Joint Maritime Information Center

Update 115 to JMIC Advisory Note:
01 March – 19 November 2026

Regional Tension - Impact on Maritime Security

Area of Concern:

Middle East Maritime Region

JMIC# 001-26 ICOD: 191300 UTC Regional Threat Level: SEVERE

1. Confirmed Maritime Security Incidents List since last report

Date	Vessel	Vessel Type	Event Type	Location	Narrative
16 Nov 2026 UKMTO 206-26	Name withheld UFN	Tanker	Suspicious Activity	Arabian Sea	On 16 Nov the master of a tanker reported being approached by a possible mothership and skiff approx. 430 NM east of Socotra, Yemen. Four armed persons were sighted onboard the skiff, with a ladder visible.
16 Nov 2026 UKMTO 207-26	ON PHOENIX	Tanker	Attack	Strait of Hormuz	On 16 Nov a tanker, identified by NAVAREA IX as the ON PHOENIX, was struck by an unknown projectile while transiting outbound in the Strait of Hormuz, causing an engine-room fire. No crew casualties were reported.
16 Nov 2026 UKMTO 208-26	TARA GAS	LPG Tanker	Attack	Strait of Hormuz	At 161900 UTC an LPG tanker, identified by NAVAREA IX as the TARA GAS, was attacked while transiting the Strait of Hormuz 7NM north of Khasab, Oman, disabling the vessel and resulting in an engine room fire. On 17 Nov the vessel was reported struck a second time, causing a further fire, and crew abandonment. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs reported one crew member missing and two injured. Extensive damage, environmental impact is unknown.
17 Nov 2026 UKMTO 209-26	DAR SALWA	Tanker	Attack	Arabian Gulf	On 13 Nov a tanker, identified by the IMO as the DAR SALWA, was struck by an unknown projectile while transiting eastbound in the Arabian Gulf before entering the Strait of Hormuz. All crew were reported safe; the extent of damage is unknown.

17 Nov 2026 UKMTO 210-26	**Name withheld UFN**	**Cargo vessel**	**Incident**	**Gulf of Aden**	**On 17 Nov a cargo vessel was approached about 50 NM southwest of Al Mukalla, Yemen, by a small skiff carrying weapons and ladders. The armed security team on board fired a warning shot and the skiff returned to a mothership.**
17 Nov 2026 UKMTO 211-26	**NAVIG8 MESSI**	**Tanker**	**Attack**	**Strait of Hormuz**	**On 17 Nov a tanker, identified by India's Minister of Ports, Shipping and Waterways as the NAVIG8 MESSI, was struck by an unknown projectile 13 NM north of Khasab, Oman, while transiting the Strait of Hormuz outbound, causing a fire that was later extinguished. ADNOC confirmed that one of its vessels was attacked that evening; one crew member is missing, 11 were injured and the remaining crew were evacuated. The vessel was reported under tow to port. Environmental impact is unknown.**
18 Nov 2026 UKMTO 212-26	**Name withheld UFN**	**Tanker**	**Attack**	**Strait of Hormuz**	**On 18 Nov a tanker was struck by an unknown projectile in the engine room 6 NM north of Khasab, Oman, while transiting the Strait of Hormuz outbound. The crew was reported safe. Damage and environmental impact are unknown.**

2. Operational Summary – Last 96 Hours

2A. Arabian Gulf

One confirmed attack was reported in this period. A tanker was struck by an unknown projectile on 13 Nov (UKMTO 209-26, MSCIO 184/26).

Traffic flows continued, with anchorage congestion high across the region.

2B. Strait of Hormuz

Four attacks were reported in this period (UKMTO 207-26; UKMTO 208-26; UKMTO 211-26; UKMTO 212-26, MSCIO 187/26), against no confirmed attacks in the previous period.

IRGC attacks, attempted attacks, and/or harassment activity persisted including UAV overflight, targeted surveillance of merchant shipping, and occasional VHF hailing. These actions continue to demonstrate Iran's intent to assert presence along key transit lanes and maintain pressure on transiting vessels. Iranian claims of mine strikes on tankers have not been confirmed by any official or national authorities.

Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained at reduced levels compared to the 2025 baseline. Independent tracking data indicated single to low double digit transits per day, while US NCAGS data indicated an average of approx. 27 U.S. assisted transits per day on 15–18 Nov. compared to 31 per day on 8–14 Nov.

