



VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA

WEEKLY OVERVIEW

Transit statistics, GNSS interference and regional incident activity across the maritime VRA.

PRODUCED
02 Oct 2026

REPORT
No. 9

121

WARNINGS YTD

17

ADVISORIES YTD

110

IRAN-US CONFLICT
RELATED INCIDENTS YTD

6



RED SEA ATTACKS ON
SHIPPING YTD

41

PIRACY RELATED
INCIDENTS YTD

STRAIT OF HORMUZ TRANSIT OVERVIEW

Week ending: 02 Oct 26
Reporting Range 28 Feb 26 – 30 Sep 26



TOTAL OUTBOUND TRANSITS LAST 7 DAYS

124

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Total of AIS derived and US stated facilitated transits

TOTAL INBOUND TRANSITS LAST 7 DAYS



123

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Total of AIS derived and US stated facilitated transits

53

INCIDENTS REPORTED TO UKMTO DURING STRAIT OF HORMUZ TRANSIT SINCE 28 FEB 26



7-Day Flags of Registration	Count	7-Day Economic Benefit	Count
Liberia	7	United Arab Emirates	7
Panama	6	Marshall Islands	5
Palau	2	Unknown	4
Comoros	2	Panama	3
Vietnam	2	Qatar	3

Top 5 most occurring included, for the reporting period derived solely from AIS data, Red text denotes unknown ownership or false flag registry. Derived from S&P Data.

UKMTO Comment: Vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains approximately 75% below pre-conflict levels, with tankers continuing to dominate observed movements. AIS-derived traffic indicates most broadcasting vessels are routing via Iranian Route. Separately sourced US NCAGS facilitation figures remain significantly higher than AIS-observed transits (approx. 5:1), suggesting a substantial proportion of vessels using the southern route are not broadcasting AIS or are otherwise not captured by AIS analysis.

Disclaimer: All figures are derived from AIS data and enriched through S&P vessel entity correlation, except US NCAGS facilitated transit figures and associated totals, which are sourced separately, including non-AIS broadcasting vessels, and cannot be independently verified by UKMTO at this stage.

MARITIME INCIDENTS – Strait of Hormuz, Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman

Week ending: 02 Oct 26
Reporting Range 28 Feb 26 – 30 Sep 26

91

REPORTS OF DAMAGE TO VESSELS YTD

↑Up

14

NEAR MISS REPORTS YTD

33

INJURY / FATALITIES YTD

5

CONFIRMED TOTAL LOSSES YTD


110

TOTAL EVENTS REPORTED YTD

↑Up

214

DAYS SINCE CONFLICT START (28 FEB 26)



EVENT TIMELINE

28 Feb 26 – US/Israel – Iran Conflict Begins

1 Mar 26 – First Reported Incident on commercial shipping

8 Apr 26 – US-Iran ceasefire

9 Apr 26 – Iran issues alternative transit route and mine warnings

10 Apr 26 – US-led Maritime Security Zone established

13 Apr 26 – US blockade of Iran-linked maritime traffic

25 Apr 26 – First Reported Ceasefire Violation

4 May 26 – US implement Project Freedom

17 Jun 26 – Islamabad Memorandum (Peace Agreement)

19 Jun 26 – PGSA announce northern route

20 Jun 26 – JMIC issue guidance for southern route

23 Jun 26 – IMO launch phased evacuation plan


08 Jul 26 – US announce end of US-Iran ceasefire

14 Jul 26 – Resumption of US blockade on Iran

17 Aug 26 – 60 Day MOU Deadline Expires

28 Aug 26 – US CENTCOM reports SoH sea lanes cleared of mines

14 Sep 26 – Further vessels added to PGSA list



INCIDENTS REPORTED TO UKMTO IN THE LAST 7 DAYS

Date	Name	IMO	Type	Position	Event	Product
29/09/2026	WITHHELD	WITHHELD	TANKER	26°23'N, 056°26'E Strait of Hormuz	ATTACK	146-26
29/09/2026	WITHHELD	WITHHELD	TANKER	26°26'N, 056°29'E Strait of Hormuz	ATTACK	145-26
29/09/2026	WITHHELD	WITHHELD	TANKER	26°23'N, 056°29'E Strait of Hormuz	ATTACK	144-26
28/09/2026	WITHHELD	WITHHELD	TANKER	26°23'N, 056°18'E Strait of Hormuz	SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY	143-26

Red text denotes approximate position.

