Joint Maritime Information Center

Update 112 to JMIC Advisory Note:
01 March – 08 November 2026

Regional Tension - Impact on Maritime Security

Area of Concern:

Middle East Maritime Region

JMIC# 001-26 ICOD: 081300 UTC Regional Threat Level: SEVERE

1. Confirmed Maritime Security Incidents List since last report

Date	Vessel	Vessel Type	Event Type	Location	Narrative
06 Nov 2026 UKMTO 197-26	Name withheld UFN	Tanker	Attack	Strait of Hormuz	UKMTO reported that on 05 Nov the Master of a tanker transiting the Strait of Hormuz outbound reported an explosion at the waterline, port side, approx. 16 NM east of Khasab, Oman. The crew reported safe, and the vessel continued its voyage. Also reported by MSCIO in 171/26.
07 Nov 2026 MSCIO 172/26	Unidentified	Unknown	Suspicious Activity	Bab el-Mandeb	MSCIO reported suspicious activity on 06 Nov 2026, in position 12°46.4'N 043°18.0'E, in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. A merchant vessel observed a small radar target heading northbound towards Yemen, outside the Traffic Separation Scheme. The target could not be visually identified and appeared to be operating without navigation lights. At approx. 22:45 UTC, a large explosion was observed at the target's position, followed by a fire on the sea surface lasting more than 30 minutes. No distress calls or radio communications were reported. The identity of the target, the cause of the explosion and the circumstances remain unknown.
07 Nov 2026 UKMTO 198-26	HUDA	Bulk Carrier	Blockade Enforcement	Gulf of Oman	UKMTO reported that on 07 Nov, a vessel identified by US CENTCOM as the HUDA, was disabled by military forces in the Gulf of Oman, approx. 18 NM east of Khor Fakkan, UAE. CENTCOM stated that U.S. forces disabled the vessel after its crew ignored repeated warnings and attempted to violate the naval blockade; a U.S. military aircraft fired precision munitions at the stern after directing the crew to

					abandon targeted spaces. Status of the crew, damage assessment and environmental impact were unknown at the time of the UKMTO report.
08 Nov 2026 UKMTO 199-26	**Name withheld UFN**	**Tanker**	**Incident**	**Strait of Hormuz**	**UKMTO received a time-late report that on 07 Nov military authorities reported that a tanker approx. 8 NM northwest of Khasab, Oman, was on fire, which resulted in the evacuation of the crew.**
08 Nov 2026 UKMTO 200-26	**Name withheld UFN**	**Tanker**	**Attack**	**Strait of Hormuz**	**UKMTO received a time-late report that on 07 Nov the Company Security Officer of a tanker reported that the vessel was struck by an unknown projectile while transiting outbound through the Strait of Hormuz. All crew are safe and accounted for and there is no reported environmental impact.**

2. Operational Summary – Last 72 Hours

2A. Arabian Gulf

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

Traffic flows continued, with anchorage congestion high across the region.

2B. Strait of Hormuz

Two attacks were reported in this period (UKMTO 197-26 and 200-26), against four in the previous period. On 05 November an outbound tanker reported an explosion at the waterline, this was the fifth attack off the Musandam coast of Oman since 01 November (UKMTO 191-26, 193-26, 194-26, 195-26 and 197-26).

IRGC attacks, attempted attacks, and/or harassment activity persisted including UAV overflight, targeted surveillance of merchant shipping, and occasional VHF hailing. These actions continue to demonstrate Iran's intent to assert presence along key transit lanes and maintain pressure on transiting vessels.

Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained at reduced levels compared to the 2025 baseline. Independent tracking data indicated single to low double digit transits per day, while US NCAGS data indicated an average of approx. 30 U.S. assisted transits per day on 05–07.

2C. Gulf of Oman

On 07 Nov UKMTO reported an incident/ blockade enforcement involving a bulk carrier and military forces in the Gulf of Oman, approx. 18 NM east of Khor Fakkan, UAE (UKMTO 198-26).

Naval presence remained elevated due to blockade enforcement activity. According to official CENTCOM figures issued on 07 Nov, 147 commercial vessels have been redirected and five merchant ships have been disabled as a result of blockade enforcement. Two vessels had previously been reported boarded for blockade compliance (CENTCOM, 01 Nov).

Vessels were expected to respond promptly to military queries and maintain AIS-on unless constrained by security threats. Operators continued to exercise caution due to regional strike activity and ongoing IRGC monitoring of shipping in adjacent waters.

2D. Arabian Sea (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. Naval forces continued routine patrols, and commercial traffic was transiting without significant disruption.

