Joint Maritime Information Center

Update 111 to JMIC Advisory Note:
01 March – 05 November 2026

Regional Tension - Impact on Maritime Security

Area of Concern:

Middle East Maritime Region

JMIC# 001-26 ICOD: 051300 UTC Regional Threat Level: SEVERE

1. Confirmed Maritime Security Incidents List since last report

Date	Vessel	Vessel Type	Event Type	Location	Narrative
01 Nov 2026 UKMTO 191-26 02 Nov 2026 NAVAREA IX 425/26	SELAT STORM	Tug	Attack	Strait of Hormuz	UKMTO received a report that on 01 Nov the Master of a merchant vessel relayed a Mayday call stating that a vessel had been struck by an unknown projectile within the Strait of Hormuz. NAVAREA IX 425/26 reported the tug, identified by NAVAREA IX as the SELAT STORM, involved in a security incident and sunk approx. 0.6 NM west of Jazirat Um Al Ghanam. Casualty reports are conflicting.
02 Nov 2026 UKMTO 192-26	LARGO ATOM	Tanker	Attack	Arabian Gulf	UKMTO received a report that on 01 Nov a tanker, identified by UKMTO as the LARGO ATOM, travelling southeast through the Arabian Gulf was struck by two unknown projectiles on the port side approx. 72 NM east of Ras Al Khafji, Saudi Arabia. All crew were accounted for and no environmental impact was reported.
02 Nov 2026 UKMTO 193-26	Name withheld UFN	Unknown	Attack	Strait of Hormuz	UKMTO received a report that on 01 Nov a vessel was struck by an unknown projectile approx. 9 NM northeast of Lima, Oman, causing a hole on the starboard side. The vessel and crew were reported safe, with no environmental impact. Also reported by MSCIO in 166/26.
03 Nov 2026 UKMTO 194-26	MSV AL JUSUFI	Dhow	Attack	Strait of Hormuz	UKMTO received a report by the Indian Government that on 02 Nov an Indian-crewed dhow, identified by India's Ministry of External Affairs as the MSV AL JUSUFI, was attacked while sailing outbound through the Strait of Hormuz. The Royal Navy of Oman rescued the surviving crew; Indian officials

					reported one crew member fatality and 13 rescued. UKMTO is unaware of the status of the vessel.
03 Nov 2026 UKMTO 195-26	**Name withheld UFN**	**Tanker**	**Attack**	**Strait of Hormuz**	**UKMTO received a report from the Company Security Officer of a tanker that on 03 Nov the vessel was struck by two unknown projectiles in the engine room approx. 14 NM northeast of Lima, Oman. No casualties or environmental impact were reported.**
03 Nov 2026 MSCIO 168/26	**Unknown**	**Unknown**	**Suspicious activity**	**Bab el-Mandeb**	**MSCIO received a report that on 03 Nov a merchant vessel observed a large floating object, possibly a boat, surrounded by smoke in the Bab el-Mandeb. No distress calls were received and the circumstances are unknown.**
31 Oct 2026 UKMTO 190-26 **02 Nov 2026 MSCIO 161/26 UPDATE 02**	**AZINI**	**Fishing vessel**	**Suspicious activity**	**Somali Basin**	**UKMTO received a report on 31 Oct that a large fishing vessel had been boarded and taken by armed persons east-southeast of Socotra. The vessel identified by MSCIO as the AZINI, was hijacked by armed pirates off northeast Somalia on 29 Oct. MSCIO UPDATE 02 (02 Nov) reported the AZINI liberated and the incident closed.**
05 Nov 2026 UKMTO 196-26	**Name withheld UFN**	**Tanker**	**Attack**	**Arabian Gulf**	**UKMTO received a report that on 04 Nov a tanker was struck by two unidentified projectiles approx. 50 NM north of Madinat ash Shamal, Qatar. The status of the crew, damage assessment and environmental impact is unconfirmed as of ICOD.**

2. Operational Summary – Last 96 Hours

2A. Arabian Gulf

Two attacks were reported in this period (UKMTO 192-26 and 196-26), no further disruptions were reported. The attacks were the seventh and eighth inside the Arabian Gulf since 07 Oct; UKMTO 196-26 occurred in the central Gulf, north of Qatar.

