

Joint Maritime Information Center

Update 099 to JMIC Advisory Note:

01 March – 24 September 2026

Regional Tension - Impact on Maritime Security

Area of Concern:

Middle East Maritime Region

JMIC# 001-26

ICOD: 241500 UTC

Regional Threat Level: SEVERE

1. Confirmed Maritime Security Incidents List since last report

Date	Vessel	Vessel Type	Event Type	Location	Narrative
21 Sep 2026, UKMTO 140-26	Name withheld UFN	Tanker	Attack	Transiting inbound through the Strait of Hormuz.	The US Navy reports a tanker was struck by a UAV while transiting inbound through the Strait of Hormuz. The Master confirmed no damage and no crew injuries. The vessel continued to its next port of call.
21 Sep 2026, UKMTO 141-26	Name withheld UFN	LPG tanker	Attack	Transiting outbound through the Strait of Hormuz in TTW, off the coast of the Musandam Peninsula, Oman.	At 202114 UTC in approx. pos 262400N 0563000E two unknown projectiles exploded in the air, the debris from the explosion landed on the vessel. No crew injuries reported and vessel continued to its next port of call.
23 Sep 2026, UKMTO 142-26	CAPE DAO	Bulk carrier	Attack	Transiting outbound through the Strait of Hormuz in TTW, approximately 15NM northeast of Khasab, Oman.	At 230630 UTC in position 2624600N 0562510E a vessel, reported by NAVAREA IX as the bulk carrier CAPE DAO, was struck by an unknown projectile. The vessel was struck in the bridge and accommodation area. All crew members have been evacuated by the Royal Navy of Oman, one fatality confirmed; one additional injury reported. The fire onboard was extinguished.

2. Operational Summary – Last 96 Hours

2A. Arabian Gulf (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. Recent attacks on ships in anchorage areas pose risk for adjacent ships due to explosions and environmental damage. Mariners should monitor relevant VHF channels and coordinate all movements with the appropriate port authorities.

Traffic flows remained stable, with anchorage congestion unchanged across the region.



Navigational system interference and wider regional military activity continued to warrant caution, and recurring GNSS interference remained consistent with prior reporting.

2B. Strait of Hormuz

Three attacks were reported in this period (UKMTO 140-26, 141-26, 142-26). One fatality was confirmed; remaining crews are reported safe.

IRGC attacks, attempted attacks, and/or harassment activity persisted including UAV overflight, targeted surveillance of merchant shipping, and occasional VHF hailing. These actions continue to demonstrate Iran's intent to assert presence along key transit lanes and maintain pressure on transiting vessels.

Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained at reduced levels compared to the 2025 baseline. Independent tracking data indicated suppression with single-digit numbers transiting in both directions, while US NCAGS data indicated traffic flows averaging approximately 30 vessel transits per day for the last 96 hours.

2C. Gulf of Oman

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. Traffic flows in the Gulf of Oman remained stable, with vessels maintaining heightened awareness amid ongoing naval activity.

Naval presence remained elevated due to blockade enforcement activity. Latest available official CENTCOM figure (23 September), 115 commercial vessels had been redirected, three disabled because of blockade enforcement, and two boarded for compliance verification.

Vessels were expected to respond promptly to military queries and maintain AIS-on unless constrained by security threats. Operators continued to exercise caution due to regional strike activity, and ongoing IRGC monitoring of shipping in adjacent waters.

2D. Arabian Sea (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. Naval forces continued routine patrols, and commercial traffic was transiting without disruption. The broader operating environment remained influenced by regional tensions.

2E. Gulf of Aden (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

Commercial traffic remained relatively steady in the Gulf of Aden.

2F. Southern Red Sea & Bab el Mandeb (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

Houthi forces remain in control of the Yemeni coast and islands commanding the eastern approaches and both Bab el-Mandeb channels. Commercial traffic continues at reduced levels after the 20 July embargo declaration and the territorial gains.

2G. Somali Coast and Somali Basin (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruption were reported in this period.

Four merchant vessels remain hijacked at the reporting date:

- MT HONOUR 25, Palau-flagged product tanker: Hijacked 21 April 2026 off the northern Somali coast while en route to Mogadishu with oil products.
- MT EUREKA, Togo-flagged product tanker: Hijacked 2 May 2026 while anchored off Qana Port, Shabwa, Yemen with oil products.



- MT ASANA, Tanzania-flagged product/chemical tanker: Hijacked 17 July 2026 approximately 65 NM southwest of Mukalla, Yemen with oil products.
- MT SEAMULL (SIBU 1), Eritrea-flagged tanker. Hijacked 20 August 2026 off the coast of Somalia in the IRTC.