2E. Gulf of Aden (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

Commercial traffic remained relatively steady in the Gulf of Aden.

2F. Southern Red Sea & Bab el Mandeb

No confirmed attack on merchant shipping was reported in this period. On 06 Nov MSCIO reported suspicious activity in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (MSCIO 172/26). Traffic remains below the 20 Jul Houthi selective embargo. Commercial traffic in the Bab el Mandeb averaged approx. 28 transits per day on S&P tracking on 05–07 Nov, against approx. 35 per day in the previous week.

Bab el-Mandeb remains open to commercial traffic but is considered as volatile. Houthi statements continue to assert that non-Saudi commercial shipping may transit safely. The Houthi-run Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) advertises a voluntary, free 'safe transit' request service for vessels outside its declared ban. Recent reporting that merchant vessels have used this service remains independently unconfirmed.

2G. Somali Coast and Somali Basin (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. One merchant vessel remains hijacked since the date of initial incident reporting:

- MT ASANA, a Tanzanian-flagged product/chemical tanker, was hijacked on 17 July 2026 approx. 65 NM southwest of Mukalla, Yemen, while carrying oil products.

2H. Northern Red Sea & Suez Canal (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. Maritime traffic in the Northern Red Sea and Suez Canal held steady over the last 72 hours.

2I. Eastern Mediterranean (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. This is consistent with the persistent baseline.

3. Regional Threat Overview (No change)

JMIC Threat Scale: Low | Moderate | Substantial | Severe | Critical

Region	Threat Level	Notes
Arabian Gulf	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to recent Iranian attacks, the threat level in the Arabian Gulf remains SUBSTANTIAL. Navigation interference has also increased. An attack is a strong possibility.
Strait of Hormuz	SEVERE	Due to recent Iranian attacks, the threat level remains SEVERE, with deliberate hostile action considered as highly likely under current conditions. Navigation interference persists, and mariners are advised to remain vigilant for attempted mining within and adjacent to the TSS. IRGC attacks, hailing, and routing pressure continue, particularly for AIS-on vessels.
Gulf of Oman	MODERATE	The U.S. naval blockade remains enforced, with ongoing monitoring, hailing, and verification queries, particularly near approaches to Iranian ports. Enforcement activity poses no direct impact to neutral shipping transits in the Gulf of Oman. Electronic interference continues to present a credible concern for mariners.
Arabian Sea	MODERATE	Residual conflict-linked risk persists, but no attacks have been reported, and current indicators suggest no imminent change to the threat environment.
Gulf of Aden	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to piracy-related events and Houthi rhetoric and attacks, the threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with a strong possibility of a maritime security incident in coastal approaches, transit corridors, and established small-craft areas.
Bab el-Mandeb / Southern Red Sea	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to Houthi attacks on vessels and maritime infrastructure in the Southern Red Sea and territorial gains in Yemen along the Red Sea, the threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Based on sustained intent against Saudi-affiliated interests, and maintained capability, additional attacks are a strong possibility
Somali Coast / Somali Basin	MODERATE	PAG activity remains possible; the southwest monsoon subsided on 15 October, and skiff operations further offshore are more feasible.
Northern Red Sea / Suez Canal	MODERATE	Suez Canal operations remain normal. Periodic Electro-magnetic Interference (EMI) remains possible.
Eastern Mediterranean	LOW	Due to a lack of security incidents, the threat level remains LOW. Localized EMI disruptions persist, and regional naval presence remains consistent.

JMIC Regional Threat Levels

Threat Level	Definition
Low	An attack is highly unlikely
Moderate	An attack is possible but not likely
Substantial	An attack is a strong possibility
Severe	An attack is highly likely
Critical	An attack is almost certain

4. Maritime Incidents & Traffic Assessment

4A. Confirmed Vessel Incidents since 01 March

Total of 177 incidents since 01 March; five incidents since the last report (UKMTO 197-26, MSCIO 172/26, UKMTO 198-26, UKMTO 199-26 and UKMTO 200-26). The total includes all incidents listed in Table 1.

N.B: Correction: the total in Update 110 should have read 166, not 167; the error was a double count. Totals from previous update, JMIC Advisory Update 111, are corrected.

4B. Infrastructure Incidents (Last 72 Hours) (No change)

The overall risk remains MODERATE, driven by the potential for an increase in kinetic activity against ports, terminals and offshore installations along the Iranian, Yemeni and Saudi coasts.

No attack on ports, terminals, offshore platforms, oil and gas loading facilities or subsea infrastructure was reported in this period.