Traffic flows continued, with anchorage congestion high across the region.

2B. Strait of Hormuz

Four attacks were reported in this period (UKMTO 191-26, 193-26, 194-26 and 195-26), against three in the previous period. All four occurred within about 52 hours (01 Nov 1509 UTC to 03 Nov 1900 UTC) off the Musandam coast of Oman.

IRGC attacks, attempted attacks, and/or harassment activity persisted including UAV overflight, targeted surveillance of merchant shipping, and occasional VHF hailing. These actions continue to demonstrate Iran's intent to assert presence along key transit lanes and maintain pressure on transiting vessels.

Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained at reduced levels compared to the 2025 baseline. Independent tracking data indicated single to low double digit transits per day, while US

NCAGS data indicated an average of approximately 31 U.S. assisted transits during this period against an average of 34 per day over 24–30 October.

2C. Gulf of Oman (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

Naval presence remained elevated due to blockade enforcement activity. According to the latest official CENTCOM figures (01 Nov), 144 commercial vessels had been redirected; four vessels had been disabled as a result of blockade enforcement, and two had been boarded for blockade compliance. No further CENTCOM blockade enforcement action was announced in this period.

Vessels were expected to respond promptly to military queries and maintain AIS-on unless constrained by security threats. Operators continued to exercise caution due to regional strike activity and ongoing IRGC monitoring of shipping in adjacent waters.

2D. Arabian Sea (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. Naval forces continued routine patrols, and commercial traffic was transiting without significant disruption.

2E. Gulf of Aden

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. NAVAREA IX 416/26 (suspected Pirate Action Group activity, following UKMTO 184-26) was stated to remain in force until 03 November; no replacement warning has been identified.

Commercial traffic remained relatively steady in the Gulf of Aden.

2F. Southern Red Sea & Bab el Mandeb

One incident of suspicious activity was reported in this period (MSCIO 168/26). No attack on a merchant vessel was reported. Traffic remains below the 20 Jul Houthi selective embargo. Commercial traffic in the Bab el Mandeb rose on S&P tracking, to an average of approx. 34 transits per day on 01–04 November (38, 37, 35 and 26) against approx. 28 per day in the previous week.

Bab el-Mandeb remains open to commercial traffic but is considered as volatile. Houthi statements continue to assert that non-Saudi commercial shipping may transit safely.

2G. Somali Coast and Somali Basin

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. The fishing vessel AZINI (UKMTO 190-26; MSCIO 161/26), hijacked by armed pirates off northeastern Somalia on 29 October and assessed by MSCIO as a possible mother ship, was reported liberated and the incident closed (MSCIO 161/26 UPDATE 02, 02 November). One merchant vessel remains hijacked since the date of initial incident reporting:

- MT ASANA, a Tanzanian-flagged product/chemical tanker, was hijacked on 17 July 2026 approximately 65 NM southwest of Mukalla, Yemen, while carrying oil products.

2H. Northern Red Sea & Suez Canal (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. Maritime traffic in the Northern Red Sea and Suez Canal held steady over the last 96 hours.

2I. Eastern Mediterranean (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. This is consistent with the persistent baseline.

