

Joint Maritime Information Center

Update 095 to JMIC Advisory Note:

01 March – 10 September 2026

Regional Tension - Impact on Maritime Security

Area of Concern:

Middle East Maritime Region

JMIC# 001-26

ICOD: 101500 UTC

Regional Threat Level: SEVERE

1. Confirmed Maritime Security Incidents List since last report

Date	Vessel	Vessel Type	Event Type	Location	Narrative
08 Sep 2026, UKMTO 128-26	HORIZON 1	LPG tanker	Advisory	Gulf of Oman In international Waters, 38NM NE from the coast of Dibba, UAE.	At 082005 UTC: Managers of the LPG tanker reported that it was struck by a projectile on its stern. Vessel reported a fire which spread to its accommodation block; vessel was subsequently anchored with 3,177 MT LPG on board. Crew abandoned to life raft and were recovered safely to a bunker barge. On 08 September US CENTCOM stated that this was one of several vessels subjected to disabling action by U.S. military forces. Prior to strike, managers reported that U.S. forces directed the crew to abandon ship before the vessel was struck and rendered inoperable.
08 Sep 2026, UKMTO 129-26 ALPHA	DERYA	Tanker	Advisory	Arabian Gulf IVO Kharg Island	On 08 September US CENTCOM stated that this was one of several vessels subjected to disabling action by U.S. military forces. There are no reports of casualties or environmental impact. Prior to strike, U.S. forces directed the crew to abandon ship before the vessel was struck and rendered inoperable.
08 Sep 2026, UKMTO 129-26 BRAVO	KAVIZ	Tanker	Advisory	Gulf of Oman	On 08 September US CENTCOM stated that this was one of several vessels subjected to disabling action by U.S. military forces. There are no reports of casualties or environmental impact. Prior to strike, U.S. forces directed the crew to abandon ship before the vessel was struck and rendered inoperable.
08 Sep 2026, UKMTO 129-26 CHARLIE	CHARMINAR	Tanker	Advisory	Gulf of Oman	On 08 September US CENTCOM stated that this was one of several vessels subjected to disabling action by U.S. military forces. There are no reports of casualties or environmental impact. Prior to strike, U.S. forces directed the crew



					to abandon ship before the vessel was struck and rendered inoperable.
08 Sep 2026, UKMTO 129-26 DELTA	RIESCO	Tanker	Advisory	Gulf of Oman	On 08 September US CENTCOM stated that this was one of several vessels subjected to disabling action by U.S. military forces. There are no reports of casualties or environmental impact. Prior to strike, U.S. forces directed the crew to abandon ship before the vessel was struck and rendered inoperable. The vessel subsequently sank.
09 Sep 2026, UKMTO 130-26	HERCULES STAR	Tanker	Advisory	Arabian Gulf 24NM northwest of Port Rashid, UAE	At 090248 UTC: A tanker was reported as listing while at anchor in Port Rashid Anchorage, indicating possible flooding following a suspected projectile strike. One fatality was reported among the crew, and one crew member remained missing. Several support vessels, including a tug and an unidentified Coast Guard vessel, were reported in proximity.
09 Sep 2026, UKMTO 131-26	NEW ANDROS	Tanker	Attack	Arabian Gulf 28NM south of Al-Faw, Iraq	At 090230 UTC: The master reported that the vessel was struck by an unknown projectile without prior warning via VHF Channel 16, impacting the forward ballast tank. No casualties were reported and all crew were reported as safe. The vessel subsequently anchored, with local authorities on scene.
10 Sep 2026, UKMTO 132-26	GLAMOR	Cargo	Suspicious Activity	Gulf of Aden 32NM south of Yemen	At 101000 UTC: GLAMOR, a cargo ship, was approached by an unauthorized vessel. The crew mustered in the citadel, and unauthorized personnel boarded the vessel but were unsuccessful in seizing control. The crew has now confirmed that the unauthorized personnel have disembarked, and the vessel has resumed normal transit. All crew are safe.

2. Operational Summary – Last 96 Hours

2A. Arabian Gulf

Three incidents were reported in this period (UKMTO 129-26 ALPHA, 130-26, 131-26).

Recent attacks on ships in anchorage areas pose risk for adjacent ships due to explosions and environmental damage. Mariners should monitor relevant VHF channels and coordinate all movements with the appropriate port authorities.