UKMTO Comment:

No diplomatic resolution has been achieved and the regional threat environment remains elevated. Commercial vessels continue to be targeted on the southern route, with ongoing military activity sustaining an increased risk to maritime operations.

Since 6 Jul 26, 31 of 48 projectile strike incidents reported to UKMTO have occurred on the southern Omani route. There is probably other projectile strikes occurring that have NOT been reported to UKMTO.

Since 6 Jul 26, 25 incidents involved engine room damage, highlighting the continued vulnerability of propulsion and manoeuvrability systems.

UKMTO reports only incidents that can be verified through primary sources; additional incidents are known but cannot be independently verified.

UKMTO encourages transparent and timely reporting from vessels to support maritime situational awareness and enable information sharing across the wider maritime community.

JMIC Threat Levels: Strait of Hormuz SEVERE (hostile action highly likely, continued navigation interference and potential mining activity); Gulf of Oman MODERATE (ongoing electronic interference and enforcement activity); Arabian Gulf MODERATE (navigation interference and residual kinetic risk remain present).

MARITIME INCIDENTS – Red Sea, Gulf of Aden

Week ending: 02 Oct 26
Reporting Range 01 Jan 26 – 30 Sep 26

6

Confirmed Events within Defined Area

7

Year to Date Suspicious Activity Reported


24%

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Bab El-Mandeb Transits Prior to 22 Jul 26

6

Casualties Reported Year to Date



UKMTO Comment:


- Northernmost incident at 17°N in line with previous 2023-2024 northernmost attacks, in the same period 056°E and 10°N were the eastern and southernmost positions of incidents
- Current threat to shipping appears to be in line with published blockade to Saudi linked shipping
- Since the Houthi announced a maritime blockade on Saudi shipping 6 fatalities have been reported to UKMTO
- Houthis currently have more control over the strait, seizing Mokha and key Red Sea islands.
- JMIC threat level for the Southern Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden is SUBSTANTIAL
- No projectile attacks to shipping reported to UKMTO in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden since 24/08/26
- However, attacks against KSA commercial ports is significant, with numerous reports of missile strikes.

ATTACKS – projectile strikes, near misses & aggressive approaches with weapons discharged

- No recent attacks reported UKMTO in the last 7-days within the defined area


LATEST SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY – unaccountable actions indicating potential threats, such as unusual equipment or behaviour

- No recent suspicious activity reported UKMTO in the last 7-days within the defined area



MARITIME PIRACY RELATED INCIDENTS – Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Somali Coast

Week ending: 02 Oct 26
Reporting Range 01 Jan 26 – 30 Sep 26



41

PIRACY RELATED INCIDENTS YTD

10

BOARDING & HIJACKS YEAR TO DATE

4

ATTACKS YEAR TO DATE

27

SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY YEAR TO DATE

HIJACKS & BOARDINGS – attackers who take control of or board a vessel against the crews will without legal justification

Date	Name	IMO	Type	Position	Event	Product	Status
10/09/26	GLAMOR	9177961	GENERAL CARGO	13°24'N, 047°58'E	BOARDING	132-26	Hijack Unsuccessful
20/08/26	SEAMULL	9204776	TANKER	14°41'N, 051°27'E	HIJACK	118-26	Released 25 Sep 26
17/08/26	LUTUF	9109134	GENERAL CARGO	08°12'N, 050°11'E	HIJACK	114-26	Released 29 Aug 26
17/07/26	ASANA	9035838	TANKER	13°36'N, 048°37'E	HIJACK	090-26	~68 days in captivity
01/07/26	GOLDEN ARSENAL	9493212	DRY BULK CARGO	12°52'N, 048°1'E	BOARDING	077-26	Released 03 Jul 26
02/05/26	EUREKA	1022823	TANKER	13°49'N, 048°28'E	HIJACK	Null	Released 29 Sep 26
26/04/26	SWORD	9174244	GENERAL CARGO	7°13'N, 049°32'E	HIJACK	046-26	Released 18 Sep 26
21/04/26	HONOUR 25	1099735	TANKER	8°25'N, 050°21'E	HIJACK	045-26	Released 29 Sep 26