3. Regional Threat Overview (No change)

JMIC Threat Scale: Low | Moderate | Substantial | Severe | Critical

Region	Threat Level	Notes
Arabian Gulf	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to recent Iranian attacks, the threat level in the Arabian Gulf remains SUBSTANTIAL. Navigation interference has also increased. An attack is a strong possibility.
Strait of Hormuz	SEVERE	Due to recent Iranian attacks, the threat level remains SEVERE, with deliberate hostile action considered as highly likely under current conditions. Navigation interference persists, and mariners are advised to remain vigilant for attempted mining within and adjacent to the TSS. IRGC attacks, hailing, and routing pressure continue, particularly for AIS-on vessels.
Gulf of Oman	MODERATE	The U.S. naval blockade remains enforced, with ongoing monitoring, hailing, and verification queries, particularly near approaches to Iranian ports. Enforcement activity poses no direct impact to neutral shipping transits in the Gulf of Oman. Electronic interference continues to present a credible concern for mariners.
Arabian Sea	MODERATE	Residual conflict-linked risk persists, but no attacks have been reported, and current indicators suggest no imminent change to the threat environment.
Gulf of Aden	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to piracy-related events and Houthi rhetoric and attacks, the threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with a strong possibility of a maritime security incident in coastal approaches, transit corridors, and established small-craft areas.
Bab el-Mandeb / Southern Red Sea	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to Houthi attacks on vessels and maritime infrastructure in the Southern Red Sea and territorial gains in Yemen along the Red Sea, the threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Based on the recent attacks, sustained intent against Saudi-affiliated interests, and maintained capability, additional attacks are a strong possibility
Somali Coast / Somali Basin	MODERATE	PAG activity remains possible; the southwest monsoon subsided on 15 October, and skiff operations further offshore are more feasible.
Northern Red Sea / Suez Canal	MODERATE	Suez Canal operations remain normal. Periodic Electro-magnetic Interference (EMI) remains possible.
Eastern Mediterranean	LOW	Due to a lack of security incidents, the threat level remains LOW. Localized EMI disruptions persist, and regional naval presence remains consistent.

JMIC Regional Threat Levels

Threat Level	Definition
Low	An attack is highly unlikely
Moderate	An attack is possible but not likely
Substantial	An attack is a strong possibility
Severe	An attack is highly likely
Critical	An attack is almost certain

4. Maritime Incidents & Traffic Assessment

4A. Confirmed Vessel Incidents since 01 March

Total of 172 incidents since 01 March; six incidents since the last report (UKMTO 191-26, 192-26, 193-26, 194-26, 195-26 and 196-26).

N.B: Correction: the total in Update 110 should have read 166, not 167; the error was a double count. Totals from this update are corrected.

4B. Infrastructure Incidents (Last 96 Hours) (No change)

The overall risk remains MODERATE, driven by the potential for an increase in kinetic activity against ports, terminals and offshore installations along the Iranian, Yemeni and Saudi coasts.

No attack on ports, terminals, offshore platforms, oil and gas loading facilities or subsea infrastructure was reported in this period.

4C. Traffic Trends

- Strait of Hormuz:
    - Historical average: ~138 vessels/day (2025 baseline)
    - U.S. – facilitated SoH transits 01-04 Nov (past 96 hours): 126

** Metrics are drawn from two separate sources: U.S. NCAGS data reflecting U.S.-facilitated Strait of Hormuz transits only, and S&P Maritime/SeaVision data reflecting non-facilitated vessel traffic for cargo-carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons, excluding vessels calling Iranian ports adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.*

- Bab el-Mandeb:
    - Historical average: ~61 vessels/day (2023 baseline)
    - Vessel transits 01-04 Nov (past 96 hours): 136


** Metrics are drawn from S&P Maritime for cargo-carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons.*

4D. Port & Anchorage Congestion

Congestion remains high and is driven primarily by restricted transit, and to a lesser degree by port capacity. On 05 Nov approximately 179 vessels were at anchor in the vicinity of Fujairah/Khor Fakkan, approximately 141 off Dubai/Jebel Ali to Ras Al Khaimah, mainly off Sharjah/Ajman/Umm Al Quwain, approximately 50 in the vicinity of Musandam/Sohar and approximately 17 off Bandar Abbas/Qeshm according to internal estimates. Bandar Abbas / Qeshm counts remain low confidence because Iranian AIS coverage is thin and the base is small; satellite imagery will be used to cross-check once all tests are validated.

