Joint Maritime Information Center

Update 116 to JMIC Advisory Note:
01 March – 22 November 2026

Regional Tension - Impact on Maritime Security

Area of Concern:

Middle East Maritime Region

JMIC# 001-26 ICOD: 221300 UTC Regional Threat Level: SEVERE

1. Confirmed Maritime Security Incidents List since last report

Date	Vessel	Vessel Type	Event Type	Location	Narrative
20 Nov 2026 UKMTO 213-26	DAISY	Bulk Carrier	Suspicious Activity	Gulf of Aden	On 20 Nov the bulk carrier DAISY, transiting eastbound in the IRTC approx. 95 NM southwest of Al Mukalla, Yemen, was approached by a skiff with six armed persons on board, who fired four shots. The armed security team on board returned warning shots and the skiff moved away. No damage or injuries were reported.
20 Nov 2026 UKMTO 214-26	Name withheld UFN	Tanker	Attack	Strait of Hormuz	On 20 Nov a tanker transiting the Strait of Hormuz outbound was struck on the port bow by an unknown projectile approx. 8 NM north of Khasab, Oman, causing a fire on board. No crew casualties or environmental impact were reported.
21 Nov 2026 UKMTO 215-26	TORKEL	Tanker	Attack	Strait of Hormuz	On 21 Nov a tanker, identified by NAVAREA IX as the TORKEL, was struck on the stern by an unknown projectile approx. 11 NM north of Khasab, Oman, while transiting the Strait of Hormuz outbound, causing a fire on board. The vessel was later reported at anchor. No crew casualties were reported. Environmental impact is unknown.
21 Nov 2026 UKMTO 216-26	ARINA	Tanker	Attack	Strait of Hormuz	On 21 Nov the tanker ARINA, transiting the Strait of Hormuz outbound, was struck in the engine room by an unknown projectile approx. 17 NM east of Khasab, Oman. No crew casualties were reported. Environmental impact is unknown.

2. Operational Summary – Last 72 Hours

2A. Arabian Gulf

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

Traffic flows continued, with anchorage congestion high across the region.

2B. Strait of Hormuz

Three attacks were reported in this period (UKMTO 214-26, MSCIO 189/26; UKMTO 215-26, MSCIO 190/26; UKMTO 216-26, MSCIO 191/26), against four in the previous period.

All three were outbound tankers struck by unknown projectiles 8–17 NM from Khasab, Oman, within about 15 hours on 20–21 Nov; two of them (UKMTO 215-26, 216-26) were struck about 50 minutes apart, the second 17 NM east of Khasab. Seven tankers have been struck in the Strait of Hormuz since 16 Nov.

IRGC attacks, attempted attacks, and/or harassment activity persisted including UAV overflight, targeted surveillance of merchant shipping, and occasional VHF hailing. These actions continue to demonstrate Iran's intent to assert presence along key transit lanes and maintain pressure on transiting vessels. Iranian claims of mine strikes on tankers have not been confirmed by any official or national authorities.

Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained at reduced levels compared to the 2025 baseline. AIS-visible commercial transits through the Strait of Hormuz remained very low, with no transits by cargo-carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons recorded on S&P tracking on 19–21 Nov. US NCAGS data indicated an average of approx. 38 U.S. assisted transits per day on 19–21 Nov compared to 27 per day on 15–18 Nov.

2C. Gulf of Oman (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

Naval presence remained elevated due to blockade enforcement activity. According to official CENTCOM figures issued on 11 Nov, nearly 150 commercial vessels have been redirected and five merchant ships have been disabled as a result of blockade enforcement. Two vessels had previously been reported boarded for blockade compliance. No further blockade-enforcement disablement was announced in this period.

Vessels were expected to respond promptly to military queries and maintain AIS-on unless constrained by security threats. Operators continued to exercise caution due to regional strike activity and ongoing IRGC monitoring of shipping in adjacent waters.

2D. Arabian Sea

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

Naval forces continued routine patrols, and commercial traffic was transiting without significant disruption.

2E. Gulf of Aden

One incident of suspicious activity was reported in this period (UKMTO 213-26, MSCIO 188/26). It was the second armed skiff approach southwest of Al Mukalla in four days, after the 17 Nov incident (UKMTO 210-26); in both cases warning shots from the armed security team ended the approach.

