Joint Maritime Information Center

Update 117 to JMIC Advisory Note:
01 March – 26 November 2026

Regional Tension - Impact on Maritime Security

Area of Concern:

Middle East Maritime Region

JMIC# 001-26 ICOD: 261300 UTC Regional Threat Level: SEVERE

1. Confirmed Maritime Security Incidents List since last report

Date	Vessel	Vessel Type	Event Type	Location	Narrative
22 Nov 2026 UKMTO 217-26	Name withheld UFN	Tanker	Blockade enforcement	Gulf of Oman	On 22 Nov UKMTO reported an incident involving a tanker and military forces in the Gulf of Oman, off Chabahar, Iran. Authorities were aware and investigating. No damage or injuries were reported.
23 Nov 2026 UKMTO 218-26	Name withheld UFN	Bulk Carrier	Attack	Gulf of Oman	On 22 Nov a bulk carrier at anchor at Dibba OPL, approx. 23 NM northeast of Khor Fakkan, UAE, was struck on the port side by an unknown projectile, causing a fire on board. No casualties were reported. The incident was reported late, on 23 Nov.
24 Nov 2026 UKMTO 219-26	Name withheld UFN	Tanker	Attack	Strait of Hormuz	On 22 Nov a tanker transiting the Strait of Hormuz eastbound was struck by an unknown projectile, the first of three tankers struck within about 17 minutes. The vessel continued its transit and all crew were accounted for. Damage and environmental impact are unknown.
24 Nov 2026 UKMTO 220-26	Name withheld UFN	Tanker	Attack	Strait of Hormuz	On 22 Nov a second tanker transiting the Strait of Hormuz eastbound was struck by an unknown projectile. The vessel continued its transit and all crew were accounted for. Damage and environmental impact are unknown.
24 Nov 2026 UKMTO 221-26	Name withheld UFN	Tanker	Attack	Strait of Hormuz	On 22 Nov a third tanker transiting the Strait of Hormuz eastbound was struck by an unknown projectile. The vessel continued its transit and all crew were accounted for. Damage and environmental impact are unknown.

25 Nov 2026 UKMTO 222-26	**Name withheld UFN**	**Tanker**	**Suspicious Activity**	**Arabian Gulf**	**On 25 Nov a tanker approx. 50 NM west of Dubai, UAE, reported two explosions caused by unknown projectiles in close proximity to the vessel. No damage or environmental impact was reported. The crew was reported safe.**
25 Nov 2026 UKMTO 223-26	**Name withheld UFN**	**Tanker**	**Attack**	**Strait of Hormuz**	**On 25 Nov an outbound tanker was struck by an unknown projectile approx. 18 NM east of Khasab, Oman, while transiting the Strait of Hormuz. No report of environmental impact.**

2. Operational Summary – Last 96 Hours

2A. Arabian Gulf

One suspicious activity incident was reported in this period: on 25 Nov a tanker reported two explosions (UKMTO 222-26, MSCIO 195/26).

Traffic flows continued, with anchorage congestion high across the region.

ADNOC-PPA Port Marine Notice JDR/MN/023/2026 (23 Nov) bars tankers carrying crude, petroleum products, liquefied gases, chemicals or other hazardous cargoes, UAE-flagged included, from entering, transiting or waiting in ADNOC-PPA controlled waters unless calling at ADNOC-PPA ports or terminals. Tankers calling at Ruwais, Jebel Dhanna, Das, Zirku or Mubarraz must give 72 hours' notice and follow designated routes and VTS instructions.

2B. Strait of Hormuz

Four attacks were reported in this period (UKMTO 219-26, 220-26 and 221-26, MSCIO 193/26, and UKMTO 223-26), against three in the previous period. Seventeen tankers have been struck in the Strait of Hormuz since 1 Nov.

IRGC attacks, attempted attacks, and/or harassment activity persisted including UAV overflight, targeted surveillance of merchant shipping, and occasional VHF hailing. These actions continue to demonstrate Iran’s intent to assert presence along key transit lanes and maintain pressure on transiting vessels. Iranian claims of mine strikes on tankers have not been confirmed by any official or national authorities.