There was no mass departure, new cluster or gap near an attack area, including off Musandam where four attacks were reported; the Fujairah/Khor Fakkan and Dubai/Jebel Ali to Ras Al Khaimah anchorages were broadly unchanged over the 96 hours, while Musandam/Sohar (from about 57 to about 50 vessels) and Bandar Abbas/Qeshm (from about 29 to about 17 vessels). JMIC internal tracking counted approximately 229 commercial vessels stationary at the main anchorages east of the Strait of Hormuz (Fujairah, Khor Fakkan, Sohar and Musandam), against single-digit to low double-digit AIS-visible transits per day; thus, the backlog is expected to persist.

Data limits: internal AIS estimates; AIS-dark vessels excluded. Satellite radar imagery is consistent with the AIS picture of vessel concentrations at the Fujairah, Khor Fakkan and Sohar anchorages. No significant change in anchorage activity is assessed until next reporting period.



Source: MarineTraffic, visual estimate; stationary commercial vessels (tanker, cargo, tug/special, high-speed, unspecified). Data cut-off 05 Nov 2026 1440 Bahrain (1140Z). *Low confidence. Change compares snapshots 01 Nov 1415 and 05 Nov 1440 Bahrain

4E. GNSS / AIS Interference

GNSS interference in the Arabian Gulf was stable; it was concentrated along the UAE coast near Dubai/Sharjah. Windward recorded 362 jammed vessels of 5,921 transmitting in the Gulf and Gulf of Oman on 3 November (latest available), about 3% below its 7-day average. UKMTO's weekly VRA report (week ending 30 October) recorded four vessel GNSS reports. In the Strait of Hormuz, indications remained low; the Gulf of Oman rose slightly from a quiet base.

In the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, no significant GNSS interference was observed at sea; aircraft data showed limited indications in the central Red Sea (single source).

No new specific UKMTO, MARAD, NAVCENT, or NAVAREA IX GNSS/EMI notices were issued 01 – 05 November. Baseline advisories remain in force.

5. Outlook (24–48 Hours)

5A. Arabian Gulf

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with continued navigational system interference and demonstrated kinetic threat and wider regional military activity continued to warrant caution.

Outlook: eight attacks inside the Gulf since 07 Oct, including the 01 November attack on a tanker approx. 72 NM east of Ras Al Khafji (UKMTO 192-26) and the 04 November attack on a tanker approx. 50 NM north of Madinat ash Shamal, Qatar (UKMTO 196-26), show that attacks remain a strong possibility throughout the Arabian Gulf, including the northern and central Gulf, anchorages and STS areas. Electronic interference was stable but remained a credible concern in the central and southern Arabian Gulf. The operating environment requires heightened situational awareness throughout all approaches.

Vessels stationary for extended periods, or maintaining AIS-on while static, may face elevated targeting risk.

5B. Strait of Hormuz

The threat level remains SEVERE, with deliberate attacks considered highly likely under current conditions.

Outlook: four attacks were reported in the Strait of Hormuz within about 52 hours, all off the Musandam coast of Oman (UKMTO 191-26, 193-26, 194-26 and 195-26); further attacks on transiting vessels, including tugs and dhows, are highly likely, particularly off Musandam. Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is expected to remain at reduced levels, compared to the 2025

baseline, across both the northern Iranian-controlled route and the southern Omani corridor. Operator caution should continue, driven by a series of vessel attacks, ongoing U.S. blockade enforcement, and elevated regional tension. Vessels transiting with AIS-on can expect elevated targeting risk and receive directed hails instructing them to divert toward the northern Iranian-controlled route.

The U.S. blockade of Iranian ports continues to be enforced. Unauthorized entry or departure may result in interception or force. Neutral transit is permitted, but vessels should expect visit-and-search checks, strong U.S. naval presence, persistent IRGC monitoring, and increased VHF hails. A 30 NM standoff from U.S. units is advised to reduce misidentification risk.