Commercial traffic remained relatively steady in the Gulf of Aden.

2F. Southern Red Sea & Bab el Mandeb

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

Houthi forces hold the Red Sea coastal positions vacated by government-aligned forces on 15 Nov, and Houthi ground pressure toward Aden continues. No corroborated attack on commercial shipping in the Red Sea has been reported since 24 August 2026.

Traffic remains below the 20 Jul Houthi selective embargo. Commercial traffic in the Bab el Mandeb recorded approx. 23 transits per day on S&P tracking on 19–21 Nov, against approx. 19 per day on 15–18 Nov.

Bab el-Mandeb remains open to commercial traffic but is considered volatile. Houthi statements continue to assert that non-Saudi commercial shipping may transit safely.

2G. Somali Coast and Somali Basin (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

One merchant vessel remains hijacked since the date of initial incident reporting:

- MT ASANA, a Tanzanian-flagged product/chemical tanker, was hijacked on 17 July 2026 approx. 65 NM southwest of Mukalla, Yemen, while carrying oil products.

2H. Northern Red Sea & Suez Canal (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

Maritime traffic in the Northern Red Sea and Suez Canal held steady over the last 72 hours.

2I. Eastern Mediterranean (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. This is consistent with the persistent baseline.

3. Regional Threat Overview (No change)

JMIC Threat Scale: Low | Moderate | Substantial | Severe | Critical

Region	Threat Level	Notes
Arabian Gulf	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to Iranian attacks, the threat level in the Arabian Gulf remains SUBSTANTIAL. Navigation interference has also increased. An attack is a strong possibility.
Strait of Hormuz	SEVERE	Due to continued Iranian attacks, the threat level remains SEVERE, with deliberate hostile action considered as highly likely under current conditions. Navigation interference persists, and mariners are advised to remain vigilant for attempted mining within and adjacent to the TSS. IRGC attacks, hailing, and routing pressure continue, particularly for AIS-on vessels.
Gulf of Oman	MODERATE	The U.S. naval blockade remains enforced, with ongoing monitoring, hailing, and verification queries, particularly near approaches to Iranian ports. Enforcement activity poses no threat to neutral shipping transits in the Gulf of Oman. Electronic interference continues to present a credible concern for mariners.
Arabian Sea	MODERATE	Residual conflict-linked risk persists, but no attacks have been reported, and current indicators suggest no imminent change to the threat environment.
Gulf of Aden	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to piracy-related events and Houthi rhetoric, with no vessel attacks since 24 Aug, the threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with a strong possibility of a maritime security incident in coastal approaches, transit corridors, and established small-craft areas.
Bab el-Mandeb / Southern Red Sea	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to Houthi attacks on infrastructure adjacent to maritime interests in the Southern Red Sea and territorial gains in Yemen along the Red Sea, the threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Based on sustained intent against Saudi-affiliated interests, and maintained capability, additional attacks are a strong possibility
Somali Coast / Somali Basin	MODERATE	PAG activity remains possible; the southwest monsoon subsided on 15 October, and skiff operations further offshore are more feasible.
Northern Red Sea / Suez Canal	MODERATE	Suez Canal operations remain normal. Periodic Electro-magnetic Interference (EMI) remains possible.
Eastern Mediterranean	LOW	Due to a lack of security incidents, the threat level remains LOW. Localized EMI disruptions persist, and regional naval presence remains consistent.

JMIC Regional Threat Levels

Threat Level	Definition
Low	An attack is highly unlikely
Moderate	An attack is possible but not likely
Substantial	An attack is a strong possibility
Severe	An attack is highly likely
Critical	An attack is almost certain

4. Maritime Incidents & Traffic Assessment

4A. Confirmed Vessel Incidents since 01 March

Total of 194 incidents since 01 March; four incidents since the last report (UKMTO 213-26, 214-26, 215-26 and 216-26).

4B. Infrastructure Incidents

The overall risk remains MODERATE, driven by the potential for an increase in kinetic activity against ports, terminals and offshore installations along the Iranian, Yemeni and Saudi coasts. Ongoing land exchanges between Houthi forces and Saudi-led coalition forces continued.

On 20 Nov the Saudi-led coalition struck Hodeidah port facilities after ordering an evacuation. Houthi claims of strikes on Jizan port and Houthi media claims of a strike on Mokha port have not been independently confirmed.