2C. Gulf of Oman (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

Naval presence remained elevated due to blockade enforcement activity. According to official CENTCOM figures issued on 11 Nov, nearly 150 commercial vessels have been redirected and five

merchant ships have been disabled as a result of blockade enforcement. Two vessels had previously been reported boarded for blockade compliance. No further blockade-enforcement disablement was announced in this period.

Vessels were expected to respond promptly to military queries and maintain AIS-on unless constrained by security threats. Operators continued to exercise caution due to regional strike activity and ongoing IRGC monitoring of shipping in adjacent waters.

2D. Arabian Sea

One incident of suspicious activity was reported in this period (UKMTO 206-26, MSCIO 181/26, NAVAREA IX 441/26).

Naval forces continued routine patrols, and commercial traffic was transiting without significant disruption.

2E. Gulf of Aden

One incident was reported in this period (UKMTO 210-26, MSCIO 185/26).

Commercial traffic remained relatively steady in the Gulf of Aden.

2F. Southern Red Sea & Bab el Mandeb

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

In the last 96 hours, Yemeni government-aligned forces (including Southern Armed Forces elements) withdrew from the Red Sea coastal plain and Bab el-Mandeb area, including Dhubab Airport, on 15 November and began establishing new defensive positions near Jabal Kharaz in Lahij Governorate (approx. 100 km west of Aden). Houthi forces seized the abandoned coastal positions and advanced eastward along the Mokha–Aden ground line of communication. As of 18 November, Houthi forces are assessed as attempting to capture advantageous terrain around Jabal Kharaz, the last major defensible position covering Aden's western flank. No corroborated attack on commercial shipping in the Red Sea has been reported since 24 August 2026.

Traffic remains below the 20 Jul Houthi selective embargo. Commercial traffic in the Bab el Mandeb recorded approx. 19 transits per day on S&P tracking on 15–18 Nov, against approx. 22 per day on 12–14 Nov.

Bab el-Mandeb remains open to commercial traffic but is considered volatile. Houthi statements continue to assert that non-Saudi commercial shipping may transit safely.

2G. Somali Coast and Somali Basin

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

One merchant vessel remains hijacked since the date of initial incident reporting:

- MT ASANA, a Tanzanian-flagged product/chemical tanker, was hijacked on 17 July 2026 approx. 65 NM southwest of Mukalla, Yemen, while carrying oil products.

2H. Northern Red Sea & Suez Canal (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

Maritime traffic in the Northern Red Sea and Suez Canal held steady over the last 96 hours.

2I. Eastern Mediterranean (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. This is consistent with the persistent baseline.

3. Regional Threat Overview (No change)

JMIC Threat Scale: Low | Moderate | Substantial | Severe | Critical

Region	Threat Level	Notes
Arabian Gulf	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to Iranian attacks, the threat level in the Arabian Gulf remains SUBSTANTIAL. Navigation interference has also increased. An attack is a strong possibility.
Strait of Hormuz	SEVERE	Due to continued Iranian attacks, the threat level remains SEVERE, with deliberate hostile action considered as highly likely under current conditions. Navigation interference persists, and mariners are advised to remain vigilant for attempted mining within and adjacent to the TSS. IRGC attacks, hailing, and routing pressure continue, particularly for AIS-on vessels.
Gulf of Oman	MODERATE	The U.S. naval blockade remains enforced, with ongoing monitoring, hailing, and verification queries, particularly near approaches to Iranian ports. Enforcement activity poses no threat to neutral shipping transits in the Gulf of Oman. Electronic interference continues to present a credible concern for mariners.
Arabian Sea	MODERATE	Residual conflict-linked risk persists, but no attacks have been reported, and current indicators suggest no imminent change to the threat environment.
Gulf of Aden	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to piracy-related events and Houthi rhetoric, with no vessel attacks since 24 Aug, the threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with a strong possibility of a maritime security incident in coastal approaches, transit corridors, and established small-craft areas.
Bab el-Mandeb / Southern Red Sea	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to Houthi attacks on infrastructure adjacent to maritime interests in the Southern Red Sea and territorial gains in Yemen along the Red Sea, the threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Based on sustained intent against Saudi-affiliated interests, and maintained capability, additional attacks are a strong possibility
Somali Coast / Somali Basin	MODERATE	PAG activity remains possible; the southwest monsoon subsided on 15 October, and skiff operations further offshore are more feasible.
Northern Red Sea / Suez Canal	MODERATE	Suez Canal operations remain normal. Periodic Electro-magnetic Interference (EMI) remains possible.
Eastern Mediterranean	LOW	Due to a lack of security incidents, the threat level remains LOW. Localized EMI disruptions persist, and regional naval presence remains consistent.

