Joint Maritime Information Center

Update 114 to JMIC Advisory Note:
01 March – 15 November 2026

Regional Tension - Impact on Maritime Security

Area of Concern:

Middle East Maritime Region

JMIC# 001-26 ICOD: 151300 UTC Regional Threat Level: SEVERE

1. Confirmed Maritime Security Incidents List since last report

Date	Vessel	Vessel Type	Event Type	Location	Narrative
13 Nov 2026 MSCIO 179/26	Unidentified	Fishing vessel	Armed Robbery	Somali Coast	MSCIO received information on 13 Nov concerning the hijacking of a fishing vessel, which EUNAVFOR ATALANTA is investigating as an armed robbery. The latest information located the fishing vessel within Somali territorial waters in position 06°19'N 049°13'E, approx. 67 NM northeast of Hobyo, Somalia.
15 Nov 2026 UKMTO 205-26	Name withheld UFN	Tanker	Attack	Arabian Gulf, eastbound prior to entering the Strait of Hormuz	UKMTO received a report that on 15 Nov a tanker was attacked while transiting the Arabian Gulf eastbound prior to entering the Strait of Hormuz, as reported by Indian Shipping Authorities. The crew were accounted for and safe. Damage assessment and environmental impact were unknown at the time of the report.

2. Operational Summary – Last 72 Hours

2A. Arabian Gulf

One attack was reported in this period (UKMTO 205-26), against two incidents in the previous period (UKMTO 203-26 and 204-26). UKMTO 203-26 is a time-late report of a tanker struck in the Arabian Gulf around 10 November.

Traffic flows continued, with anchorage congestion high across the region.

2B. Strait of Hormuz

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period, against two attacks in the previous period (UKMTO 201-26 and 202-26).

IRGC attacks, attempted attacks, and/or harassment activity persisted including UAV overflight, targeted surveillance of merchant shipping, and occasional VHF hailing. These actions continue to

demonstrate Iran's intent to assert presence along key transit lanes and maintain pressure on transiting vessels.

Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained at reduced levels compared to the 2025 baseline. Independent tracking data indicated single to low double digit transits per day, while US NCAGS data indicated approx. an average of approx. 28 U.S. assisted transits per day over the last 72 hours.

2C. Gulf of Oman (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

Naval presence remained elevated due to blockade enforcement activity. According to official CENTCOM figures issued on 11 Nov, nearly 150 commercial vessels have been redirected and five merchant ships have been disabled as a result of blockade enforcement. Two vessels had previously been reported boarded for blockade compliance. No further blockade-enforcement disablement was announced in this period.

Vessels were expected to respond promptly to military queries and maintain AIS-on unless constrained by security threats. Operators continued to exercise caution due to regional strike activity and ongoing IRGC monitoring of shipping in adjacent waters.

2D. Arabian Sea (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. Naval forces continued routine patrols, and commercial traffic was transiting without significant disruption.

2E. Gulf of Aden (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

Commercial traffic remained relatively steady in the Gulf of Aden.

2F. Southern Red Sea & Bab el Mandeb

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period.

In the last 72 hours, Houthi forces claimed missile strikes on Yemeni government staging areas in Lahij and on depots in Aden, and the Saudi-led coalition reported destroying two drones; no Houthi claim against shipping was reported.

Traffic remains below the 20 Jul Houthi selective embargo. Commercial traffic in the Bab el Mandeb recorded approx. 22 transits per day on S&P tracking on 12-14 Nov, against approx. 25 per day on 05–11 Nov.

Bab el-Mandeb remains open to commercial traffic but is considered volatile. Houthi statements continue to assert that non-Saudi commercial shipping may transit safely. The Houthi-run Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) advertises a voluntary, free 'safe transit' request service for vessels outside its declared ban. Recent reporting that merchant vessels have used this service remains independently unconfirmed.