No attack on offshore platforms or subsea infrastructure was reported in this period.

4C. Traffic Trends

- Strait of Hormuz:
    - Historical average: ~138 vessels/day (2025 baseline)
    - U.S. – facilitated SoH transits 19-21 Nov (past 72 hours): 114

** Metrics are drawn from two separate sources: U.S. NCAGS data reflecting U.S.-facilitated Strait of Hormuz transits only, and S&P Maritime/SeaVision data reflecting non-facilitated vessel traffic for cargo-carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons, excluding vessels calling Iranian ports adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.*


- Bab el-Mandeb:
    - Historical average: ~61 vessels/day (2023 baseline)
    - Vessel transits 19-21 Nov (past 72 hours): 68

** Metrics are drawn from S&P Maritime for cargo-carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons.*

4D. Port & Anchorage Congestion

Congestion remains high and is driven primarily by restricted transit, and to a lesser degree by port capacity.

There was no mass departure, new cluster or gap near the attack area off Khasab; Fujairah/Khor Fakkan was high and broadly stable and slight easing (from about 188 vessels on 19 Nov to about 167 on 22 Nov), Dubai/Jebel Ali to Ras Al Khaimah was broadly unchanged (from about 138 to about 136), Musandam/Sohar rose slightly on a small base (from about 46 to about 51), and Bandar Abbas/Qeshm was broadly unchanged on a small, low-confidence base (from about 11 to about 10). JMIC internal tracking counted approx. 218 commercial vessels stationary at the main anchorages east of the Strait of Hormuz (Fujairah, Khor Fakkan, Sohar and Musandam), against no AIS-visible transits by cargo-carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons recorded on S&P tracking on 19–21 Nov; thus, the backlog is expected to persist.



Source: MarineTraffic, visual estimate; stationary commercial vessels (tanker, cargo, tug/special, high-speed, unspecified). Data cut-off 22 Nov 2026 1422 Bahrain (1122Z). *Low confidence.
Change compares snapshots 19 Nov 1420 and 22 Nov 1422 Bahrain (nearest available to the previous and present Advisory (COD, 1300Z = 1600 Bahrain). Actual interval 72 h 02 min (nominal 72 h).

4E. GNSS / AIS Interference

GNSS interference stayed high over the Gulf of Oman on 21 Nov, at about four times its 7-day average, and strengthened for a second day along the Oman Batinah coast and at sea off Sohar, with strong indications also off Fujairah. These new indications along the Batinah coast off Sohar were observed in aircraft signals and have not been confirmed by ship reports or official notices. In the Arabian Gulf, indications rose again, strongest along the UAE coast (Dubai/Sharjah), and returned over Bahrain and the Saudi east coast.

Windward recorded 350 jammed vessels of 5,324 transmitting in the Gulf and Gulf of Oman on 19 Nov, about 22% above its 7-day average. UKMTO's weekly VRA report (20 Nov) recorded two vessel GNSS reports in seven days and 11,682 anomalous AIS positions, against 15,374 the week before, and kept the Red Sea, Gulf of Oman and Arabian Gulf as hotspots.

In the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, no significant GNSS interference was observed at sea; Windward recorded 32 jammed vessels of 994 transmitting in the Red Sea on 19 Nov.

No new specific UKMTO, MARAD, NAVCENT, or NAVAREA IX GNSS/EMI notices were issued 19 – 22 November. Baseline advisories remain in force.

5. Outlook (24–48 Hours)

5A. Arabian Gulf

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with continued navigational system interference and demonstrated kinetic threat and wider regional military activity continuing to warrant caution.

Outlook: Multiple attacks inside the Gulf since 07 Oct demonstrate that attacks remain a strong possibility throughout the Arabian Gulf, including the northern and central Gulf, anchorages and STS areas. Electronic interference remains a credible concern, particularly along the UAE coast and off Bahrain and the Saudi east coast. The operating environment requires heightened situational awareness throughout all approaches.

Vessels stationary for extended periods, or maintaining AIS-on while static, may face elevated targeting risk.

5B. Strait of Hormuz

The threat level remains SEVERE, with deliberate attacks considered highly likely under current conditions.