JMIC Regional Threat Levels

Threat Level	Definition
Low	An attack is highly unlikely
Moderate	An attack is possible but not likely
Substantial	An attack is a strong possibility
Severe	An attack is highly likely
Critical	An attack is almost certain

4. Maritime Incidents & Traffic Assessment

4A. Confirmed Vessel Incidents since 01 March

Total of 190 incidents since 01 March; seven incidents since the last report (UKMTO 209-26, 206-26, 207-26, 208-26, 210-26, 211-26 and 212-26).

4B. Infrastructure Incidents (No change)

The overall risk remains MODERATE, driven by the potential for an increase in kinetic activity against ports, terminals and offshore installations along the Iranian, Yemeni and Saudi coasts. Ongoing land exchanges between Houthi forces and Saudi-led coalition forces continued.

No attack on ports, terminals, offshore platforms or subsea infrastructure was reported in this period.

4C. Traffic Trends

- Strait of Hormuz:
    - Historical average: ~138 vessels/day (2025 baseline)
    - U.S. – facilitated SoH transits 15-18 Nov (past 96 hours): 106

** Metrics are drawn from two separate sources: U.S. NCAGS data reflecting U.S.-facilitated Strait of Hormuz transits only, and S&P Maritime/SeaVision data reflecting non-facilitated vessel traffic for cargo-carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons, excluding vessels calling Iranian ports adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.*


- Bab el-Mandeb:
    - Historical average: ~61 vessels/day (2023 baseline)
    - Vessel transits 15-18 Nov (past 96 hour): 77

** Metrics are drawn from S&P Maritime for cargo-carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons.*

4D. Port & Anchorage Congestion

Congestion remains high and is driven primarily by restricted transit, and to a lesser degree by port capacity.

There was no mass departure, new cluster or gap near an attack area; Fujairah/Khor Fakkan was broadly unchanged (from about 181 vessels on 15 Nov to about 188 on 19 Nov), Dubai/Jebel Ali to Ras Al Khaimah rose slightly (from about 128 to about 138), Musandam/Sohar was unchanged on a small base (about 46), and Bandar Abbas/Qeshm fell on a small, low-confidence base (from about 18 to about 11). JMIC internal tracking counted approx. 234 commercial vessels stationary at the main anchorages east of the Strait of Hormuz (Fujairah, Khor Fakkan, Sohar and Musandam), against single-digit to low double-digit AIS-visible transits per day; thus, the backlog is expected to persist.



Source: MarineTraffic, visual estimate; stationary commercial vessels (tanker, cargo, tug/special, high-speed, unspecified). Data cut-off 19 Nov 2026 1420 Bahrain (1120Z). *Low confidence. Change compares snapshots 15 Nov 1424 and 19 Nov 1420 Bahrain (nearest available to the previous and present Advisory ICOD, 1300Z = 1600 Bahrain).

4E. GNSS / AIS Interference

GNSS interference stayed elevated over the Arabian Gulf on 18 Nov but shifted west and north: indications strengthened along the UAE coast (Dubai/Sharjah), returned for the first time since late October to the Saudi east coast offshore waters between Jubail and Ras Tanura and to Kuwait and the northern Gulf, and the Qatar core ended after six days. In the Strait of Hormuz, the strongest indication was off the Musandam/Khasab coast, while in the Gulf of Oman indications were low.

Windward recorded 267 jammed vessels of 4,996 transmitting in the Gulf and Gulf of Oman on 17 Nov, about 5% above its 7-day average. UKMTO's weekly VRA report (13 Nov) recorded six vessel GNSS reports in seven days and 15,374 anomalous AIS positions, against 17,976 the week before, and listed the Red Sea, Gulf of Oman and Arabian Gulf as hotspots.

In the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, no significant GNSS interference was observed at sea; Windward recorded 10 jammed vessels of 977 transmitting in the Red Sea on 17 Nov.

