°45'E	ATTACK	131-26
09/09/2026	WITHHELD	WITHHELD	TANKER	25°30'N 054°55'E	ATTACK	130-26
08/09/2026	REISCO	9251822	TANKER	26°07'N 057°00'E	ADVISORY	129-26
08/09/2026	CHARMINAR	9318022	TANKER	25°31'N 057°41'E	ADVISORY	129-26
08/09/2026	KAVIS	9282041	TANKER	25°21'N 057°05'E	ADVISORY	129-26
08/09/2026	DERYA	9569700	TANKER	29°14'N 050°18'E	ADVISORY	129-26

UKMTO COMMENT INCIDENT TREND – DYNAMIC, VOLATILE, ADAPTIVE

Jul 26 – Ceasefire collapse leads to large-scale US-Iran escalation. Trend: increased missile, drone, USV and small-boat threats to commercial shipping across the region.

Aug 26 – No diplomatic resolution to the Strait of Hormuz conflict has been achieved, and the regional threat environment remains elevated. Commercial vessels continue to be targeted on the southern route, while regular kinetic activity against oil distribution infrastructure increases the risk of further disruption

Sep 26 – Continued US-Iran escalation marked by US action against Iranian-linked shipping in the Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. Trend: reciprocal military activity sustains a heightened threat environment and increases uncertainty for commercial shipping.

MARITIME INCIDENTS – Red Sea, Gulf of Aden

Week ending: 25 Sep 26
Reporting Range 01 Jan 26 – 23 Sep 26

6

Confirmed Events within
Defined Area

7

Year to date suspicious
activity reported

25%




Bab El-Mandeb Transits
prior to 22 Jul 26

6

Casualties Reported YTD

Incident Location Map



UKMTO COMMENT:

- Northernmost incident at 17°N in line with previous 2023-2024 northernmost attacks, in the same period 056°E and 10°N were the eastern and southernmost positions of incidents
- Current threat to shipping appears to be in line with published blockade to Saudi linked shipping
- Since the Houthi announced a maritime blockade on Saudi shipping 6 fatalities have been reported to UKMTO
- Houthis currently have more control over the strait, seizing Mocha and key Red Sea islands.
- JMIC threat level for the Southern Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden is SUBSTANTIAL
- No projectile attacks to shipping reported to UKMTO in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden since 24/08/26
- However, attacks against KSA commercial ports is significant, with numerous reports of missile strikes.


ATTACKS – projectile strikes, near misses & aggressive approaches with weapons discharged

Date	Name	IMO	Type	Position	Event	Product
24/08/26	WITHHELD	WITHHELD	TANKER	23°53'N 036°55'E	ATTACK	UKMTO-119
18/08/26	WITHHELD	WITHHELD	RO-RO	UNKNOWN	ATTACK	UKMTO-117
11/08/26	TIHAMAH	1031329	GENERAL CARGO	13°04'N 043°13'E	ATTACK	UKMTO-110
05/08/26	DAISY	9516545	TANKER	11°43'N 046°22'E	ATTACK	UKMTO-106
04/08/26	MSV FAIZE NOORE	-	CARGO DHOW	13°12'N 043°08'E	ATTACK	UKMTO-105
22/07/26	ENCELIA	9240172	TANKER	17°00'N 041°05'E	ATTACK	UKMTO-095


LATEST SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY – unaccountable actions indicating potential threats, such as unusual equipment or behaviour

- No recent suspicious activity reported UKMTO in the last 30 days within the reporting area

Bab el-Mandeb Transits: Northbound vs Southbound, 2026 vs 2025



MARITIME PIRACY RELATED INCIDENTS – Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Somali Coast



41

PIRACY RELATED INCIDENTS YTD

10

BOARDING & HIJACKS YEAR TO DATE

4

ATTACKS YEAR TO DATE

27

SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY YEAR TO DATE

HIJACKS & BOARDINGS – attackers who take control of or board a vessel against the crews will without legal justification