Outlook: Three further tankers were struck off Khasab on 20–21 Nov (UKMTO 214-26, 215-26, 216-26), two of them within an hour, extending the sustained pattern of attacks on outbound tankers off Musandam. Further attacks on tankers transiting the Omani side of the Strait are highly likely, and disabled or anchored vessels remain exposed. AIS-visible transits are expected to stay low.

Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is expected to remain at reduced levels, compared to the 2025 baseline, across both the northern Iranian-controlled route and the southern Omani corridor. Operator caution should continue, driven by a series of vessel attacks, ongoing U.S. blockade enforcement, and elevated regional tension. Vessels transiting with AIS-on can expect elevated targeting risk and receive directed hails instructing them to divert toward the northern Iranian-controlled route.

The U.S. blockade of Iranian ports continues to be enforced. Unauthorized entry or departure may result in interception or force. Neutral transit is permitted, but vessels should expect visit-and-search checks, strong U.S. naval presence, persistent IRGC monitoring, and increased VHF hails. A 30 NM standoff from U.S. units is advised to reduce misidentification risk.

A vetted humanitarian-cargo exemption remains in place but requires submission to NAVCENT NCAGS. Approved vessels may transit to Iranian ports but remain subject to inspection and may not load cargo in Iran beyond fuel and stores.

Industry Guidance for Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz:

https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/media/vkaa3pjr/2026-05-20-guidance-strait-of-hormuz.pdf

5C. Gulf of Oman

The threat level remains MODERATE, with deliberate attacks considered possible but not likely under current conditions.

Outlook: Vessels can expect persistent IRGC monitoring and routing pressure in western portion of the Gulf of Oman; however, further east/south, attacks are considered possible but not likely. Residual risk diminishes with distance from the primary concentration of IRGC activity and with distance from Musandam / Jask. Approx. 167 vessels are at anchor in the vicinity of Fujairah/Khor Fakkan and congestion is expected to persist. Neutral vessels between non-Iranian ports may be questioned, visited and searched under the blockade and should be prepared to provide the documentation noted in JMIC Advisory Note 016-26 to expedite clearance.

A U.S. naval blockade remains enforced, with ongoing monitoring, hailing, and verification queries, particularly near approaches to Iranian ports. Unauthorized entry or departure may result in interception or force. Neutral transit is permitted, but vessels should expect visit-and-search checks, strong U.S. naval presence, persistent IRGC monitoring, and occasional hails. A 30 NM standoff from U.S. units is advised, as well as ensuring continuous monitoring of VHF Channel 16, to reduce misidentification risk.

Electronic interference continues to present a credible concern, with new indications along the Batinah coast off Sohar. The operating environment requires heightened situational awareness throughout all approaches.

5D. Arabian Sea (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE, with deliberate attacks considered possible but not likely.

Outlook: The southwest monsoon has ended and small-craft operations farther offshore are more feasible, as seen by the armed skiff approach, with a possible mothership, reported in UKMTO 206-26 and MSCIO 181/26. NAVAREA IX 441/26 warns vessels to keep well clear of the position.

Residual risk persists due to broader regional tensions.

5E. Gulf of Aden

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with deliberate attacks considered a strong possibility.

Armed skiff approaches southwest of Al Mukalla on 17 and 20 Nov (UKMTO 210-26; UKMTO 213-26, MSCIO 188/26) show continued small-craft activity in the Gulf of Aden and the IRTC; in both cases warning shots from the embarked armed security team ended the approach.

Outlook: Sea conditions in the Gulf of Aden remain favourable for skiffs, with winds of about 15–20 kt and seas around 1 m, stronger near Bab el-Mandeb. The milder northeast monsoon (December–March) is expected to keep conditions suitable for skiff and mothership operations. Vessels should therefore expect a continued risk of piracy and of being approached by armed skiffs and should maintain a vigilant lookout and report any suspicious approach to UKMTO without delay.

5F. Southern Red Sea / Bab el Mandeb

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with deliberate attacks considered a strong possibility.