2H. Northern Red Sea & Suez Canal (No change)

No confirmed attack or incident was reported in this period.

The overall pattern in the Northern Red Sea traffic remains security-sensitive and reactive to threats, producing day-to-day fluctuations, while the Suez Canal continue operations with steady tanker flows and selective container vessel returns. Northern Red Sea approaches to the canal remain functional for northbound and southbound traffic at stable levels without systemic interruption or mass diversion.

2I. Eastern Mediterranean (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period – consistent with persistent baseline.



3. Regional Threat overview

JMIC Threat Scale: ● Low | ● Moderate | ● Substantial | ● Severe | ● Critical

Region	Threat Level	Notes
Arabian Gulf	MODERATE	Navigation interference and residual kinetic risk persist; an attack is possible but not likely under current conditions.
Strait of Hormuz	SEVERE	Due to recent Iranian attacks, the threat level remains SEVERE, with deliberate hostile action considered as highly likely under current conditions. Navigation interference persists, and mariners are advised to remain vigilant for attempted mining activity within and adjacent to the TSS. IRGC attacks, hailing, and routing pressure continue, particularly for AIS-on vessels.
Gulf of Oman	MODERATE	The U.S. naval blockade remains enforced, with ongoing monitoring, hailing, and verification queries, particularly near approaches to Iranian ports. Enforcement activity poses no direct impact to neutral shipping transits in the Gulf of Oman. Electronic interference continues to present a credible concern for mariners.
Arabian Sea	MODERATE	Residual conflict-linked risk persists, but no attacks have been reported, and current indicators suggest no imminent change to the threat environment.
Gulf of Aden	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to piracy-related events and Houthi rhetoric and attacks, the threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with a strong possibility of a maritime security incident in coastal approaches, transit corridors, and established small-craft areas.
Bab el-Mandeb / Southern Red Sea	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to Houthi attacks on vessels and maritime infrastructure in the Southern Red Sea and territorial gains in Yemen along the Red Sea, the threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Based on the recent attacks, sustained intent against Saudi-affiliated interests, and maintained capability, additional attacks are a strong possibility
Somali Coast / Somali Basin	MODERATE	PAG activity remains possible; monsoon conditions restrict offshore skiffs, but coastal opportunism persists.
Northern Red Sea / Suez Canal	MODERATE	Suez Canal operations remain normal. Periodic Electro-magnetic Interference (EMI) remains possible.
Eastern Mediterranean	LOW	Due to a lack of security incidents, the threat level remains LOW. Localized EMI disruptions persist, and regional naval presence remains consistent.

JMIC Regional Threat Levels

Threat Level	Definition
Low	An attack is highly unlikely
Moderate	An attack is possible but not likely
Substantial	An attack is a strong possibility
Severe	An attack is highly likely
Critical	An attack is almost certain



4. Maritime Incidents & Traffic Assessment

4A. Confirmed Vessel Incidents (Since 01 March)

Total of 119 incidents since 01 March.

4B. Infrastructure Incidents (Last 96 Hours)

The overall risk remains MODERATE driven by the potential for an increase in kinetic activity and ongoing uncertainty along Iranian, Yemeni, and Saudi coastal areas. Caution is warranted due to the conflict between Houthi forces and Saudi Arabia that have resulted in missile exchanges with targets hit on both sides of the border.

Oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, including East–West pipeline pumping stations, was struck by drones on 10 Sep, causing injuries and damage. Three pumping stations were reported damaged. The pipeline restarted at a reduced rate on 22 Sep and is building up volumes to Red Sea coast refineries; industry sources estimate a return to full capacity in six to eight weeks. This is not a Saudi official timeline. Yanbu crude loadings have not resumed as of ICOD.

4C. Traffic Trends

- Strait of Hormuz:
 - Historical average: ~138 vessels/day (2025 baseline)
 - U.S. – facilitated SoH transits 20 – 23 September (past 96 hours): 117

** Metrics are drawn from two separate sources: U.S. NCAGS data reflecting U.S.-facilitated Strait of Hormuz transits only, and S&P Maritime/SeaVision data reflecting non-facilitated vessel traffic for cargo carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons, excluding vessels calling Iranian ports adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.*

- Bab el-Mandeb:
 - Historical average: ~61 vessels/day (2023 baseline)
 - Vessel transits 20 – 23 September (past 96 hours): 95

** Metrics are drawn from S&P Maritime for cargo carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons.*

4D. Port & Anchorage Congestion (no change)

High vessel density persists across Arabian Gulf and Omani anchorages, still reports of a large number of AIS-off vessels IVO Kharg Island with overall congestion remaining stable.