Traffic flows remained stable, with anchorage congestion unchanged across the region. Mariners should maintain vigilance relating to any potential escalation in the Arabian Gulf as a result of recent Iranian and U.S. strikes.

Navigational system interference and wider regional military activity continued to warrant caution, and recurring GNSS interference remained consistent with prior reporting.



2B. Strait of Hormuz

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

IRGC attacks, attempted attacks, and/or harassment activity persisted including UAV overflight, targeted surveillance of merchant shipping, and occasional VHF hailing. These actions continue to demonstrate Iran's intent to assert presence along key transit lanes and maintain pressure on transiting vessels.

Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained at reduced levels compared to the 2025 baseline. Independent tracking data indicated suppression with single-digit numbers transiting in both directions, while US NCAGS data indicated traffic flows averaging over 20 vessel transits per day for the last week.

2C. Gulf of Oman

Four incidents were reported in this period (UKMTO 128-26, 129-26 BRAVO, 129-26 CHARLIE, 129-26 DELTA).

Traffic flows in the Gulf of Oman remained stable, with vessels maintaining heightened awareness amid ongoing naval activity.

Naval presence remained elevated due to blockade enforcement activity. Latest available official CENTCOM figure (09 September), 94 commercial vessels had been redirected, three disabled, and two boarded for compliance verification.

Vessels were expected to respond promptly to military queries and maintain AIS-on unless constrained by security threats. Operators continued to exercise caution due to regional strike activity, and ongoing IRGC monitoring of shipping in adjacent waters.

2D. Arabian Sea (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. Naval forces continued routine patrols, and commercial traffic was transiting without disruption. The broader operating environment remained influenced by regional tensions.

2E. Gulf of Aden (No change)

One incident in Gulf of Aden (UKMTO 132-26)

Commercial traffic remained relatively steady in the Gulf of Aden.

2F. Southern Red Sea & Bab el Mandeb (No change)

No confirmed attack or disruption was reported in this period. Commercial traffic through the Southern Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb continues at reduced levels, consistent with the pattern established after the 20 July Houthi declaration of a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia and earlier confirmed attacks on vessels in the region.

2G. Somali Coast and Somali Basin (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruption were reported in this period.

Five merchant vessels remain held at the reporting date:

- MT HONOUR 25, Palau-flagged product tanker: Hijacked 21 April 2026 off the northern Somali coast while en route to Mogadishu with oil products.
- MV SWARD, Saint Kitts and Nevis-flagged general cargo ship: Hijacked 26 April 2026 off the northern Somali coast while bound for Mombasa with fertilizer.



- MT EUREKA, Togo-flagged product tanker: Hijacked 2 May 2026 while anchored off Qana Port, Shabwa, Yemen with oil products.
- MT ASANA, Tanzania-flagged product/chemical tanker: Hijacked 17 July 2026 approximately 65 NM southwest of Mukalla, Yemen with oil products.
- MT SEAMULL (SIBU 1), Eritrea-flagged tanker. Hijacked 20 August 2026 off the coast of Somalia in the IRTC.

2H. Northern Red Sea & Suez Canal (No change)

No confirmed attack or incident was reported in this period.

The overall pattern in the Northern Red Sea traffic remains security-sensitive and reactive to threats, producing day-to-day fluctuations, while the Suez Canal continue operations with steady tanker flows and selective container vessel returns. Northern Red Sea approaches to the canal remain functional for northbound and southbound traffic at stable levels without systemic interruption or mass diversion.

2I. Eastern Mediterranean (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period – consistent with persistent baseline.