Date	Vessel Name	IMO No.	Vessel Sub-Type	Position	Event Type	UKMTO Product	Status
10/09/26	GLAMOR	9177961	GENERAL CARGO	13°24'N, 47°58'E	BOARDING	132-26	Hijack Unsuccessful
20/08/26	SEAMULL	9204776	TANKER	14°41'N, 51°27'E	HIJACK	118-26	~27 days in captivity
17/08/26	LUTUF	9109134	GENERAL CARGO	08°12'N, 50°11'E	HIJACK	114-26	Released 29 Aug 26
17/07/26	ASANA	9035838	TANKER	13°36'N, 48°37'E	HIJACK	090-26	~61 days in captivity
01/07/26	GOLDEN ARSENAL	9493212	DRY BULK CARGO	12°52'N, 48°1'E	BOARDING	077-26	Released 03 Jul 26
02/05/26	EUREKA	1022823	TANKER	13°49'N, 48°28'E	HIJACK	Null	~137 days in captivity
26/04/26	SWORD	9174244	GENERAL CARGO	7°13'N, 49°32'E	HIJACK	046-26	Released 18 Sep 26
21/04/26	HONOUR 25	1099735	TANKER	8°25'N, 50°21'E	HIJACK	045-26	~148 days in captivity

LATEST ATTACKS – aggressive approach with weapons discharged (last 90 days)

- No recent vessel attacks reported to UKMTO in the last 90 days within the reporting area

LATEST SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY – unaccountable actions indicating potential threats, such as unusual equipment or behaviour (last 30 days)

Date	Name	IMO	Type	Position	Event	Product
17/09/2026	WITHHELD	WITHHELD	TANKER	13°07'N, 46°18'E	Small craft approach	136-26

UKMTO COMMENT:

- Recent Piracy incidents meeting BMP criteria have migrated from the Somali coastline towards the Gulf of Aden
- Historical hijackings and boardings demonstrate a proven capability for operations up to 500 NM offshore
- Recent reporting also highlights opportunistic attacks closer to shore, indicating adaptive and flexible tactics
- As of 16 Sep 26 four vessels are currently reported under pirate control
- JMIC threat level for the Gulf of Aden is SUBSTANTIAL and Somali Coast/ Somali Basin is MODERATE
- None of the vessels successfully hijacked or boarded were actively reporting to UKMTO prior to the incident

UKMTO VRA: VESSEL REPORTED GNSS INTERFERENCE

Week ending: 25 Sep 26
Reporting Range 01 Jan 26 – 23 Sep 26

VESSEL REPORTING AND ANOMALOUS POSITIONS IN THE VRA

5

7-DAY REPORTS

34

30-DAY REPORTS

650

YTD REPORTS




37,005

7-DAY ANOMALOUS AIS

UKMTO Comment:

- GNSS interference reporting during 2026 remains concentrated within the Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Gulf.
- The highest reporting density continues to be observed in the southern Arabian Gulf and along the Red Sea transit corridor.
- Reports received during the last 30 days indicate that interference activity remains persistent within these established geographic areas, with no significant shift in the overall distribution of incidents.
- Locations with high concentrations of GNSS interference reports closely correlate with areas where UKMTO has observed anomalous AIS positions and vessel movement patterns inconsistent with normal commercial operations.
- The alignment of these independently derived datasets increases confidence in the assessed extent and location of GNSS disruption activity.
- Image A is representative of observed AIS positions of vessels subject to spoofing in the last 7 days. Image B is an example of an individual vessel track on 15 Sep 26.

ANOMALOUS AIS POSITIONS OVER TIME



WARNINGS

UKMTO warnings notify the maritime industry of attacks, boardings, hijackings, and other maritime security incidents occurring within the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA). They provide timely alerts to Masters and Company Security Officers (CSOs) to support risk awareness and decision-making.

ADVISORIES

UKMTO advisories are security-related reports received within, or relevant to, the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) that do not meet the BMP criteria for issuing a warning. They are published to maintain situational awareness and provide industry with information on maritime security developments within the region.

IRAN-US CONFLICT RELATED INCIDENTS

Events reported to, or shared with, UKMTO concerning maritime security-related incidents potentially linked to the Iran-US conflict within the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and wider Arabian Sea.

RED SEA ATTACKS ON SHIPPING

Events reported to, or shared with, UKMTO relating to maritime security incidents within the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, and adjacent areas. These incidents are reported separately from BMP-defined piracy activity, with a focus on kinetic events targeting commercial shipping in the region.

PIRACY RELATED INCIDENTS

Events reported to UKMTO within the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA), predominantly covering the Somali Basin, Gulf of Aden, and wider Indian Ocean. This category focuses on incidents that meet BMP piracy reporting criteria, including hijackings, attacks, illegal boardings, and suspicious activity.

TRANSIT OVERVIEW

Derived from AIS data, supplemented with vessel characteristics, ownership, operator, flag state, and entity-link information from S&P Global. Vessel tracks are operator-verified to mitigate the effects of GNSS interference, AIS manipulation, and reporting anomalies. Full transits are defined as IMO-numbered vessels completing a movement from the Arabian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, via any currently utilised Strait of Hormuz transit route, within a 24-hour reporting period. Vessels not completing a transit within the reporting window are reviewed on the following day and categorised as either completed transits or local/partial movements.