2G. Somali Coast and Somali Basin

On 13 Nov MSCIO reported the hijacking of a fishing vessel within Somali territorial waters, approx. 67 NM northeast of Hobyo, Somalia; EUNAVFOR ATALANTA is investigating the event as an armed robbery (MSCIO 179/26). One merchant vessel remains hijacked since the date of initial incident reporting:

- MT ASANA, a Tanzanian-flagged product/chemical tanker, was hijacked on 17 July 2026 approx. 65 NM southwest of Mukalla, Yemen, while carrying oil products.

2H. Northern Red Sea & Suez Canal (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. Maritime traffic in the Northern Red Sea and Suez Canal held steady over the last 72 hours.

2I. Eastern Mediterranean (No change)

No confirmed attacks or disruptions were reported in this period. This is consistent with the persistent baseline.

3. Regional Threat Overview (No change)

JMIC Threat Scale: Low | Moderate | Substantial | Severe | Critical

Region	Threat Level	Notes
Arabian Gulf	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to Iranian attacks, the threat level in the Arabian Gulf remains SUBSTANTIAL. Navigation interference has also increased. An attack is a strong possibility.
Strait of Hormuz	SEVERE	Due to continued Iranian attacks, the threat level remains SEVERE, with deliberate hostile action considered as highly likely under current conditions. Navigation interference persists, and mariners are advised to remain vigilant for attempted mining within and adjacent to the TSS. IRGC attacks, hailing, and routing pressure continue, particularly for AIS-on vessels.
Gulf of Oman	MODERATE	The U.S. naval blockade remains enforced, with ongoing monitoring, hailing, and verification queries, particularly near approaches to Iranian ports. Enforcement activity poses no direct impact to neutral shipping transits in the Gulf of Oman. Electronic interference continues to present a credible concern for mariners.
Arabian Sea	MODERATE	Residual conflict-linked risk persists, but no attacks have been reported, and current indicators suggest no imminent change to the threat environment.
Gulf of Aden	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to piracy-related events and Houthi rhetoric and attacks, the threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with a strong possibility of a maritime security incident in coastal approaches, transit corridors, and established small-craft areas.
Bab el-Mandeb / Southern Red Sea	SUBSTANTIAL	Due to Houthi attacks on infrastructure adjacent to maritime interests in the Southern Red Sea and territorial gains in Yemen along the Red Sea, the threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL. Based on sustained intent against Saudi-affiliated interests, and maintained capability, additional attacks are a strong possibility
Somali Coast / Somali Basin	MODERATE	PAG activity remains possible; the southwest monsoon subsided on 15 October, and skiff operations further offshore are more feasible.
Northern Red Sea / Suez Canal	MODERATE	Suez Canal operations remain normal. Periodic Electro-magnetic Interference (EMI) remains possible.
Eastern Mediterranean	LOW	Due to a lack of security incidents, the threat level remains LOW. Localized EMI disruptions persist, and regional naval presence remains consistent.

JMIC Regional Threat Levels

Threat Level	Definition
Low	An attack is highly unlikely
Moderate	An attack is possible but not likely
Substantial	An attack is a strong possibility
Severe	An attack is highly likely
Critical	An attack is almost certain

4. Maritime Incidents & Traffic Assessment

4A. Confirmed Vessel Incidents since 01 March

Total of 183 incidents since 01 March; two incidents since the last report (MSCIO 179/26 and UKMTO 205-26).

4B. Infrastructure Incidents (Last 72 Hours)

The overall risk remains MODERATE, driven by the potential for an increase in kinetic activity against ports, terminals and offshore installations along the Iranian, Yemeni and Saudi coasts. Ongoing land exchanges between Houthi forces and Saudi-led coalition forces continued; specific claims of strikes on Lahij staging areas or Aden depots remain unconfirmed in open sources for this reporting window.

No attack on ports, terminals, offshore platforms or subsea infrastructure was reported in this period.