ATTACKS – aggressive approach with weapons discharged

- No recent attacks reported UKMTO in the last 7-days within the defined area

SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY – unaccountable actions indicating potential threats, such as unusual equipment or behaviour

- No recent suspicious activity reported UKMTO in the last 7-days within the defined area

UKMTO Comment:

- Recent Piracy incidents meeting BMP criteria have migrated from the Somali coastline towards the Gulf of Aden
- Historical hijackings and boardings demonstrate a proven capability for operations up to 500 NM offshore
- Recent reporting also highlights opportunistic attacks closer to shore, indicating adaptive and flexible tactics
- As of 30 Sep 26 one vessel is currently reported under pirate control
- JMIC threat level for the Gulf of Aden is SUBSTANTIAL and Somali Coast/ Somali Basin is MODERATE
- None of the vessels successfully hijacked or boarded were actively reporting to UKMTO prior to the incident
- Active and frequent reports of suspicious activity are useful as potential indicators and early warning, UKMTO encourages any vessel within the VRA to report any anomalous maritime behaviour for wider sharing to the maritime community.



UKMTO VRA: VESSEL REPORTED GNSS INTERFERENCE

Week ending: 02 Oct 26
Reporting Range 01 Jan 26 – 30 Sep 26

VESSEL REPORTING AND ANOMALOUS POSITIONS IN THE VRA



- UKMTO Comment:**
- GNSS interference reporting during 2026 has remained concentrated within the Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Gulf.
 - The highest reporting density is observed in the southern Arabian Gulf and along the Red Sea transit corridor.
 - Reporting received during the last 30 days indicates interference activity remains persistent within these established areas, with no significant change in the geographic distribution of incidents.
 - Areas with high concentrations of GNSS interference reports closely correlate with locations where UKMTO has observed AIS spoofing, anomalous vessel positions, and movement patterns inconsistent with normal commercial operations, increasing confidence in the assessed extent of disruption activity.



WARNINGS

UKMTO warnings notify the maritime industry of attacks, boardings, hijackings, and other maritime security incidents occurring within the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA). They provide timely alerts to Masters and Company Security Officers (CSOs) to support risk awareness and decision-making.

ADVISORIES

UKMTO advisories are security-related reports received within, or relevant to, the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) that do not meet the BMP criteria for issuing a warning. They are published to maintain situational awareness and provide industry with information on maritime security developments within the region.

IRAN-US CONFLICT RELATED INCIDENTS

Events reported to, or shared with, UKMTO concerning maritime security-related incidents potentially linked to the Iran-US conflict within the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and wider Arabian Sea.

RED SEA ATTACKS ON SHIPPING

Events reported to, or shared with, UKMTO relating to maritime security incidents within the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, and adjacent areas. These incidents are reported separately from BMP-defined piracy activity, with a focus on kinetic events targeting commercial shipping in the region.

PIRACY RELATED INCIDENTS

Events reported to UKMTO within the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA), predominantly covering the Somali Basin, Gulf of Aden, and wider Indian Ocean. This category focuses on incidents that meet BMP piracy reporting criteria, including hijackings, attacks, illegal boardings, and suspicious activity.

TRANSIT OVERVIEW

Derived from AIS data, supplemented with vessel characteristics, ownership, operator, flag state, and entity-link information from S&P Global. Vessel tracks are operator-verified to mitigate the effects of GNSS interference, AIS manipulation, and reporting anomalies. Full transits are defined as IMO-numbered vessels completing a movement from the Arabian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, via any currently utilised Strait of Hormuz transit route, within a 24-hour reporting period. Vessels not completing a transit within the reporting window are reviewed on the following day and categorised as either completed transits or local/partial movements.

Complementary contextual reporting is also received from US NCAGS on daily facilitated transit volumes through the Strait of Hormuz. These figures cannot be independently verified in full by UKMTO and may include vessels not observable through AIS. Consequently, facilitated transit figures and AIS-derived transit statistics should be considered related but distinct datasets, each reflecting different collection methods, coverage, and limitations.