No new specific UKMTO, MARAD, NAVCENT, or NAVAREA IX GNSS/EMI notices were issued 15 – 18 November. Baseline advisories remain in force.

5. Outlook (24–48 Hours)

5A. Arabian Gulf

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with continued navigational system interference and demonstrated kinetic threat and wider regional military activity continuing to warrant caution.

Outlook: Nine attacks inside the Gulf since 07 Oct demonstrate that attacks remain a strong possibility throughout the Arabian Gulf, including the northern and central Gulf, anchorages and STS areas. Electronic interference remains a credible concern in the central and southern Arabian Gulf. The operating environment requires heightened situational awareness throughout all approaches.

Vessels stationary for extended periods, or maintaining AIS-on while static, may face elevated targeting risk.

5B. Strait of Hormuz

The threat level remains SEVERE, with deliberate attacks considered highly likely under current conditions.

Outlook: the repeat strike on the already disabled TARA GAS, and the strike on the ON PHOENIX, with two further tankers struck on 17 and 18 Nov (UKMTO 211-26, 212-26), show sustained attacks on tankers transiting off Musandam/Khasab, including on ships that are already stopped. Further attacks are highly likely, and disabled or drifting vessels remain exposed. AIS-visible transits are expected to stay low.

Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is expected to remain at reduced levels, compared to the 2025 baseline, across both the northern Iranian-controlled route and the southern Omani corridor. Operator caution should continue, driven by a series of vessel attacks, ongoing U.S. blockade enforcement, and elevated regional tension. Vessels transiting with AIS-on can expect elevated targeting risk and receive directed hails instructing them to divert toward the northern Iranian-controlled route.

The U.S. blockade of Iranian ports continues to be enforced. Unauthorized entry or departure may result in interception or force. Neutral transit is permitted, but vessels should expect visit-and-search checks, strong U.S. naval presence, persistent IRGC monitoring, and increased VHF hails. A 30 NM standoff from U.S. units is advised to reduce misidentification risk.

A vetted humanitarian-cargo exemption remains in place but requires submission to NAVCENT NCAGS. Approved vessels may transit to Iranian ports but remain subject to inspection and may not load cargo in Iran beyond fuel and stores.

Industry Guidance for Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz:
https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/media/vkaa3pjr/2026-05-20-guidance-strait-of-hormuz.pdf

5C. Gulf of Oman (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE, with deliberate attacks considered possible but not likely under current conditions.

Outlook: Vessels can expect persistent IRGC monitoring and routing pressure in western portion of the Gulf of Oman; however, further east/south, attacks are considered possible but not likely. Residual risk diminishes with distance from the primary concentration of IRGC activity and with distance from Musandam / Jask. Approx. 188 vessels are at anchor in the vicinity of Fujairah/Khor Fakkan and congestion is expected to persist. Neutral vessels between non-Iranian ports may be questioned, visited and searched under the blockade and should be prepared to provide the documentation noted in JMIC Advisory Note 016-26 to expedite clearance.

A U.S. naval blockade remains enforced, with ongoing monitoring, hailing, and verification queries, particularly near approaches to Iranian ports. Unauthorized entry or departure may result in interception or force. Neutral transit is permitted, but vessels should expect visit-and-search checks, strong U.S. naval presence, persistent IRGC monitoring, and occasional hails. A 30 NM standoff from U.S. units is advised, as well as ensuring continuous monitoring of VHF Channel 16, to reduce misidentification risk.

Electronic interference continues to present a credible concern. The operating environment requires heightened situational awareness throughout all approaches.

5D. Arabian Sea

The threat level remains MODERATE, with deliberate attacks considered possible but not likely.

Outlook: The southwest monsoon has ended and small-craft operations farther offshore are more feasible, as seen by the armed skiff approach, with a possible mothership, reported in UKMTO 206-26 and MSCIO 181/26. NAVAREA IX 441/26 warns vessels to keep well clear of the position.

Residual risk persists due to broader regional tensions.

5E. Gulf of Aden

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with deliberate attacks considered a strong possibility.

Outlook: The autumn transition permits small-craft operations, and the northeast monsoon (December–March) is climatologically milder. This may impact armed small craft approaches as seen on 17 Oct (UKMTO 176-26), 30 Oct (MSCIO 160/26) and 17 Nov (UKMTO 210-26, MSCIO 185/26); in each case the embarked armed security team's response, warning shots or a display of weapons, was reported to have ended the approach.