3. Regional Threat overview

JMIC Threat Scale: ● Low | ● Moderate | ● Substantial | ● Severe | ● Critical

Region	Threat Level	Notes
Arabian Gulf	MODERATE	Navigation interference and residual kinetic risk persist; an attack is possible but not likely under current conditions.
Strait of Hormuz	SEVERE	Due to recent Iranian attacks, the threat level remains SEVERE, with deliberate hostile action considered as highly likely under current conditions. Navigation interference persists, and mariners are advised to remain vigilant for attempted mining activity within and adjacent to the TSS. IRGC attacks, hailing, and routing pressure continue, particularly for AIS-on vessels.
Gulf of Oman	MODERATE	The U.S. naval blockade remains enforced, with ongoing monitoring, hailing, and verification queries, particularly near approaches to Iranian ports. Enforcement activity poses no direct impact to neutral shipping transits in the Gulf of Oman. Electronic interference continues to present a credible concern for mariners.
Arabian Sea	MODERATE	Residual conflict-linked risk persists, but no attacks have been reported, and current indicators suggest no imminent change to the threat environment.
Gulf of Aden	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to piracy-related events and Houthi rhetoric and attacks, the threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with a strong possibility of a maritime security incident in coastal approaches, transit corridors, and established small-craft areas.
Bab el-Mandeb / Southern Red Sea	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to Houthi attacks on vessels and maritime infrastructure in the Southern Red Sea, the threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Based on the recent attacks, sustained intent, and maintained capability, additional attacks are a strong possibility
Somali Coast / Somali Basin	MODERATE	PAG activity remains possible; monsoon conditions restrict offshore skiffs, but coastal opportunism persists.
Northern Red Sea / Suez Canal	MODERATE	Suez Canal operations remain normal. Periodic EMI/GNSS interference remains possible.
Eastern Mediterranean	LOW	Due to a lack of security incidents, the threat level remains LOW. Localized EMI/GNSS disruptions persist, and regional naval presence remains consistent.

JMIC Regional Threat Levels

Threat Level	Definition
Low	An attack is highly unlikely
Moderate	An attack is possible but not likely
Substantial	An attack is a strong possibility
Severe	An attack is highly likely
Critical	An attack is almost certain



4. Maritime Incidents & Traffic Assessment

4A. Confirmed Vessel Incidents (Since 01 March)

Total of 109 incidents since 01 March; 7 incidents since the last report.

4B. Infrastructure Incidents (Last 96 Hours)

The overall risk remains MODERATE, driven by the potential for renewed kinetic activity and ongoing uncertainty along Iranian, Yemeni, and Saudi coastal areas.

Caution is due to the escalating tension between Houthi forces and Saudi Arabia that have resulted in missile exchanges with targets hit on both sides of the border. Oil infrastructure in Jazan (Saudi Arabia) has been targeted with no confirmed damage to the port or maritime facilities.

On 9 September 2026, Qatar Ministry of Interior confirmed a fire aboard a vessel at Al Wakrah Port. Civil Defense brought the fire under control, and no injuries were reported. No indication of hostile activity or damage to commercial port or energy infrastructure has been confirmed.

4C. Traffic Trends

- Strait of Hormuz:
 - Historical average: ~138 vessels/day (2025 baseline)
 - U.S. – facilitated SoH transits 06 – 09 September (past 96 hours): 95

** Metrics are drawn from two separate sources: U.S. NCAGS data reflecting U.S.-facilitated Strait of Hormuz transits only, and S&P Maritime/SeaVision data reflecting non-facilitated vessel traffic for cargo carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons, excluding vessels calling Iranian ports adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.*

- Bab el-Mandeb:
 - Historical average: ~61 vessels/day (2023 baseline)
 - Vessel transits 06 – 09 September (past 96 hours): 112

** Metrics are drawn from S&P Maritime for cargo carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons.*

4D. Port & Anchorage Congestion (no change)

High vessel density persists across Arabian Gulf and Omani anchorages, a large number of AIS-off vessels IVO Kharg Island with overall congestion remaining stable.

Periodic repositioning within anchorages remains advisable to avoid long-term predictability and to maintain safe separation in congested areas.

4E. GNSS / AIS Interference

GNSS interference remains consistent across the Strait of Hormuz approaches, the Gulf of Oman, and the Arabian Gulf. Persistent mixed jamming/spoofing remains the baseline across the northern AOO (Arabian Gulf–Gulf of Oman). Southern corridor (Aden–Northern Red Sea) remains at a residual level of lower intensity.

GNSS/EMI hazard across the Red Sea corridor continues to persist. Broad-spectrum GNSS/GPS spoofing and false AIS transponder manipulation remain saturated across the Hodeidah littoral and southern Red Sea approach lanes. Elevated electronic interference and AIS-off operations persist in the vicinity of Yanbu. Intensity in the Red Sea remains lower and more intermittent than concurrent activity in the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf. Geographic concentrations are unchanged: Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Gulf, with the highest report density in the southern and eastern Arabian Gulf. Anomalous AIS positions and speeds continue to correlate with the same areas.