Outlook: Houthi messaging consistently frames the 20 July maritime blockade as selective against assets considered as Israeli-, Saudi-, or Yemeni internationally recognized government-linked. Following Sept territorial gains, Houthi forces occupied the Red Sea coastal positions vacated by Yemeni government-aligned forces on 15 Nov (Dhubab Airport and the Bab el-Mandeb area), further consolidating their coastal presence and strike capability along the southern Red Sea approaches. Houthi forces are assessed to be advancing in Lahij Governorate toward Aden, and the front line remains fluid. The Houthi threat of 20 Nov against Jeddah and all Saudi Red Sea ports, issued after the coalition strike on Hodeidah port, raises the risk to Saudi ports and to ships alongside them. Reports of Houthi fortification along the Bab el-Mandeb coast have not been independently confirmed.

Retaliatory action against Saudi-, Israeli- or Yemeni government-linked shipping remains possible. Expanded Houthi control of the coastline could facilitate the deployment of radars and short-range weapons against vessels in Bab el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden should the Houthis choose to escalate. Houthi long-range missile and drone capability against the waterway is also retained from inland positions. Attacks in the wider area remain a strong possibility but expansion into indiscriminate targeting of all commercial shipping remains unlikely. Traffic will continue at reduced but stable levels.

Mariners should maintain heightened security postures, implement speed and timing mitigation, minimize predictable AIS behavior in the narrows, and prepare for short-notice navigational directives.

5G. Somali Coast and Somali Basin

The threat level remains MODERATE, with deliberate attacks considered possible but not likely.

Outlook: Pirate Action Group (PAG) activity persists across the Somali Coast and Somali Basin. Sea states of about 1.5 m and winds near 17 kt between the monsoons allow skiffs and motherships to operate well offshore. The northeast monsoon (December–March) is usually milder, so this window is expected to stay open. The 13 Nov hijack of a fishing vessel near Hobyo (MSCIO 179/26) and the 16 Nov approach by an armed skiff with a possible mothership about 430 NM east of Socotra (UKMTO 206-26, MSCIO 181/26) show reach well offshore. Fishing vessels and dhows remain exposed to further approaches, and hijacked vessels may be used to extend PAG range offshore. Residual opportunistic piracy risk persists in nearshore Somali waters and the Gulf of Aden, where small-boat activity remains feasible. PAGs retain the capability to board and divert merchant vessels along the Somali coast, IRTC approaches, and adjacent Gulf of Aden lanes.

5H. Northern Red Sea / Suez (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE, with deliberate attacks considered possible but not likely.

Outlook: Periodic EMI and GNSS disruptions are likely to continue in the area. Minimal AIS usage at Yanbu berths and approaches is expected to persist. The Suez Canal will remain operable in both directions with no interruption.

5I. Eastern Mediterranean (No change)

The threat level remains LOW, with deliberate attacks considered highly unlikely.

Outlook: A security incident against merchant shipping is highly unlikely, with EMI/GNSS as the principal published hazard to merchant shipping; GNSS interference on the Levant coast will continue.

Naval presence remains, and vessels should maintain prudent separation from military units. No change – consistent with the persistent baseline.

ANNEXES

Transit comparisons

CARGO VESSELS TRANSITS COMPARISON


Date	15-Nov	16-Nov	17-Nov	18-Nov	19-Nov	20-Nov	21-Nov
SoH E	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
SoH W	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
SoH Total	**0**	**3**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
BAM NW	6	9	7	4	4	10	6
BAM SE	8	7	6	2	5	2	18
BAM Total	**14**	**16**	**13**	**6**	**9**	**12**	**24**


TANKERS (ALL TYPES) TRANSITS COMPARISON

Date	15-Nov	16-Nov	17-Nov	18-Nov	19-Nov	20-Nov	21-Nov
SoH E	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
SoH W	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
SoH Total	**1**	**2**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
BAM NW	4	3	2	5	3	5	7
BAM SE	3	6	3	2	3	1	4
BAM Total	**7**	**9**	**5**	**7**	**6**	**6**	**11**


** Metrics are drawn from two separate sources: S&P Maritime / SeaVision data reflecting non-facilitated vessel traffic above 1,000 deadweight tons, excluding vessels calling Iranian ports adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.*

UKMTO transits (Updated 19 Nov)





UKMTO Strait of Hormuz – Latest incidents (Updated 19 Nov)



UKMTO VRA AIS Anomalies (Updated 19 Nov)



Non-Geofeasible AIS Positions 30-Day Hexbin Aggregation ICOD: 19/11/26 00:01UTC



Non-Geofeasible AIS Positions 7-Day Hexbin Aggregation ICOD: 19/11/26 00:01UTC