On 24 Nov Iran's Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) said it had added 26 tugboats to its list of non-compliant vessels for servicing ships it says breach its restrictions in the southern Strait of Hormuz. The PGSA list is a unilateral Iranian designation, not an official or internationally recognized sanctions list.

Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained at reduced levels compared to the 2025 baseline. AIS-visible commercial transits through the Strait of Hormuz remained very low, with three transits by cargo-carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons (all tankers, inbound, one on 23 Nov and two on 25 Nov) recorded on S&P tracking on 22–25 Nov. US NCAGS data indicated an average of approx. 32 U.S. assisted transits per day on 22–25 Nov compared to 38 per day on 19–21 Nov.

2C. Gulf of Oman

One attack and one blockade enforcement were reported in this period (UKMTO 218-26, MSCIO 192/26): on 22 Nov a bulk carrier at anchor at Dibba OPL was struck by an unknown projectile. On the same day UKMTO reported an incident involving a tanker and military forces off Chabahar, Iran (UKMTO 217-26).

Naval presence remained elevated due to blockade enforcement activity. According to latest official CENTCOM figures issued on 11 Nov, nearly 150 commercial vessels have been redirected and five merchant ships have been disabled as a result of blockade enforcement. Two vessels had previously been reported boarded for blockade compliance. No further information or blockade-enforcement disablement was announced in this period.

Vessels were expected to respond promptly to military queries and maintain AIS-on unless constrained by security threats. Operators continued to exercise caution due to regional strike activity and ongoing IRGC monitoring of shipping in adjacent waters.

2D. Arabian Sea (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

Naval forces continued routine patrols, and commercial traffic was transiting without significant disruption.

2E. Gulf of Aden (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

Commercial traffic remained relatively steady in the Gulf of Aden.

2F. Southern Red Sea & Bab el Mandeb

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

The Saudi-led coalition struck Hodeidah port on 25 Nov after a second evacuation order. The Houthis stated that Jeddah and all Saudi Red Sea ports would be targeted and called on shipping companies to remove their vessels.

Houthi forces hold the Red Sea coastal positions vacated by government-aligned forces on 15 Nov, and Houthi ground pressure toward Aden continues. No corroborated attack on commercial shipping in the Red Sea has been reported since 24 August 2026.

Traffic remains below the 20 Jul Houthi selective embargo. Commercial traffic in the Bab el Mandeb recorded approx. 24 transits per day on S&P tracking on 22–25 Nov, against approx. 23 per day on 19–21 Nov.

Bab el-Mandeb remains open to commercial traffic but is considered volatile. Houthi statements continue to assert that non-Saudi commercial shipping may transit safely.

2G. Somali Coast and Somali Basin (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

One merchant vessel remains hijacked since the date of initial incident reporting:

- MT ASANA, a Tanzanian-flagged product/chemical tanker, was hijacked on 17 July 2026 approx. 65 NM southwest of Mukalla, Yemen, while carrying oil products.

2H. Northern Red Sea & Suez Canal (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

Maritime traffic in the Northern Red Sea and Suez Canal held steady over the last 96 hours.

2I. Eastern Mediterranean (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. This is consistent with the persistent baseline.