GNSS REPORTING

This heatmap displays year-to-date GNSS interference reports voluntarily submitted to UKMTO by vessels operating within the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA). Geographic concentrations of reported interference broadly align with areas where anomalous AIS positions are observed, providing increased confidence that both datasets are reflecting the same underlying GNSS disruption patterns. AIS anomaly analysis is derived from commercial vessels over 1,000GT displaying geographically implausible positions or speeds greater than 30 knots within a 20km hexbin. The data presented should not be considered a complete representation of all GNSS interference activity, as reporting remains voluntary and is dependent upon vessel participation, AIS availability, data integrity, and reporting compliance.

INCIDENT INFORMATION

Events are correlated with AIS positioning and S&P entity data; some incident reporting remains single-source and cannot always be verified beyond the initial report information is verified against other sources where possible. Incident Attack density uses 100NM natural breaks; piracy density uses 250NM natural breaks, larger radius is to account for mobility of pirate action groups (PAG).

EVENT DEFINITIONS

The following event definitions are aligned with BMP Maritime Security (BMP MS) terminology and classifications wherever possible:

- **Hijack:** Attackers take control of a ship against the crew's will for purposes such as robbery, cargo theft, or kidnapping.
- **Kidnap:** Unauthorised forcible removal of one or more persons from a vessel.
- **Attack:** Aggressive approach or hostile action against a vessel, including the discharge of weapons or missiles, or the impact of loitering munitions on or near the vessel.
- **Illegal Boarding:** Boarding of a vessel without lawful authority and with intent to steal, cause harm, or commit another criminal act, without taking control of the vessel.
- **Attempted Boarding:** A close approach to a vessel with visible boarding paraphernalia or indicators of intent to board, where the boarding is unsuccessful or prevented by defensive measures.
- **Suspicious Activity:** Unaccountable actions, behaviours, or circumstances that may indicate a potential threat to a vessel. Indicators can include unusual equipment, unusual vessel behaviour, abnormal crew numbers, high-speed approaches, multiple skiffs, unusual vessel types for the location, or other activity inconsistent with normal maritime operations.

UKMTO event definitions are intended to be consistent with BMP MS guidance wherever possible.

This is not an exhaustive list. Other incidents, events, activities, vessels, or behaviours may reasonably be assessed as suspicious based on the professional judgement of a vessel's Master, crew, reporting authority, or relevant maritime security organisation, taking into account local operating conditions and information shared within the maritime community.

INFORMATION SOURCES, VALIDATION & USE

All information contained within this report is OFFICIAL and derived from a combination of commercial Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, geospatial analysis, vessel and industry reporting, open-source information, and information shared by partner organisations including the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC), Maritime Security Centre Indian Ocean (MSCIO), Information Fusion Center – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), US Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS), MICA Center and other regional maritime security stakeholders.

Where practicable, information is assessed using a multi-source analytical process. Reporting is cross-referenced against available AIS, geospatial, industry and partner information to improve confidence, reduce duplication, and provide the most accurate representation of the maritime operating environment available at the time of publication. Some partner and vessel reporting may remain single-source and independently unverifiable.

This product is provided to support maritime security awareness, voyage planning, operational understanding, and risk-informed decision-making by Masters, operators and Company Security Officers operating within the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA). It should be considered alongside company procedures, Flag State guidance, industry best practice (BMP MS), and individual vessel risk assessments.

UKMTO provides information and situational awareness to support informed decision-making. The inclusion of information within this report does not constitute navigational advice, routing recommendations, operational direction, legal attribution of responsibility, or formal determination of liability.

Information reflects reporting available to UKMTO at the time of publication and may be subject to amendment as additional information becomes available. Whilst every effort is made to ensure accuracy and timeliness, UKMTO cannot guarantee the completeness, accuracy, or continued validity of third-party reporting.

This report may be shared for legitimate maritime safety and security purposes, provided the content remains unaltered and appropriate UKMTO attribution is retained.

UKMTO remains a neutral and impartial information provider, supporting vessels of all flags and ownership operating within the VRA.