4C. Traffic Trends

- Strait of Hormuz:
    - Historical average: ~138 vessels/day (2025 baseline)
    - U.S. – facilitated SoH transits 12-14 Nov (past 72 hours): 83

** Metrics are drawn from two separate sources: U.S. NCAGS data reflecting U.S.-facilitated Strait of Hormuz transits only, and S&P Maritime/SeaVision data reflecting non-facilitated vessel traffic for cargo-carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons, excluding vessels calling Iranian ports adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.*


- Bab el-Mandeb:
    - Historical average: ~61 vessels/day (2023 baseline)
    - Vessel transits 12-14 Nov (past 72 hours): 67

** Metrics are drawn from S&P Maritime for cargo-carrying vessels above 1,000 deadweight tons.*

4D. Port & Anchorage Congestion

Congestion remains high and is driven primarily by restricted transit, and to a lesser degree by port capacity.

There was no mass departure or new cluster of vessels in an anchorage area; Fujairah/Khor Fakkan rose slightly (from about 165 vessels on 12 Nov to about 181 on 15 Nov), Dubai/Jebel Ali to Ras Al Khaimah rose (from about 112 to about 128), mainly off Sharjah, Musandam/Sohar was unchanged on a small base (about 46), and Bandar Abbas/Qeshm rose on a small, low-confidence base (from about 14 to about 18). JMIC internal tracking counted approx. 227 commercial vessels stationary at the main anchorages east of the Strait of Hormuz (Fujairah, Khor Fakkan, Sohar and Musandam), against single-digit to low double-digit AIS-visible transits per day; thus, the backlog is expected to persist.



Source: MarineTraffic, visual estimate; stationary commercial vessels (tanker, cargo, tug/special, high-speed, unspecified). Data cut-off 15 Nov 2026 1424 Bahrain (1124Z). *Low confidence. Change compares snapshots 12 Nov 1418 and 15 Nov 1424 Bahrain (nearest available to the previous and present Advisory ICOD, 1300Z = 1600 Bahrain). Actual interval 72 h 06 min (nominal 72 h).

4E. GNSS / AIS Interference

GNSS interference in the Arabian Gulf rose on 12 Nov and stayed elevated on 13 and 14 Nov, easing slightly on 14 Nov, with the strongest indications shifting west from the Dubai coast toward Qatar, the waters between Qatar and the western UAE, and Abu Dhabi; indications off the Saudi east coast and the Bahrain approaches stayed low.

Windward recorded 261 jammed vessels of 4,394 transmitting in the Gulf and Gulf of Oman on 12 Nov, about 7% below its 7-day average. UKMTO's weekly VRA report (No. 15, week ending 13 Nov) recorded six vessel GNSS reports in seven days and 15,374 anomalous AIS positions, against 17,976 the week before, and listed the Red Sea, Gulf of Oman and Arabian Gulf as hotspots.

In the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, no significant GNSS interference was observed at sea; Windward recorded 13 jammed vessels of 865 transmitting in the Red Sea on 12 Nov.

No new specific UKMTO, MARAD, NAVCENT, or NAVAREA IX GNSS/EMI notices were issued 12 – 14 November. Baseline advisories remain in force.

5. Outlook (24–48 Hours)

5A. Arabian Gulf

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with continued navigational system interference and demonstrated kinetic threat and wider regional military activity continuing to warrant caution.

Outlook: Eleven attacks inside the Gulf since 07 Oct demonstrate that attacks remain a strong possibility throughout the Arabian Gulf, including the northern and central Gulf, anchorages and STS areas. Electronic interference remains a credible concern in the central and southern Arabian Gulf. The operating environment requires heightened situational awareness throughout all approaches.

Vessels stationary for extended periods, or maintaining AIS-on while static, may face elevated targeting risk.

5B. Strait of Hormuz

The threat level remains SEVERE, with deliberate attacks considered highly likely under current conditions.