No new specific UKMTO, MARAD, NAVCENT, or NAVAREA IX GNSS/EMI notices were issued. September. Baseline advisories remain in force.

5. Outlook (24–48 Hours)

5A. Arabian Gulf (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE, with continued navigational system interference and residual kinetic risk. An attack is possible but not likely under current conditions. However, escalating tension between the U.S. and Iran should be monitored closely. Rapid, short-notice actions near Iranian coastal waters and anchorages remains possible.

Vessels stationary for extended periods, or maintaining AIS-on while static, may still face elevated targeting risk.

5B. Strait of Hormuz

The threat level remains SEVERE, with deliberate hostile action considered highly likely under current conditions. Attack frequency against commercial shipping in the Strait has remained consistent over the reporting period, including unknown-projectile strikes on both inbound and outbound transiting vessels, and the environment reflects an established post-MOU status quo, notwithstanding this week's increase in tension. Vessels transiting with AIS-on can expect to be targeted and receive directed hails instructing them to divert toward the northern Iranian-controlled route.

Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is expected to remain at reduced levels, compared to the 2025 baseline, across both the northern Iranian-controlled route and the southern Omani corridor. Operator caution should continue, driven by a series of vessel attacks, ongoing U.S. blockade enforcement, and elevated regional tension.

The U.S. blockade of Iranian ports continues to be enforced. Unauthorized entry or departure may result in interception or force. Neutral transit is permitted, but vessels should expect visit-and-search checks, strong U.S. naval presence, persistent IRGC monitoring, and increased VHF hails. A 30 NM standoff from U.S. units is advised to reduce misidentification risk.

A vetted humanitarian-cargo exemption remains in place but requires submission to NAVCENT NCAGS. Approved vessels may transit to Iranian ports but remain subject to inspection and may not load cargo in Iran beyond fuel and stores.

Navigation interference persists, and mariners are encouraged to remain vigilant for mining activity in the area.

Industry Guidance for Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz:

<https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/media/vkaa3pir/2026-05-20-guidance-strait-of-hormuz.pdf>

5C. Gulf of Oman (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE. Vessels can expect persistent IRGC monitoring and routing pressure in that sector; however, further east/south within Gulf of Oman, deliberate hostile action is considered possible but not likely. Open-source reporting shows no confirmed kinetic incidents in this sector for several months; residual risk diminishes with distance from the primary concentration of IRGC activity and recent strike locations IVO the Strait of Hormuz.

A U.S. naval blockade remains enforced, with ongoing monitoring, hailing, and verification queries, particularly near approaches to Iranian ports. Unauthorized entry or departure may result in interception or force. Neutral transit is permitted, but vessels should expect visit-and-search checks, strong U.S. naval presence, persistent IRGC monitoring, and occasional hails. A 30 NM standoff



from U.S. units is advised, as well as ensuring continuous monitoring of VHF Channel 16, to reduce misidentification risk.

Electronic interference continues to present a credible concern. The operating environment requires heightened situational awareness throughout all approaches.

5D. Arabian Sea (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE. The regional posture remains stable, with no confirmed maritime attacks reported. Residual risk persists due to broader regional tensions; an attack is possible but not likely, and current indicators do not suggest any shift toward increased threat levels in the near term.

5E. Gulf of Aden (No change)

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with intermittent skiff presence still considered a strong possibility in the wider area despite the monsoon and recent Houthi rhetoric and attacks. Small-craft groups retain the capability to conduct aggressive close-approach behavior, underscoring the need for sustained vigilance throughout the IRTC and adjacent coastal zones. Pirate Action Groups continue to demonstrate the ability to board and divert merchant vessels in both coastal Somali waters and the Gulf of Aden under current monsoon conditions. Further opportunistic seizures remain a credible near-term risk across the IRTC approaches and adjacent coastal zones.

The operating environment continues to support opportunistic movement in coastal and sheltered areas, particularly within established small-craft operating zones. Southwest monsoon conditions remain firmly established, with coastal waters offering favorable conditions for small-boat activity but restrict offshore skiff activity.