A vetted humanitarian-cargo exemption remains in place but requires submission to NAVCENT NCAGS. Approved vessels may transit to Iranian ports but remain subject to inspection and may not load cargo in Iran beyond fuel and stores.

Industry Guidance for Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz:
https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/media/vkaa3pjr/2026-05-20-guidance-strait-of-hormuz.pdf

5C. Gulf of Oman

The threat level remains MODERATE. Vessels can expect persistent IRGC monitoring and routing pressure in western portion of the Gulf of Oman; however, further east/south, attacks are considered possible but not likely. Residual risk diminishes with distance from the primary concentration of IRGC activity and with distance from Musandam / Jask.

Outlook: approximately 179 vessels are at anchor in the vicinity of Fujairah/Khor Fakkan and congestion is expected to persist. Neutral vessels between non-Iranian ports may be questioned, visited and searched under the blockade and should be prepared to provide the documentation noted in JMIC Advisory Note 016-26 to expedite clearance.

A U.S. naval blockade remains enforced, with ongoing monitoring, hailing, and verification queries, particularly near approaches to Iranian ports. Unauthorized entry or departure may result in interception or force. Neutral transit is permitted, but vessels should expect visit-and-search checks, strong U.S. naval presence, persistent IRGC monitoring, and occasional hails. A 30 NM standoff from U.S. units is advised, as well as ensuring continuous monitoring of VHF Channel 16, to reduce misidentification risk.

Electronic interference continues to present a credible concern. The operating environment requires heightened situational awareness throughout all approaches.

5D. Arabian Sea (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE. The regional posture remains stable, with no confirmed maritime attacks reported. Residual risk persists due to broader regional tensions; an attack is possible but not likely, and current indicators do not suggest any shift toward increased threat levels in the near term.

Outlook: no attack was reported in this period; further interaction with military forces enforcing the blockade is possible, and no change is expected.

5E. Gulf of Aden

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Attacks and piracy-related activity remain a strong possibility in the Gulf of Aden and IRTC. Small-craft groups retain close-approach capability, and Pirate Action Groups can still board and divert merchant vessels as monsoon restrictions are gone.

Outlook: no attack or suspicious approach was reported in the Gulf of Aden in this period, after the 30 Oct approach by an armed skiff approx. 50 NM south of Aden (MSCIO 160/26), the third report

of suspicious small craft near merchant vessels since 17 Oct (UKMTO 176-26; UKMTO 184-26). Further approaches are likely in the western Gulf of Aden and the IRTC, where NAVAREA IX 416/26 was in force until 03 Nov; MSCIO continues to advise strict adherence to BMP-MS. The southwest monsoon withdrew on 15 Oct and no issued storm warning for the Arabian Sea; sea state across the Gulf of Aden is forecast to remain slight, with significant wave heights of approx. 0.7–1.4 m and winds of 12–18 kt through the reporting period. These conditions permit continued skiff operations across the Gulf of Aden and the IRTC.

5F. Southern Red Sea / Bab el Mandeb

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Houthi messaging consistently frames the 20 July maritime blockade as selective against assets considered as Israeli-, Saudi-, or Yemeni internationally recognized government-linked. Houthi forces retain coastal presence and strike capability along the southern Red Sea approaches following Sept territorial gains. Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces launched a counter-offensive in early Oct and have claimed gains in the Bab el-Mandeb approaches; the precise extent of control remains still contested and unverified by independent sources.

Outlook: no confirmed attack on shipping was reported in this period, although MSCIO reported unexplained smoke around a large floating object in the Bab el-Mandeb on 03 Nov (MSCIO 168/26); the last confirmed Houthi attack on a merchant vessel was on 24 Aug. Retaliatory action against Saudi-, Israeli- or Yemeni government-linked shipping remains possible. Houthi long-range missile and drone capability against the waterway is assessed as retained despite limited government gains. Attacks in the wider area remain a strong possibility but expansion into indiscriminate targeting of all commercial shipping remains unlikely. Traffic will continue at reduced but stable levels.