Complementary contextual reporting is also received from US NCAGS on daily facilitated transit volumes through the Strait of Hormuz. These figures cannot be independently verified in full by UKMTO and may include vessels not observable through AIS. Consequently, facilitated transit figures and AIS-derived transit statistics should be considered related but distinct datasets, each reflecting different collection methods, coverage, and limitations.

GNSS REPORTING

This heatmap displays year-to-date GNSS interference reports voluntarily submitted to UKMTO by vessels operating within the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA). Geographic concentrations of reported interference broadly align with areas where anomalous AIS positions are observed, providing increased confidence that both datasets are reflecting the same underlying GNSS disruption patterns. AIS anomaly analysis is derived from commercial vessels over 1,000GT displaying geographically implausible positions or speeds greater than 30 knots within a 20km hexbin. The data presented should not be considered a complete representation of all GNSS interference activity, as reporting remains voluntary and is dependent upon vessel participation, AIS availability, data integrity, and reporting compliance.

INCIDENT INFORMATION

Events are correlated with AIS positioning and S&P entity data; some incident reporting remains single-source and cannot always be verified beyond the initial report information is verified against other sources where possible. Incident Attack density uses 100NM natural breaks; piracy density uses 250NM natural breaks, larger radius is to account for mobility of pirate action groups (PAG).

EVENT DEFINITIONS

The following event definitions are aligned with BMP Maritime Security (BMP MS) terminology and classifications wherever possible:

- **Hijack:** Attackers take control of a ship against the crew's will for purposes such as robbery, cargo theft, or kidnapping.
- **Kidnap:** Unauthorised forcible removal of one or more persons from a vessel.
- **Attack:** Aggressive approach or hostile action against a vessel, including the discharge of weapons or missiles, or the impact of loitering munitions on or near the vessel.
- **Illegal Boarding:** Boarding of a vessel without lawful authority and with intent to steal, cause harm, or commit another criminal act, without taking control of the vessel.
- **Attempted Boarding:** A close approach to a vessel with visible boarding paraphernalia or indicators of intent to board, where the boarding is unsuccessful or prevented by defensive measures.
- **Suspicious Activity:** Unaccountable actions, behaviours, or circumstances that may indicate a potential threat to a vessel. Indicators can include unusual equipment, unusual vessel behaviour, abnormal crew numbers, high-speed approaches, multiple skiffs, unusual vessel types for the location, or other activity inconsistent with normal maritime operations.

UKMTO event definitions are intended to be consistent with BMP MS guidance wherever possible.

This is not an exhaustive list. Other incidents, events, activities, vessels, or behaviours may reasonably be assessed as suspicious based on the professional judgement of a vessel's Master, crew, reporting authority, or relevant maritime security organisation, taking into account local operating conditions and information shared within the maritime community.

INFORMATION SOURCES, VALIDATION & USE

All information contained within this report is OFFICIAL and derived from a combination of commercial Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, geospatial analysis, vessel and industry reporting, open-source information, and information shared by partner organisations including the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC), Maritime Security Centre Indian Ocean (MSCIO), Information Fusion Center – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), US Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS), MICA Center and other regional maritime security stakeholders.

Where practicable, information is assessed using a multi-source analytical process. Reporting is cross-referenced against available AIS, geospatial, industry and partner information to improve confidence, reduce duplication, and provide the most accurate representation of the maritime operating environment available at the time of publication. Some partner and vessel reporting may remain single-source and independently unverifiable.

This product is provided to support maritime security awareness, voyage planning, operational understanding, and risk-informed decision-making by Masters, operators and Company Security Officers operating within the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA). It should be considered alongside company procedures, Flag State guidance, industry best practice (BMP MS), and individual vessel risk assessments.

UKMTO provides information and situational awareness to support informed decision-making. The inclusion of information within this report does not constitute navigational advice, routing recommendations, operational direction, legal attribution of responsibility, or formal determination of liability.

Information reflects reporting available to UKMTO at the time of publication and may be subject to amendment as additional information becomes available. Whilst every effort is made to ensure accuracy and timeliness, UKMTO cannot guarantee the completeness, accuracy, or continued validity of third-party reporting.

This report may be shared for legitimate maritime safety and security purposes, provided the content remains unaltered and appropriate UKMTO attribution is retained.

UKMTO remains a neutral and impartial information provider, supporting vessels of all flags and ownership operating within the VRA.