3. Regional Threat Overview (No change)

JMIC Threat Scale: Low | Moderate | Substantial | Severe | Critical

Region	Threat Level	Notes
Arabian Gulf	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to Iranian attacks, the threat level in the Arabian Gulf remains SUBSTANTIAL. Navigation interference has also increased. An attack is a strong possibility.
Strait of Hormuz	SEVERE	Due to continued Iranian attacks, the threat level remains SEVERE, with deliberate hostile action considered as highly likely under current conditions. Navigation interference persists, and mariners are advised to remain vigilant for attempted mining within and adjacent to the TSS. IRGC attacks, hailing, and routing pressure continue, particularly for AIS-on vessels.
Gulf of Oman	MODERATE	The U.S. naval blockade remains enforced, with ongoing monitoring, hailing, and verification queries, particularly near approaches to Iranian ports. Enforcement activity poses no threat to neutral shipping transits in the Gulf of Oman. Electronic interference continues to present a credible concern for mariners.
Arabian Sea	MODERATE	Residual conflict-linked risk persists, but no attacks have been reported, and current indicators suggest no imminent change to the threat environment.
Gulf of Aden	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to piracy-related events and Houthi rhetoric, with no vessel attacks since 24 Aug, the threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with a strong possibility of a maritime security incident in coastal approaches, transit corridors, and established small-craft areas.
Bab el-Mandeb / Southern Red Sea	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to Houthi attacks on infrastructure adjacent to maritime interests in the Southern Red Sea and territorial gains in Yemen along the Red Sea, the threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Based on sustained intent against Saudi-affiliated interests, and maintained capability, additional attacks are a strong possibility
Somali Coast / Somali Basin	MODERATE	PAG activity remains possible; the southwest monsoon subsided on 15 October, and skiff operations further offshore are more feasible.
Northern Red Sea / Suez Canal	MODERATE	Suez Canal operations remain normal. Periodic Electro-magnetic Interference (EMI) remains possible.
Eastern Mediterranean	LOW	Due to a lack of security incidents, the threat level remains LOW. Localized EMI disruptions persist, and regional naval presence remains consistent.

JMIC Regional Threat Levels

Threat Level	Definition
Low	An attack is highly unlikely
Moderate	An attack is possible but not likely
Substantial	An attack is a strong possibility
Severe	An attack is highly likely
Critical	An attack is almost certain

4. Maritime Incidents & Traffic Assessment

4A. Confirmed Vessel Incidents since 01 March

Total of 201 incidents since 01 March; seven incidents since the last report (UKMTO 217-26, 218-26, 219-26, 220-26, 221-26, 222-26 and 223-26).

4B. Infrastructure Incidents

The overall risk remains MODERATE, driven by the potential for an increase in kinetic activity against ports, terminals and offshore installations along the Iranian, Yemeni and Saudi coasts. Ongoing land exchanges between Houthi forces and Saudi-led coalition forces continued.

On 25 Nov the Saudi-led coalition struck Hodeidah port after a second evacuation order. Later that day the coalition reported that a projectile it attributed to the Houthis struck Jazan port, causing minor damage; this has not been independently verified. That evening the coalition also reported intercepting a Houthi drone near Jeddah Islamic Port but no further details known or independently confirmed.

On 25 Nov the Saudi-led coalition also reported intercepting and destroying four drones at Ras Tanura, with debris falling and no injuries in the initial assessment. The Houthis claimed a refinery strike and fires; the coalition did not report a hit or any effect on marine terminal operations, and international media reported satellite imagery of smoke over the refinery.

No attack on offshore platforms or subsea infrastructure was reported in this period.

4C. Traffic Trends

- Strait of Hormuz:
    - Historical average: ~138 vessels/day (2025 baseline)
    - U.S.-facilitated SoH transits 22-25 Nov (past 96 hours): 128

** Metrics are drawn from two separate sources: U.S. NCAGS data reflecting U.S.-facilitated Strait of Hormuz transits only, and S&P Maritime/SeaVision data reflecting non-facilitated vessel traffic for cargo-carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons, excluding vessels calling Iranian ports adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.*

- Bab el-Mandeb:
    - Historical average: ~61 vessels/day (2023 baseline)
    - Vessel transits 22-25 Nov (past 96 hours): 98

** Metrics are drawn from S&P Maritime for cargo-carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons.*

4D. Port & Anchorage Congestion

Congestion remains high and is driven primarily by restricted transit, and to a lesser degree by port capacity.