Periodic repositioning within anchorages remains advisable to avoid long-term predictability and to maintain safe separation in congested areas.

4E. GNSS / AIS Interference

GNSS interference remains consistent across the Strait of Hormuz approaches, the Gulf of Oman, and the Arabian Gulf. Persistent mixed jamming/spoofing remains the baseline across the northern AOO (Arabian Gulf–Gulf of Oman). Southern corridor (Aden–Northern Red Sea) remains at a residual level of lower intensity.

GNSS/EMI hazard across the Red Sea corridor continues to persist. Broad-spectrum GNSS spoofing and false AIS transponder manipulation remain saturated across the Hodeidah littoral and southern Red Sea approach lanes. Elevated electronic interference and AIS-off operations persist in the vicinity of Yanbu. Intensity in the Red Sea remains lower and more intermittent than concurrent activity in the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf. Geographic concentrations are unchanged: Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Gulf, with the highest reported density in the southern and



eastern Arabian Gulf. Anomalous AIS positions and speeds continue to correlate with the same areas.

No new specific UKMTO, MARAD, NAVCENT, or NAVAREA IX GNSS/EMI notices were issued 20 – 23 September. Baseline advisories remain in force.

5. Outlook (24–48 Hours)

5A. Arabian Gulf (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE, with continued navigational system interference and residual kinetic risk. An attack is possible but not likely under current conditions. However, tension between the U.S. and Iran should be monitored closely. Rapid, short-notice actions near Iranian coastal waters and anchorages remains possible.

Vessels stationary for extended periods, or maintaining AIS-on while static, may still face elevated targeting risk.

5B. Strait of Hormuz (No change)

The threat level remains SEVERE, with deliberate attacks considered highly likely under current conditions. Attack frequency against commercial shipping in the Strait has remained consistent over the reporting period, including unknown-projectile strikes on both inbound and outbound transiting vessels, and the environment reflects an established post-MOU status quo. Vessels transiting with AIS-on can expect elevated projectile risk and receive directed hails instructing them to divert toward the northern Iranian-controlled route.

Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is expected to remain at reduced levels, compared to the 2025 baseline, across both the northern Iranian-controlled route and the southern Omani corridor. Operator caution should continue, driven by a series of vessel attacks, ongoing U.S. blockade enforcement, and elevated regional tension.

The U.S. blockade of Iranian ports continues to be enforced. Unauthorized entry or departure may result in interception or force. Neutral transit is permitted, but vessels should expect visit-and-search checks, strong U.S. naval presence, persistent IRGC monitoring, and increased VHF hails. A 30 NM standoff from U.S. units is advised to reduce misidentification risk.

A vetted humanitarian-cargo exemption remains in place but requires submission to NAVCENT NCAGS. Approved vessels may transit to Iranian ports but remain subject to inspection and may not load cargo in Iran beyond fuel and stores.

Navigation interference persists, and mariners are encouraged to remain vigilant for mining activity in the area.

Industry Guidance for Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz:

<https://www.maritimelobalsecurity.org/media/vkaa3pjr/2026-05-20-guidance-strait-of-hormuz.pdf>

5C. Gulf of Oman (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE. Vessels can expect persistent IRGC monitoring and routing pressure in that sector; however, further east/south within Gulf of Oman, attacks are considered possible but not likely. Residual risk diminishes with distance from the primary concentration of IRGC activity and with distance from Musandam / Jask.

A U.S. naval blockade remains enforced, with ongoing monitoring, hailing, and verification queries, particularly near approaches to Iranian ports. Unauthorized entry or departure may result in



interception or force. Neutral transit is permitted, but vessels should expect visit-and-search checks, strong U.S. naval presence, persistent IRGC monitoring, and occasional hails. A 30 NM standoff from U.S. units is advised, as well as ensuring continuous monitoring of VHF Channel 16, to reduce misidentification risk.

Electronic interference continues to present a credible concern. The operating environment requires heightened situational awareness throughout all approaches.

5D. Arabian Sea (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE. The regional posture remains stable, with no confirmed maritime attacks reported. Residual risk persists due to broader regional tensions; an attack is possible but not likely, and current indicators do not suggest any shift toward increased threat levels in the near term.

5E. Gulf of Aden (No change)

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Attacks and piracy-related activity remain a strong possibility in the Gulf of Aden and IRTC. Small-craft groups retain close-approach capability, and Pirate Action Groups can still board and divert merchant vessels as monsoon restrictions ease.