5F. Southern Red Sea / Bab el Mandeb

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with deliberate attacks considered a strong possibility.

Outlook: Houthi messaging consistently frames the 20 July maritime blockade as selective against assets considered as Israeli-, Saudi-, or Yemeni internationally recognized government-linked. Following Sept territorial gains, Houthi forces occupied the Red Sea coastal positions vacated by Yemeni government-aligned forces on 15 Nov (Dhubab Airport and the Bab el-Mandeb area), further consolidating their coastal presence and strike capability along the southern Red Sea approaches. Houthi forces are assessed to be advancing in Lahij Governorate toward Aden, and the front line remains fluid.

Disclosure of voyage information in response to Houthi communications (HOCC) may increase targeting risk. U.S. MARAD Advisory 2026-013 advises U.S.-flagged commercial vessels to disregard Houthi instructions to activate AIS or submit voyage information and to report such contacts.

Retaliatory action against Saudi-, Israeli- or Yemeni government-linked shipping remains possible. Expanded Houthi control of the coastline could facilitate the deployment of radars and short-range weapons against vessels in Bab el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden should the Houthis choose to escalate. Houthi long-range missile and drone capability against the waterway is also retained from inland positions. Attacks in the wider area remain a strong possibility but expansion into indiscriminate targeting of all commercial shipping remains unlikely. Traffic will continue at reduced but stable levels.

Mariners should maintain heightened security postures, implement speed and timing mitigation, minimize predictable AIS behavior in the narrows, and prepare for short-notice navigational directives.

5G. Somali Coast and Somali Basin

The threat level remains MODERATE, with deliberate attacks considered possible but not likely.

Outlook: Pirate Action Group (PAG) activity persists across the Somali Coast and Somali Basin. The 13 Nov hijack of a fishing vessel near Hobyo (MSCIO 179/26) and the 16 Nov approach by an armed skiff with a possible mothership about 430 NM east of Socotra (UKMTO 206-26, MSCIO 181/26) show reach well offshore. Fishing vessels and dhows remain exposed to further approaches, and hijacked vessels may be used to extend PAG range offshore. Residual opportunistic piracy risk persists in nearshore Somali waters and the Gulf of Aden, where small-boat activity remains feasible. PAGs retain the capability to board and divert merchant vessels along the Somali coast, IRTC approaches, and adjacent Gulf of Aden lanes.

5H. Northern Red Sea / Suez (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE, with deliberate attacks considered possible but not likely.

Outlook: Periodic EMI and GNSS disruptions are likely to continue in the area. Minimal AIS usage at Yanbu berths and approaches is expected to persist. The Suez Canal will remain operable in both directions with no interruption.

5I. Eastern Mediterranean (No change)

The threat level remains LOW, with deliberate attacks considered highly unlikely.

Outlook: A security incident against merchant shipping is highly unlikely, with EMI/GNSS as the principal published hazard to merchant shipping; GNSS interference on the Levant coast will continue.

Naval presence remains, and vessels should maintain prudent separation from military units. No change – consistent with the persistent baseline.

ANNEXES

Transit comparisons

CARGO VESSELS TRANSITS COMPARISON


Date	12-Nov	13-Nov	14-Nov	15-Nov	16-Nov	17-Nov	18-Nov
SoH E	0	0	1	0	2	0	0
SoH W	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
SoH Total	**0**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**3**	**0**	**0**
BAM NW	6	7	7	6	9	7	4
BAM SE	5	10	4	8	7	6	2
BAM Total	**11**	**17**	**11**	**14**	**16**	**13**	**6**


TANKERS (ALL TYPES) TRANSITS COMPARISON

Date	12-Nov	13-Nov	14-Nov	15-Nov	16-Nov	17-Nov	18-Nov
SoH E	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
SoH W	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
SoH Total	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**2**	**0**	**0**
BAM NW	6	6	5	4	3	2	5
BAM SE	4	3	4	3	6	3	2
BAM Total	**10**	**9**	**9**	**7**	**9**	**5**	**7**


** Metrics are drawn from two separate sources: S&P Maritime / SeaVision data reflecting non-facilitated vessel traffic above 1,000 deadweight tons, excluding vessels calling Iranian ports adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.*

UKMTO transits





UKMTO Strait of Hormuz – Latest incidents



UKMTO VRA AIS Anomalies