4C. Traffic Trends

- Strait of Hormuz:
    - Historical average: ~138 vessels/day (2025 baseline)
    - U.S. – facilitated SoH transits 05-07 Nov (past 72 hours): 91

** Metrics are drawn from two separate sources: U.S. NCAGS data reflecting U.S.-facilitated Strait of Hormuz transits only, and S&P Maritime/SeaVision data reflecting non-facilitated vessel traffic for cargo-carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons, excluding vessels calling Iranian ports adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.*

- Bab el-Mandeb:
    - Historical average: ~61 vessels/day (2023 baseline)
    - Vessel transits 05-07 Nov (past 72 hours): 85


** Metrics are drawn from S&P Maritime for cargo-carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons.*

4D. Port & Anchorage Congestion

Congestion remains high and is driven primarily by restricted transit, and to a lesser degree by port capacity. On 08 Nov approx. 162 vessels were at anchor in the vicinity of Fujairah/Khor Fakkan, approx. 144 off Dubai/Jebel Ali to Ras Al Khaimah, mainly off Sharjah/Ajman/Umm Al Quwain, approx. 46 in the vicinity of Musandam/Sohar and approx. 32 off Bandar Abbas/Qeshm according to internal estimates. Bandar Abbas / Qeshm counts remain low confidence because Iranian AIS coverage is thin and the base is small; satellite imagery will be used to cross-check once all tests are validated.

There was no mass departure, new cluster or gap near an attack area, including off Musandam where one attack was reported; Fujairah/Khor Fakkan eased gradually (from about 179 to about 162 vessels since 05 Nov) and Musandam/Sohar fell on a small base (from about 50 to about 46), while Dubai/Jebel Ali to Ras Al Khaimah was broadly unchanged and Bandar Abbas/Qeshm rose on a small, low-confidence base (from about 17 to about 32). JMIC internal tracking counted approx. 208 commercial vessels stationary at the main anchorages east of the Strait of Hormuz (Fujairah, Khor Fakkan, Sohar and Musandam), against single-digit to low double-digit AIS-visible transits per day; thus, the backlog is expected to persist.

Data limits: internal AIS estimates; AIS-dark vessels excluded. Satellite radar imagery is consistent with the AIS picture of vessel concentrations at the Fujairah, Khor Fakkan and Sohar anchorages. No significant change in anchorage activity is anticipated in the next reporting period.



72 h change (05 Nov – 08 Nov)

Area	05 Nov	08 Nov	Change
Fujairah/Khor Fakkan	179	162	-9%
Dubai–Ras Al Khaimah	141	144	+2%
Musandam/Sohar	50	46	-8%
Bandar Abbas/Qeshm* LOW CONFIDENCE	17	32	+88%*

within ±10% | beyond ±10% | beyond ±10%, low conf.*

Amber row / LOW CONFIDENCE = low-confidence count (small base or poor visibility)

Green tile, amber border, * = within ±10% but low confidence

Source: MarineTraffic, visual estimate; stationary commercial vessels (tanker, cargo, tug/special, high-speed, unspecified). Data cut-off 08 Nov 2026 1415 Bahrain (1115Z). *Low confidence. Change compares snapshots 05 Nov 1440 and 08 Nov 1415 Bahrain (nearest available to the previous and present Advisory ICOD, 1300Z = 1600 Bahrain).

4E. GNSS / AIS Interference

GNSS interference in the Arabian Gulf was broadly stable on 7 Nov, at or below its weekly level; the most consistent indications were on the Ras al-Khaimah coast at the Hormuz approaches. Windward recorded 154 jammed vessels of 7,100 transmitting in the Gulf and Gulf of Oman on 5 Nov, about 62% below its 7-day average. UKMTO's weekly VRA report (week ending 06 Nov) recorded three vessel GNSS reports and listed the Red Sea, Gulf of Oman and Arabian Gulf as unchanged hotspots. In the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman, aircraft indications remained low.

In the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, no significant GNSS interference was observed at sea; aircraft data showed limited indications in the southern Red Sea (single source).

No new specific UKMTO, MARAD, NAVCENT, or NAVAREA IX GNSS/EMI notices were issued 05 – 08 November. Baseline advisories remain in force.

5. Outlook (24–48 Hours)

5A. Arabian Gulf

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with continued navigational system interference and demonstrated kinetic threat and wider regional military activity continued to warrant caution.