There was no mass departure, new cluster or gap near the attack areas off Khasab or Dibba; Fujairah/Khor Fakkan stayed high and broadly stable (from about 167 vessels on 22 Nov to about 171 on 26 Nov), Dubai/Jebel Ali to Ras Al Khaimah rose slightly (from about 136 to about 141), Musandam/Sohar eased slightly on a small base (from about 51 to about 47), and Bandar

Abbas/Qeshm rose on a small, low-confidence base (from about 10 to about 25). JMIC internal tracking counted approx. 218 commercial vessels stationary at the main anchorages east of the Strait of Hormuz (Fujairah, Khor Fakkan, Sohar and Musandam), against three AIS-visible transits by cargo-carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons recorded on S&P tracking on 22–25 Nov; thus, the backlog is expected to persist.



4E. GNSS / AIS Interference

GNSS interference indications in the Arabian Gulf rose sharply on 25 Nov to their highest level since monitoring began in October, centered on the southern-central Gulf offshore, the western UAE, Abu Dhabi, Dubai/Sharjah, Qatar and the Saudi east coast. Over the Gulf of Oman, indications also increased, including at sea off the Batinah coast and off Muscat. These indications were mostly observed in aircraft signals and have not been confirmed by ship reports or official notices.

Windward recorded 289 jammed vessels of 6,945 transmitting in the Gulf and Gulf of Oman on 24 Nov, about 8% below its 7-day average. UKMTO's weekly VRA report (20 Nov) recorded two vessel GNSS reports in seven days and 11,682 anomalous AIS positions, and kept the Red Sea, Gulf of Oman and Arabian Gulf as hotspots.

In the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, no significant GNSS interference was observed at sea; Windward recorded 23 jammed vessels of 1,279 transmitting in the Red Sea on 24 Nov.

No new specific UKMTO, MARAD, NAVCENT, or NAVAREA IX GNSS/EMI notices were issued 22 – 26 November. Baseline advisories remain in force.

5. Outlook

5A. Arabian Gulf

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with continued navigational system interference and demonstrated kinetic threat and wider regional military activity continuing to warrant caution.

Outlook: Multiple attacks inside the Gulf since 07 Oct demonstrate that attacks remain a strong possibility throughout the Arabian Gulf, including the northern and central Gulf, anchorages and STS areas. Further projectile incidents close to vessels in the southern Gulf off the UAE are possible (UKMTO 222-26). Electronic interference remains a credible concern, particularly at the western Hormuz approaches, along the UAE coast and on the Saudi east coast. The operating environment requires heightened situational awareness throughout all approaches.

Tanker traffic not calling at UAE terminals is likely to shift away from western Arabian Gulf waters off Abu Dhabi, with possible routing delays. Operators should check the current notice before planning passages.

Vessels calling at or operating near Ras Tanura and other Saudi east-coast energy terminals face an increased risk of collateral damage from further long-range drone or projectile attempts. Short-notice disruption to marine terminal or loading operations at those sites cannot be ruled out, and operators should monitor official port and terminal notices before arrival.

Vessels stationary for extended periods, or maintaining AIS-on while static, may face elevated targeting risk.

5B. Strait of Hormuz

The threat level remains SEVERE, with deliberate attacks considered highly likely under current conditions.

Outlook: Further attacks on tankers are highly likely on both the eastbound and the westbound lanes (UKMTO 219-26, 220-26, 221-26, 223-26), and disabled, anchored or slow-moving vessels remain exposed. AIS-visible transits are expected to stay very low while strikes continue.

The tug listing in the PGSA non-compliant list is reviewed as a widening of Iranian pressure on ships to the support craft they rely on. Towing, salvage and offshore support craft operating east of the Strait are likely to face a higher risk of harassment or targeting, which could slow assistance to damaged vessels and anchorage operations off the UAE and Oman.

Traffic is expected to stay constrained across both the northern Iranian-controlled route and the southern Omani corridor. Operator caution should continue, driven by a series of vessel attacks, ongoing U.S. blockade enforcement, and elevated regional tension. Vessels transiting with AIS-on can expect elevated targeting risk and receive directed hails instructing them to divert toward the northern Iranian-controlled route.