Mariners should maintain heightened security postures, implement speed and timing mitigation, minimize predictable AIS behavior in the narrows, and prepare for short-notice navigational directives.

5G. Somali Coast and Somali Basin

The threat level remains MODERATE as PAG activity persists across the Somali Coast and Somali Basin. The southwest monsoon withdrew on 15 Oct. Residual opportunistic piracy risk persists in nearshore Somali waters and the Gulf of Aden, where small-boat activity remains feasible. Pirate Action Groups retain the capability to board and divert merchant vessels along the Somali coast, IRTC approaches, and adjacent Gulf of Aden lanes.

Outlook: the AZINI, hijacked by armed pirates off northeastern Somalia on 29 Oct and assessed by MSCIO as a possible mother ship (UKMTO 190-26 / MSCIO 161/26), was reported liberated on 02 Nov (MSCIO 161/26 UPDATE 02), but the incident indicates that Pirate Action Group range is likely to extend across the northern Somali Basin towards the shipping routes east and south of Socotra; approaches to merchant vessels further offshore are a possibility. Sea state in the Somali Basin is forecast to remain slight, with significant wave heights of approx. 1.0–1.2 m and winds of 9–13 kt throughout the reporting period, with no storm warning until next report. Following the withdrawal of the southwest monsoon, these conditions remain favorable for skiff and mother-ship operations further offshore.

5H. Northern Red Sea / Suez (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE. Periodic EMI and GNSS disruptions are likely to continue in the area.

Outlook: Minimal AIS usage at Yanbu berths and approaches are expected to persist. The Suez Canal will remain functional in both directions with no interruption.

5I. Eastern Mediterranean (No change)
The threat level remains LOW for security risks to merchant shipping, with localized EMI/GNSS as the principal published hazard.

Outlook: a security incident against merchant shipping is highly unlikely, and GNSS interference on the Levant coast will continue.

Naval presence remains, and vessels should maintain prudent separation from military units. No change – consistent with the persistent baseline.

ANNEXES

Transit comparisons

CARGO VESSELS TRANSITS COMPARISON


Date	29-Oct	30-Oct	31-Oct	01-Nov	02-Nov	03-Nov	04-Nov
SoH E	3	3	3	0	0	0	**2**
SoH W	0	1	1	0	0	1	**2**
SoH Total	**3**	**4**	**4**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**4**
BAM NW	4	8	23	11	12	10	**10**
BAM SE	12	16	10	8	13	12	**7**
BAM Total	**16**	**24**	**33**	**19**	**25**	**22**	**17**


TANKERS (ALL TYPES) TRANSITS COMPARISON

Date	29-Oct	30-Oct	31-Oct	01-Nov	02-Nov	03-Nov	04-Nov
SoH E	1	0	2	0	1	1	**1**
SoH W	1	0	2	1	1	1	**0**
SoH Total	**2**	**0**	**4**	**1**	**2**	**2**	**1**
BAM NW	5	5	7	15	5	4	**6**
BAM SE	5	3	8	4	7	9	**3**
BAM Total	**10**	**8**	**15**	**19**	**12**	**13**	**9**


** Metrics are drawn from two separate sources: S&P Maritime / SeaVision data reflecting non-facilitated vessel traffic above 1,000 deadweight tons, excluding vessels calling Iranian ports adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.*

UKMTO transits





UKMTO Strait of Hormuz – Latest incidents



UKMTO VRA AIS Anomalies



Non-Geofeasible AIS Positions 30-Day Hexbin Aggregation ICOD: 05/11/26 00:01UTC



Non-Geofeasible AIS Positions 7-Day Hexbin Aggregation ICOD: 05/11/26 00:01UTC