5F. Southern Red Sea / Bab el Mandeb

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Houthi messaging and operational tempo remain elevated following the 20 July maritime blockade declaration against Saudi-associated interests. Enforcement remains selective, primarily targeting assets considered as Israeli, Saudi or Yemeni internationally recognized government linked, though within the broader region additional attacks are considered a strong possibility. Expansion beyond current selective Israeli, Saudi and Yemeni internationally recognized government targets into broader indiscriminate shipping attacks is possible but not probable in the near-term.

The Saudi-led Multinational Maritime Defence Coalition remains at Initial Operational Capability, not Full Operational Capability. On 02 September, Saudi MoD stated the coalition had entered its operational phase from command headquarters. Surface tasking remains sovereign opt-in. Combined battle group, common ROE, automated COP, standing escorts and basing outside Saudi facilities are not confirmed.

Collateral risk remains elevated. Bab el-Mandeb traffic has stabilized below pre-20 July blockade averages, driven mainly by tanker-sector rerouting. Non-targeted commercial traffic continues through established corridors. Small regional craft in the southern Red Sea and Yemeni coastal waters face heightened misidentification and kinetic risk.

Mariners transiting the area should maintain heightened security postures, implement speed and timing mitigation measures, and prepare for short-notice navigational directives. Residual hazards, including persistent GNSS interference and electromagnetic degradation, remain active from the central Red Sea through the southern approaches to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.



5G. Somali Coast and Somali Basin (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE as PAG activity persists across the Somali Coast and Somali Basin. Southwest monsoon conditions continue to degrade offshore environments restricting extended-range skiff operations.

Despite monsoon onset, coastal waters remain comparatively sheltered, sustaining residual opportunistic piracy risk in nearshore areas where small-boat activity remains feasible.

5H. Northern Red Sea / Suez (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE. The Houthi statement on 05 August indicated an expanded risk area in the northern Red Sea. The messaging framed the escalation as a response to alleged Saudi northward rerouting and suggested an intent to close or contest additional access points. The stated emphasis extends beyond the southern approaches and Bab el-Mandeb, broadening the area of concern into the northern Red Sea.

Periodic EMI and GNSS disruptions are likely to continue in the area. AIS-off operations at Yanbu berths, waiting areas and approaches are highly likely to remain elevated. The pattern since late July shows no open-source indication of reversal.

5I. Eastern Mediterranean (No change)

The threat level remains LOW for security risks to merchant shipping, with localized EMI/GNSS as the principal published hazard. The Suez approaches to the northern Red Sea are operating normally.

Periodic electronic and navigational interference may still be encountered near Cyprus and the Levant. Naval presence remains, and vessels should maintain prudent separation from military units. No Change – consistent with persistent baseline.



ANNEXES

Transit comparisons

CARGO VESSELS TRANSITS COMPARISON


Date	02-Sept	03-Sept	04-Sept	05-Sept	06-Sept	07-Sept	08-Sept	09-Sept
SoH E	0	0	2	1	0	1	1	1
SoH W	1	0	3	0	1	1	1	1
SoH Total	1	0	5	1	1	2	2	2
BAM NW	11	10	12	13	8	10	8	9
BAM SE	12	13	11	15	6	12	10	6
BAM Total	23	23	23	28	14	22	18	15


TANKERS (ALL TYPES) TRANSITS COMPARISON

Date	02-Sept	03-Sept	04-Sept	05-Sept	06-Sept	07-Sept	08-Sept	09-Sept
SoH E	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	1
SoH W	0	0	0	0	4	0	2	1
SoH Total	1	0	0	0	4	3	2	2
BAM NW	7	6	8	9	3	10	9	4
BAM SE	11	6	9	5	1	6	4	6
BAM Total	18	12	17	14	4	16	13	10


* Metrics are drawn from two separate sources: U.S. NCAGS data reflecting U.S.-facilitated Strait of Hormuz transits only, and S&P Maritime / SeaVision data reflecting non-facilitated vessel traffic above 1,000 deadweight tons, excluding vessels calling Iranian ports adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.

UKMTO transits





UKMTO Strait of Hormuz – Latest incidents



UKMTO VRA AIS Anomalies



Non-Geofeasible AIS Positions 30-Day Hexbin Aggregation ICOD: 10/09/26 00:01UTC



Non-Geofeasible AIS Positions 7-Day Hexbin Aggregation ICOD: 10/09/26 00:01UTC