The U.S. blockade of Iranian ports continues to be enforced. Unauthorized entry or departure may result in interception or force. Neutral transit is permitted, but vessels should expect visit-and-search checks, strong U.S. naval presence, persistent IRGC monitoring, and increased VHF hails. A 30 NM standoff from U.S. units is advised to reduce misidentification risk.

A vetted humanitarian-cargo exemption remains in place but requires submission to NAVCENT NCAGS. Approved vessels may transit to Iranian ports but remain subject to inspection and may not load cargo in Iran beyond fuel and stores.

Industry Guidance for Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz:

https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/media/vkaa3pjr/2026-05-20-guidance-strait-of-hormuz.pdf

5C. Gulf of Oman

The threat level remains MODERATE, with deliberate attacks considered possible but not likely under current conditions.

Outlook: Vessels can expect persistent IRGC monitoring and routing pressure in western portion of the Gulf of Oman; however, further east/south, attacks are considered possible but not likely. Vessels at anchor off the UAE east coast face a residual risk of projectile attack (UKMTO 218-26, MSCIO 192/26), and further encounters with military forces near the approaches to Iranian ports are possible (UKMTO 217-26). Residual risk diminishes with distance from the primary concentration of IRGC activity and with distance from Musandam / Jask. Approx. 171 vessels are at anchor in the vicinity of Fujairah/Khor Fakkan and congestion is expected to persist. Neutral vessels between non-Iranian ports may be questioned, visited and searched under the blockade and should be prepared to provide the documentation noted in JMIC Advisory Note 016-26 to expedite clearance.

A U.S. naval blockade remains enforced, with ongoing monitoring, hailing, and verification queries, particularly near approaches to Iranian ports. Unauthorized entry or departure may result in interception or force. Neutral transit is permitted, but vessels should expect visit-and-search checks, strong U.S. naval presence, persistent IRGC monitoring, and occasional hails. A 30 NM standoff from U.S. units is advised, as well as ensuring continuous monitoring of VHF Channel 16, to reduce misidentification risk.

Electronic interference continues to present a credible concern, with recurring indications near Fujairah. The operating environment requires heightened situational awareness throughout all approaches.

5D. Arabian Sea (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE, with deliberate attacks considered possible but not likely.

Outlook: The southwest monsoon has ended and small-craft operations farther offshore are feasible.

Residual risk persists due to broader regional tensions.

5E. Gulf of Aden (No change)

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with deliberate attacks considered a strong possibility.

Further armed skiff approaches in the Gulf of Aden and the IRTC are likely and embarked armed security teams are expected to remain an effective deterrent.

Outlook: Sea conditions in the Gulf of Aden remain favorable for skiffs, with winds of about 15–20 kt and seas around 1 m, stronger near Bab el-Mandeb. The milder northeast monsoon (December–March) is expected to keep conditions suitable for skiff and mothership operations. Vessels should therefore expect a continued risk of piracy and of being approached by armed skiffs and should maintain a vigilant lookout and report any suspicious approach to UKMTO without delay.

5F. Southern Red Sea / Bab el Mandeb

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with deliberate attacks considered a strong possibility.

Outlook: Houthi messaging consistently frames the 20 July maritime blockade as selective against assets considered as Israeli-, Saudi-, or Yemeni internationally recognized government-linked. Houthi control of the coast around Dhubab and the Bab el-Mandeb is expected to sustain their strike capability along the southern Red Sea approaches. Houthi forces are assessed to be advancing in Lahij Governorate toward Aden, and the front line remains fluid. The Jazan port strike is likely to raise the risk to vessels calling at or operating near Saudi Red Sea ports. Short-notice disruption to port operations at Jazan is possible, and further attempts against Saudi Red Sea ports cannot be ruled out. Operators should monitor port authority notices before arrival. Reports of Houthi fortification along the Bab el-Mandeb coast have not been independently confirmed.