Outlook: no new attack was reported in this period; the 10 and 11 Nov attacks on tankers (UKMTO 201-26, UKMTO 202-26) followed five attacks off the Musandam coast of Oman since 01 Nov and demonstrate that further attacks on transiting vessels, including tankers, tugs and dhows, remain highly likely, particularly off Musandam.

Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is expected to remain at reduced levels, compared to the 2025 baseline, across both the northern Iranian-controlled route and the southern Omani corridor. Operator caution should continue, driven by a series of vessel attacks, ongoing U.S. blockade enforcement, and elevated regional tension. Vessels transiting with AIS-on can expect elevated targeting risk and receive directed hails instructing them to divert toward the northern Iranian-controlled route.

The U.S. blockade of Iranian ports continues to be enforced. Unauthorized entry or departure may result in interception or force. Neutral transit is permitted, but vessels should expect visit-and-search checks, strong U.S. naval presence, persistent IRGC monitoring, and increased VHF hails. A 30 NM standoff from U.S. units is advised to reduce misidentification risk.

A vetted humanitarian-cargo exemption remains in place but requires submission to NAVCENT NCAGS. Approved vessels may transit to Iranian ports but remain subject to inspection and may not load cargo in Iran beyond fuel and stores.

Industry Guidance for Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz:

https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/media/vkaa3pjr/2026-05-20-guidance-strait-of-hormuz.pdf

5C. Gulf of Oman (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE, with deliberate attacks considered possible but not likely under current conditions.

Outlook: Vessels can expect persistent IRGC monitoring and routing pressure in western portion of the Gulf of Oman; however, further east/south, attacks are considered possible but not likely. Residual risk diminishes with distance from the primary concentration of IRGC activity and with distance from Musandam / Jask. Approx. 181 vessels are at anchor in the vicinity of Fujairah/Khor Fakkan and congestion is expected to persist. Neutral vessels between non-Iranian ports may be questioned, visited and searched under the blockade and should be prepared to provide the documentation noted in JMIC Advisory Note 016-26 to expedite clearance.

A U.S. naval blockade remains enforced, with ongoing monitoring, hailing, and verification queries, particularly near approaches to Iranian ports. Unauthorized entry or departure may result in interception or force. Neutral transit is permitted, but vessels should expect visit-and-search checks, strong U.S. naval presence, persistent IRGC monitoring, and occasional hails. A 30 NM standoff from U.S. units is advised, as well as ensuring continuous monitoring of VHF Channel 16, to reduce misidentification risk.

Electronic interference continues to present a credible concern. The operating environment requires heightened situational awareness throughout all approaches.

5D. Arabian Sea (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE, with deliberate attacks considered possible but not likely.

Outlook: The regional posture remains stable, with no confirmed maritime attacks reported. Residual risk persists due to broader regional tensions and current indicators do not suggest any shift toward increased threat levels in the near term.

5E. Gulf of Aden

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with deliberate attacks considered a strong possibility.

Outlook: Attacks and piracy-related activity remain a strong possibility in the Gulf of Aden and IRTC. Small-craft groups retain close-approach capability, and Pirate Action Groups can still board and divert merchant vessels as monsoon restrictions have dissipated. Additional small boat approaches are likely in the western Gulf of Aden and the IRTC; MSCIO continues to advise strict adherence to BMP-MS.

5F. Southern Red Sea / Bab el Mandeb

The threat level remains SUBSTANTIAL, with deliberate attacks considered a strong possibility.

Outlook: Houthi messaging consistently frames the 20 July maritime blockade as selective against assets considered as Israeli-, Saudi-, or Yemeni internationally recognized government-linked. Houthi forces retain coastal presence and strike capability along the southern Red Sea approaches following Sept territorial gains.

Disclosure of voyage information in response to Houthi communications (HOCC) may increase targeting risk. U.S. MARAD Advisory 2026-013 advises U.S.-flagged commercial vessels to disregard Houthi instructions to activate AIS or submit voyage information and to report such contacts.