Outlook: Eight attacks inside the Gulf since 07 Oct, including the 01 Nov attack on a tanker approx. 72 NM east of Ras Al Khafji (UKMTO 192-26) and the 04 Nov attack on a tanker approx. 50 NM north of Madinat ash Shamal, Qatar (UKMTO 196-26), demonstrate that attacks remain a strong possibility throughout the Arabian Gulf, including the northern and central Gulf, anchorages and STS areas. Electronic interference remains a credible concern in the central and southern Arabian Gulf. The operating environment requires heightened situational awareness throughout all approaches.

Vessels stationary for extended periods, or maintaining AIS-on while static, may face elevated targeting risk.

5B. Strait of Hormuz

The threat level remains SEVERE, with deliberate attacks considered highly likely under current conditions.

Outlook: the 05 Nov attack on an outbound tanker approx. 16 NM east of Khasab (UKMTO 197-26) was the fifth off the Musandam coast of Oman since 01 Nov, demonstrating that further attacks on transiting vessels, including tankers, tugs and dhows, are highly likely, particularly off Musandam. The 07 Nov attack on an outbound tanker in the Strait of Hormuz (UKMTO 200-26) also indicates that the threat to transiting vessels persists.

Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is expected to remain at reduced levels, compared to the 2025 baseline, across both the northern Iranian-controlled route and the southern Omani corridor. Operator caution should continue, driven by a series of vessel attacks, ongoing U.S. blockade enforcement, and elevated regional tension. Vessels transiting with AIS-on can expect elevated targeting risk and receive directed hails instructing them to divert toward the northern Iranian-controlled route.

The U.S. blockade of Iranian ports continues to be enforced. Unauthorized entry or departure may result in interception or force. Neutral transit is permitted, but vessels should expect visit-and-search checks, strong U.S. naval presence, persistent IRGC monitoring, and increased VHF hails. A 30 NM standoff from U.S. units is advised to reduce misidentification risk.

A vetted humanitarian-cargo exemption remains in place but requires submission to NAVCENT NCAGS. Approved vessels may transit to Iranian ports but remain subject to inspection and may not load cargo in Iran beyond fuel and stores.

Industry Guidance for Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz:

https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/media/vkaa3pjr/2026-05-20-guidance-strait-of-hormuz.pdf

5C. Gulf of Oman

The threat level remains MODERATE. Vessels can expect persistent IRGC monitoring and routing pressure in western portion of the Gulf of Oman; however, further east/south, attacks are considered possible but not likely. Residual risk diminishes with distance from the primary concentration of IRGC activity and with distance from Musandam / Jask.

Outlook: Approx. 162 vessels are at anchor in the vicinity of Fujairah/Khor Fakkan and congestion is expected to persist. Neutral vessels between non-Iranian ports may be questioned, visited and searched under the blockade and should be prepared to provide the documentation noted in JMIC Advisory Note 016-26 to expedite clearance.

A U.S. naval blockade remains enforced, with ongoing monitoring, hailing, and verification queries, particularly near approaches to Iranian ports. Unauthorized entry or departure may result in interception or force. Neutral transit is permitted, but vessels should expect visit-and-search checks, strong U.S. naval presence, persistent IRGC monitoring, and occasional hails. A 30 NM standoff from U.S. units is advised, as well as ensuring continuous monitoring of VHF Channel 16, to reduce misidentification risk.

Electronic interference continues to present a credible concern. The operating environment requires heightened situational awareness throughout all approaches.

5D. Arabian Sea (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE. The regional posture remains stable, with no confirmed maritime attacks reported. Residual risk persists due to broader regional tensions; an attack is possible but not likely, and current indicators do not suggest any shift toward increased threat levels in the near term.

Outlook: no attack was reported in this period; further interaction with military forces enforcing the blockade is possible, and no change is expected.

5E. Gulf of Aden

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Attacks and piracy-related activity remain a strong possibility in the Gulf of Aden and IRTC. Small-craft groups retain close-approach capability, and Pirate Action Groups can still board and divert merchant vessels as monsoon restrictions are gone.

Outlook: Additional small boat approaches are likely in the western Gulf of Aden and the IRTC; MSCIO continues to advise strict adherence to BMP-MS. The southwest monsoon subsided on 15 Oct and there is no issued storm warning for the Arabian Sea; sea state across the Gulf of Aden is forecast to remain slight, with wave heights of approx. 0.8–1.5 m and winds of 13–18 kt through the reporting period. These conditions permit continued skiff operations across the Gulf of Aden and the IRTC.

5F. Southern Red Sea / Bab el Mandeb

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Houthi messaging consistently frames the 20 July maritime blockade as selective against assets considered as Israeli-, Saudi-, or Yemeni internationally recognized government-linked. Houthi forces retain coastal presence and strike capability along the southern Red Sea approaches following Sept territorial gains. Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces launched a counter-offensive in early Oct and have claimed gains in the Bab el-Mandeb approaches; the precise extent of control remains still contested and unverified by independent sources.