5F. Southern Red Sea / Bab el Mandeb

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Houthi messaging consistently frames the 20 July maritime blockade as selective against assets considered as Israeli-, Saudi-, or Yemeni internationally recognized government-linked. Over the last 96 hours, Houthi activity around Bab el-Mandeb, the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden has been dominated by political-military messaging, consolidation of recently seized coastal and island positions, and air/land exchanges with Saudi Arabia and Yemeni government-aligned forces.

The physical risk to shipping in Bab el-Mandeb and the southern Red Sea is geographically tighter than before 10 September because Houthis now hold the Yemeni mainland opposite the strait, Perim Island in the channel, and nearby islands. That shortens engagement ranges for missiles, drones, USVs and potentially even artillery or fast boats. Intent, as currently stated and as practised since late July, is selective, not a general blockade. Additional attacks in the wider area remain a strong possibility but expansion into indiscriminate targeting of all commercial shipping is possible but not the declared policy.

The conflict-driven flow of refugees from Yemen to northern Djibouti continues with small boats and fishing vessels, often without AIS or radar reflectors. The pace of crossings has slowed since 16 September, but further refugees remain possible. Mariners are advised to keep a sharp lookout.

Saudi-led MMDC remains at Initial Operational Capability (IOC), not Full operational Capability (FOC), as of 24 September.

Mariners should maintain heightened security postures, implement speed and timing mitigation, minimize predictable AIS behavior in the narrows, and prepare for short-notice navigational directives. GNSS interference and electromagnetic degradation remain active from the central Red Sea through the southern approaches.

5G. Somali Coast and Somali Basin (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE as PAG activity persists across the Somali Coast and Somali Basin. Southwest monsoon conditions are approaching a seasonal end. Offshore sea state remains elevated and continues to restrict extended-range skiff operations, while coastal waters stay comparatively sheltered. Residual opportunistic piracy risk persists in nearshore Somali waters and the Gulf of Aden, where small-boat activity remains feasible. Pirate Action Groups retain the



capability to board and divert merchant vessels along the Somali coast, IRTC approaches, and adjacent Gulf of Aden lanes as monsoon restrictions begin to lift.

5H. Northern Red Sea / Suez (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE. The Houthi statement on 05 August indicated an expanded risk area in the northern Red Sea. The messaging framed the escalation as a response to alleged Saudi northward rerouting and suggested an intent to close or contest additional access points. The stated emphasis extends beyond the southern approaches and Bab el-Mandeb, broadening the area of concern into the northern Red Sea. Periodic EMI and GNSS disruptions are likely to continue in the area. AIS-off at Yanbu berths and approaches are expected to persist. Suez Canal will remain functional in both directions with no interruption.

5I. Eastern Mediterranean (No change)

The threat level remains LOW for security risks to merchant shipping, with localized EMI/GNSS as the principal published hazard.

Periodic electronic and navigational interference may still be encountered near Cyprus and the Levant. Naval presence remains, and vessels should maintain prudent separation from military units. No Change – consistent with persistent baseline.



ANNEXES

Transit comparisons

CARGO VESSELS TRANSITS COMPARISON


Date	17-Sept	18-Sept	19-Sept	20-Sept	21-Sept	22-Sept	23-Sept
SoH E	2	2	4	2	1	1	0
SoH W	1	2	2	0	0	0	3
SoH Total	3	4	6	2	1	1	3
BAM NW	14	8	12	8	8	2	8
BAM SE	13	15	11	13	9	8	7
BAM Total	27	23	23	21	17	10	15


TANKERS (ALL TYPES) TRANSITS COMPARISON

Date	17-Sept	18-Sept	19-Sept	20-Sept	21-Sept	22-Sept	23-Sept
SoH E	0	0	2	2	0	2	0
SoH W	0	1	0	0	0	0	4
SoH Total	0	1	2	2	0	2	4
BAM NW	4	4	1	1	1	3	6
BAM SE	6	5	9	6	6	2	7
BAM Total	10	9	10	7	7	5	13


* Metrics are drawn from two separate sources: S&P Maritime / SeaVision data reflecting non-facilitated vessel traffic above 1,000 deadweight tons, excluding vessels calling Iranian ports adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.

UKMTO transits





UKMTO Strait of Hormuz – Latest incidents



UKMTO VRA AIS Anomalies



Non-Geofeasible AIS Positions 30-Day Hexbin Aggregation ICOD: 24/09/26 00:01UTC



Non-Geofeasible AIS Positions 7-Day Hexbin Aggregation ICOD: 24/09/26 00:01UTC