Retaliatory action against Saudi-, Israeli- or Yemeni government-linked shipping remains possible. Houthi long-range missile and drone capability against the waterway is retained despite limited government gains since Houthi drone and missile capabilities persist from inland positions even without verified coastal dominance. Attacks in the wider area remain a strong possibility but expansion into indiscriminate targeting of all commercial shipping remains unlikely. Traffic will continue at reduced but stable levels.

Mariners should maintain heightened security postures, implement speed and timing mitigation, minimize predictable AIS behavior in the narrows, and prepare for short-notice navigational directives.

5G. Somali Coast and Somali Basin

The threat level remains MODERATE, with deliberate attacks considered possible but not likely.

Outlook: Pirate Action Group (PAG) activity persists across the Somali Coast and Somali Basin. The 13 Nov hijacking of a fishing vessel (MSCIO 179/26) demonstrates that armed groups retain the capability to seize vessels in Somali coastal waters; fishing vessels and dhows remain exposed to further approaches, and hijacked vessels may be used to extend PAG range offshore. Residual opportunistic piracy risk persists in nearshore Somali waters and the Gulf of Aden, where small-boat activity remains feasible. PAGs retain the capability to board and divert merchant vessels along the Somali coast, IRTC approaches, and adjacent Gulf of Aden lanes.

PAGs range is likely to extend across the northern Somali Basin towards the shipping routes east and south of Socotra; approaches to merchant vessels further offshore are a possibility.

5H. Northern Red Sea / Suez (No change)

The threat level remains MODERATE, with deliberate attacks considered possible but not likely.

Outlook: Periodic EMI and GNSS disruptions are likely to continue in the area. Minimal AIS usage at Yanbu berths and approaches is expected to persist. The Suez Canal will remain operable in both directions with no interruption.

5I. Eastern Mediterranean (No change)

The threat level remains LOW, with deliberate attacks considered highly unlikely.

Outlook: A security incident against merchant shipping is highly unlikely, with EMI/GNSS as the principal published hazard to merchant shipping; GNSS interference on the Levant coast will continue.

Naval presence remains, and vessels should maintain prudent separation from military units. No change – consistent with the persistent baseline.

ANNEXES

Transit comparisons

CARGO VESSELS TRANSITS COMPARISON


Date	08-Nov	09-Nov	10-Nov	11-Nov	12-Nov	13-Nov	14-Nov
SoH E	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
SoH W	0	0	1	2	0	0	0
SoH Total	**1**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**0**	**0**	**1**
BAM NW	8	10	7	5	6	7	7
BAM SE	10	10	6	2	5	10	4
BAM Total	**18**	**20**	**13**	**7**	**11**	**17**	**11**


TANKERS (ALL TYPES) TRANSITS COMPARISON

Date	08-Nov	09-Nov	10-Nov	11-Nov	12-Nov	13-Nov	14-Nov
SoH E	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SoH W	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
SoH Total	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
BAM NW	3	6	4	2	6	6	5
BAM SE	5	7	5	2	4	3	4
BAM Total	**8**	**13**	**9**	**4**	**10**	**9**	**9**

** Metrics are drawn from two separate sources: S&P Maritime / SeaVision data reflecting non-facilitated vessel traffic above 1,000 deadweight tons, excluding vessels calling Iranian ports adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.*

UKMTO transits (Updated 12 Nov)





UKMTO Strait of Hormuz – Latest incidents (Updated 12 Nov)



UKMTO VRA AIS Anomalies (Updated 12 Nov)



Non-Geofeasible AIS Positions 30-Day Hexbin Aggregation ICOD: 12/11/26 00:01UTC



Non-Geofeasible AIS Positions 7-Day Hexbin Aggregation ICOD: 12/11/26 00:01UTC