Disclosure of voyage information in response to Houthi communications (HOCC) may increase targeting risk. U.S. MARAD Advisory 2026-013 advises U.S.-flagged commercial vessels to disregard Houthi instructions to activate AIS or submit voyage information and to report such contacts.

Outlook: Retaliatory action against Saudi-, Israeli- or Yemeni government-linked shipping remains possible. Houthi long-range missile and drone capability against the waterway is assessed as retained despite limited government gains. Attacks in the wider area remain a strong possibility but expansion into indiscriminate targeting of all commercial shipping remains unlikely. Traffic will continue at reduced but stable levels.

Mariners should maintain heightened security postures, implement speed and timing mitigation, minimize predictable AIS behavior in the narrows, and prepare for short-notice navigational directives.

5G. Somali Coast and Somali Basin

The threat level remains MODERATE as PAG activity persists across the Somali Coast and Somali Basin. The southwest monsoon subsided on 15 Oct. Residual opportunistic piracy risk persists in nearshore Somali waters and the Gulf of Aden, where small-boat activity remains feasible. Pirate Action Groups retain the capability to board and divert merchant vessels along the Somali coast, IRTC approaches, and adjacent Gulf of Aden lanes.

Outlook: the AZINI, hijacked by armed pirates off northeastern Somalia on 29 Oct and assessed by MSCIO as a possible mother ship (UKMTO 190-26 / MSCIO 161/26), was reported liberated on 02 Nov (MSCIO 161/26 UPDATE 02), but the incident indicates that Pirate Action Group range is likely to extend across the northern Somali Basin towards the shipping routes east and south of Socotra; approaches to merchant vessels further offshore are a possibility. Sea state in the Somali

Basin is forecast to remain slight, with wave heights of approx. 0.8–1.3 m and winds of 10–16 kt throughout the reporting period, with no storm warning until next report. These conditions remain favorable for skiff and mother-ship operations further offshore.

5H. Northern Red Sea / Suez (No change)
The threat level remains MODERATE. Periodic EMI and GNSS disruptions are likely to continue in the area.

Outlook: Minimal AIS usage at Yanbu berths and approaches are expected to persist. The Suez Canal will remain functional in both directions with no interruption.

5I. Eastern Mediterranean (No change)
The threat level remains LOW for security risks to merchant shipping, with localized EMI/GNSS as the principal published hazard.

Outlook: a security incident against merchant shipping is highly unlikely, and GNSS interference on the Levant coast will continue.

Naval presence remains, and vessels should maintain prudent separation from military units. No change – consistent with the persistent baseline.

ANNEXES

Transit comparisons

CARGO VESSELS TRANSITS COMPARISON


Date	01-Nov	02-Nov	03-Nov	04-Nov	05-Nov	06-Nov	07-Nov
SoH E	0	0	0	2	2	**3**	**0**
SoH W	0	0	1	2	2	**1**	**1**
SoH Total	**0**	**0**	**1**	**4**	**4**	**4**	**1**
BAM NW	11	12	10	10	11	**12**	**9**
BAM SE	8	13	12	7	7	**12**	**9**
BAM Total	**19**	**25**	**22**	**17**	**18**	**24**	**18**


TANKERS (ALL TYPES) TRANSITS COMPARISON

Date	01-Nov	02-Nov	03-Nov	04-Nov	05-Nov	06-Nov	07-Nov
SoH E	0	1	1	1	1	**1**	**1**
SoH W	1	1	1	0	1	**2**	**0**
SoH Total	**1**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**1**
BAM NW	15	5	4	6	5	**7**	**4**
BAM SE	4	7	9	3	2	**5**	**2**
BAM Total	**19**	**12**	**13**	**9**	**7**	**12**	**6**


** Metrics are drawn from two separate sources: S&P Maritime / SeaVision data reflecting non-facilitated vessel traffic above 1,000 deadweight tons, excluding vessels calling Iranian ports adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.*

UKMTO transits (Not updated since 05 Nov)





UKMTO Strait of Hormuz – Latest incidents (Not updated since 05 Nov)



UKMTO VRA AIS Anomalies (Not updated since 05 Nov)



Non-Geofeasible AIS Positions 30-Day Hexbin Aggregation ICOD: 05/11/26 00:01UTC



Non-Geofeasible AIS Positions 7-Day Hexbin Aggregation ICOD: 05/11/26 00:01UTC