Retaliatory action against Saudi-, Israeli- or Yemeni government-linked shipping remains possible. Expanded Houthi control of the coastline could facilitate the deployment of radars and short-range weapons against vessels in Bab el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden should the Houthis choose to escalate. Houthi long-range missile and drone capability against the waterway is also retained from inland positions. Attacks in the wider area remain a strong possibility but expansion into indiscriminate targeting of all commercial shipping remains unlikely. Traffic will continue at reduced but stable levels. Houthi long-range drone and missile systems retain the reach to strike Saudi energy infrastructure beyond the Red Sea, including on the Arabian Gulf coast. Vessels calling at Saudi port and energy terminals outside the southern Red Sea therefore also face an increased risk of collateral damage, and operators should monitor official notices before arrival.

Mariners should maintain heightened security postures, implement speed and timing mitigation, minimize predictable AIS behavior in the narrows, and prepare for short-notice navigational directives.

5G. Somali Coast and Somali Basin (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE, with deliberate attacks considered possible but not likely.

Outlook: Pirate Action Group (PAG) activity persists across the Somali Coast and Somali Basin. Sea states of about 1.5 m and winds near 17 kt between the monsoons allow skiffs and motherships to operate well offshore, and the milder northeast monsoon (December–March) is expected to keep this window open. Fishing vessels and dhows remain exposed, and hijacked vessels may be used to extend PAG range. Opportunistic piracy risk persists in nearshore Somali waters and the Gulf of Aden, and PAGs retain the capability to board and divert merchant vessels along the Somali coast, IRTC approaches and adjacent Gulf of Aden lanes.

5H. Northern Red Sea / Suez

The threat level remains MODERATE, with deliberate attacks considered possible but not likely.

Outlook: Periodic EMI and GNSS disruptions are likely to continue in the area. Minimal AIS usage at Yanbu berths and approaches is expected to persist. Jeddah, Yanbu and other Saudi Red Sea ports remain named Houthi targets, and vessels at or near them face an increased risk of collateral damage. The wider Houthi campaign against Saudi energy infrastructure, now including Gulf-coast terminals, underscores that vessels at or near Yanbu and other Red Sea export terminals remain exposed to long-range drone or projectile attempts. Operators should continue to monitor official notices before arrival. The Suez Canal will remain operable in both directions with no interruption.

5I. Eastern Mediterranean (No change)

The threat level remains LOW, with deliberate attacks considered highly unlikely.

Outlook: A security incident against merchant shipping is highly unlikely, with EMI/GNSS as the principal published hazard to merchant shipping; GNSS interference on the Levant coast will continue.

Naval presence remains, and vessels should maintain prudent separation from military units. No change – consistent with the persistent baseline.

ANNEXES

Transit comparisons

CARGO VESSELS TRANSITS COMPARISON

Date	19-Nov	20-Nov	21-Nov	22-Nov	23-Nov	24-Nov	25-Nov
SoH E	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SoH W	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SoH Total	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
BAM NW	4	10	6	7	6	9	9
BAM SE	5	2	18	11	7	10	4
BAM Total	**9**	**12**	**24**	**18**	**13**	**19**	**13**

TANKERS (ALL TYPES) TRANSITS COMPARISON

Date	19-Nov	20-Nov	21-Nov	22-Nov	23-Nov	24-Nov	25-Nov
SoH E	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**
SoH W	0	0	0	0	1	0	**2**
SoH Total	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**2**
BAM NW	3	5	7	4	4	5	1
BAM SE	3	1	4	4	6	6	5
BAM Total	**6**	**6**	**11**	**8**	**10**	**11**	**6**

** Metrics are drawn from two separate sources: S&P Maritime / SeaVision data reflecting non-facilitated vessel traffic above 1,000 deadweight tons, excluding vessels calling Iranian ports adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.*

UKMTO transits





UKMTO Strait of Hormuz – Latest incidents



UKMTO VRA AIS Anomalies



Non-Geofeasible AIS Positions 30-Day Hexbin Aggregation ICOD: 26/11/26 00:01UTC



Non-Geofeasible AIS Positions 7-Day Hexbin Aggregation ICOD: 26/11/26 00:01UTC